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Abstract
In the scope of four related essays this thesis analyses the Chinese domestic coal sector
and coal trade policies and their respective impact on international steam coal trade
economics. In particular, the thesis investigates the role of domestic transport infras-
tructure investment policies as well as Chinese coal export and import controls and the
potential exertion of market power through such trade instruments. For this purpose,
several spatial equilibrium models have been developed that enable simulation runs to
compare different policy scenarios. These models also permit ex-post analyses to em-
pirically test hypotheses of non-competitive market conduct of individual players under
the assumption of Cournot behaviour. These model-based analyses yield, among others,
the following findings:
If coal is converted into electricity early in the Chinese energy supply chain, worldwide
marginal costs of supply are substantially lower than if coal is transported via railway.
This can reduce China’s dependence on international imports significantly. Allocation of
welfare changes, particularly in favor of Chinese consumers while rents of international
producers decrease.
If not only seaborne trade but also interactions and feedbacks between domestic coal
markets and international trade markets are accounted for, trade volumes and prices of a
China - Indonesia duopoly fit the real market outcome best in 2008. Real Chinese export
quotas have been consistent with simulated exports under a Cournot-Nash strategy.
Uncertainties with regard to future Chinese coal demand and coal sector policies generate
significant costs for international investors and lead to a spatial and temporal reallocation
of mining and infrastructure investments. The potential exertion of Chinese demand side
market power would further reduce the overall investment activity of exporters.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Strategic trade and resource policies have been known to exist in energy resource markets
for decades. The most prominent example is the formation of OPEC in 1960 and the
ensuing oil crises in the ’70s. After a return to relative calm waters during the ’80s and
’90s, the first decade of the new millennium has seen strong price increases and high
price volatility, not only for oil, but as well for gas and coal.
The unprecedented price shocks for steam coal1 since 2007 and 2008 have been a truly
novel phenomena in a market which had been characterised by long-term contracts,
stable prices and practically nonexistent financial markets (IEA, 2011b, Ritschel, 2011).
Until recently, the actual international steam coal trade was practically negligible, as
most of it was directly used in mine-mouth coal-fired power plants or in other parts of
the same nation. Seaborne steam coal trade in 1985 accounted for only 142 mt, or 5%,
of global production.
However, international trade has grown significantly in recent years, reaching almost 600
mt in 2010 (IEA, 2011a). The majority of growth took place in the Pacific portion of the
market. The main driver behind this evolution has been the rapidly growing demand for
energy in South-East Asian economies, most importantly in China. Coal is of pivotal
importance to the Chinese energy system, as around 80% of electricity generation and
65% of primary energy demand are coal based. Due to rapid economic growth, hard coal
demand in China almost tripled between 2000 and 2010. While Chinese coal reserves
1The classification of hard coal (distinct from lignite) comprises steam coal and coking coal. Steam
coal (or thermal coal) is mainly used in electricity generation, whereas coking coal is used for metallurgical
purposes.
1
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are officially plentiful, mining operations have moved further inland and pits are getting
deeper due to rapid exploitation of the best deposits.
China has been evolving into a key player in the global coal market, first as an exporter,
and then, since the market shaking shift in 2009, as the second largest importer of
steam coal. Chinese steam coal production and consumption reached 2700 mt and 2800
mt in 2010, respectively, almost five times the size of global steam coal trade market.
Thus, diminutive changes in the domestic Chinese coal market can leverage strongly
with global trade markets which potentially increases volatility of international coal
prices. There are several current developments in the Chinese coal sector that affect coal
demand and might have strong effects on imports and exports: The Chinese coal industry
is undergoing a period of large-scale consolidation, during which several so-called coal
power bases are established throughout coal bearing provinces by the major state-owned
mining companies each with more than 100 mt of production capacity (Wuyuan and
Peng, 2011). Also, the Chinese government plans the large-scale exploitation of the most
Western coal resources in the province of Xinjiang, which also might have significant
repercussions on Chinese imports once these new capacities are available. The possible
range of future imports or exports is thus very broad and highly uncertain and depends
on the amount of future economic growth, energy efficiency and energy diversification
in China (IEA, 2011c).
Another development which affects Chinese imports and exports is its tight control over
trade streams which the Chinese government established several years ago. Coal exports
have been subject to an export quota and special export licenses which are determined
by the government on a biannual level. Import taxes have reached 17% for foreign coal
shipments in 2010 and are also revised frequently. Such trade controls can also be found
for several other key resources, such as the famous rare earths. Additionally, the Chinese
government has proclaimed that it plans to introduce similar controls for gas and oil in
the near future (IEA, 2011b).
Several questions regarding the global coal market economics arise from this situation
which will be investigated in the scope of this thesis. Firstly, how are Chinese imports
and exports affected by domestic coal sector policies? How strongly does this feed
back into global trade market prices? This question is of special importance to many
OECD countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan or South Korea that procure the
overwhelming majority of their coal needs on the global trade market. Secondly, does
the tight Chinese control of imports and exports serve conservation of its domestic coal
resources or maximisation of national rent inflows from resource exports? As the largest
steam coal producer and consumer by far and as one of the major players in steam coal
trade with a partly state-owned coal industry, China has significant potential to exert
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market power. Thirdly, How are investments of other major coal exporters affected
by uncertain future Chinese import and export developments and potential exertion of
market power? Even though Asian coal demand is most likely going to grow further, the
higher price volatility due to Chinese import fluctuations makes it more risky to invest
into fixed long-term assets, such as coal export facilities and mines.
1.2 Modelling spatial market equilibria
In the scope of this thesis, it is analysed how Chinese coal sector policies and market
conduct assumptions affect global coal markets. We estimate the impact of such policies
by investigating their implications for the equilibrium of the global coal market. A major
characteristic of the global coal market which affects equilibrium in a fundamental way
is the spatial separation of coal supply and demand and the associated transport costs.
Costs for inland transportation and seaborne haulage can easily make up more than
50% of total costs of coal supply (see Figure 1.1). This makes it essential to respect
the spatial economics while analysing coal markets. A common approach to analysing
the impact of policy changes or market power is to use spatial equilibrium modelling
techniques.
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Figure 1.1: Breakdown of coal supply costs to North-Western European ports (Source:
IEA, 2011b).
Modelling spatial market equilibria has been an active area of research since the early
1950s2. First discussions focussed on solving transportation problems with fixed de-
mand and supply, applying the, at this time, modern methods of linear programming
2A comprehensive discussion of spatial market modelling for commodity goods can be found in (Labys
and Yang, 1997).
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(Hitchcock, 1941, Kantorovich, 1942, Koopmanns, 1949). Enke (1951) provided a frame-
work for solving the spatial equilibrium using analogies from load flow laws. Samuelson
(1952) showed in a seminal work that Enke’s model could be cast into a mathematical
programme by maximising net social payoff and that the dual variables of the programme
could be interpreted as equilibrium prices. He also showed that, in the case that demand
is a fixed point, minimising transport costs yields the same solution as maximising net
social payoff. This case yields the classical Hitchkock-Kantorovich-Koopmanns transport
problem known from textbook literature (Dantzig, 1963):
minxij
∑
ij tijxij
s.t.:
∑
j xij ≤ ai,
∑
i xij ≥ bj , xij ≥ 0,
where ai is the capacity constraint of plant i, bj is demand in market j, tij are the
transportation costs between i and j and xij are the transport flows. Takayama and
Judge (1964) reformulated Samuelson’s model to a case where demand and supply costs
where not constant but described by linear functions. They showed that the spatial
equilibrium can be derived by solving a quadratic programme and provided a discus-
sion of existence, regularity and uniqueness of the solution. This advance significantly
expanded application possibilities and a rich stream of empirical analyses, mostly from
the agricultural and energy sector, followed3.
However, spatial modelling techniques had thus far assumed a competitive behaviour
of all market actors which was perceived to be often not a good representation of real
market conduct. Modelling non-competitive markets required other methods than op-
timisation techniques, as they do not allow to solve optimisation problems of multiple
market players simultaneously. Advances in algorithms dating back to Lemke (1965)
led to an increasing usage of complementarity models in spatial economics as they are
able to specifically account for strategic behaviour of individual players. Complemen-
tarity models exploit the duality concept of the complementary slackness condition in
mathematical programmes (Cottle et al., 1992). These models enable one to simultane-
ously solve the optimisation problems of several market players by directly formulating
and solving a set of equilibrium conditions which are derived from the Lagrangian of
the original problem. The vector which solves the bundled equilibrium conditions of all
players represents the equilibrium for the market. The complementarity formulation has
shown to be immensely useful in economic analysis as it provides a tractable framework
for oligopolistic competition and other (non-) cooperative games. In spatial market eco-
nomics, Kolstad and Abbey (1984) and Kolstad and Burris (1986) were among the first
to use the linear complementarity approach to solve non-cooperative simultaneous-move
3For an overview of empirical analyses see for example (Labys, 1999).
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games in agricultural and resource markets. Harker (1986a) provided a general frame-
work for modelling spatial non-cooperative n-player games as linear complementarity
problems (LCP) and described appropriate solution procedures.
LCPs and non-linear complementarity problems (NLCP), problems which include non-
linear inequalities, belong to a broader class of problems called mixed complementarity
problems (MCP). This class encompasses also problems which include not only inequal-
ities but also equations. In its generalised form, MCPs can be understood as sets of
variational inequalities and a significant amount of research has been committed to this
field regarding existence, uniqueness, and sensitivity of solutions (Harker and Pang,
1990). An MCP is defined as:
Given: f : RN → RN , l, u ∈ RN ,
Find: z, w, v ∈ RN ,
s.t.: F (z)− w + v = 0,
l ≤ z ≤ u, w ≥ 0, v ≥ 0,
wT (z − l) = 0, vT (u− z) = 0,
and −∞ ≤ l ≤ u ≤ +∞ (Rutherford, 1995). Several conditions must be satisfied in
order to guarantee solvability with state-of-the-art methods4. The advantage of the
MCP format is that it can express a broad range of economic problems. For example,
the reformulation of the classical transport problem in MCP format is:
∑
j xij ≤ ai, λi ≥ 0, λi
(
ai −
∑
j xij
)
= 0, ∀i,∑
i xij ≤ bj , µj ≥ 0, µj (bj −
∑
i xij) = 0, ∀j,
λi + tij ≥ µj , xij ≥ 0, xij (λi + tij − µj) = 0, ∀i, j,
where λi is the dual variable for the capacity constraint and µj is the dual variable for the
demand constraint. The LCP of the linear programming problem thus directly states the
equilibrium condition that will hold if the associated optimisation programme is solved.
This means, in this case, that in the competitive equilibrium demand prices equal prices
in the supply node plus transport costs if xij ≥ 0. However, it would be of limited use to
apply the complementarity format for problems which can be expressed as optimisation
programmes, a property which Takayama and Judge (1971) call an integrable model.
Especially in the linear case, algorithms can usually solve optimisation programmes
much faster. A typical example of an economic model which is not integrable is a non-
cooperative spatial market game in which suppliers simultaneously set their quantities
4Among others, F has to be continuously differentiable. Sufficient conditions for convergence of
algorithms place additional restrictions on F (see: Harker and Pang, 1990).
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a´ la Cournot. The maximisation problem for each player i in such a setting can be
formulated as:
maxxij ,xi
∑
j pj
(∑
i′ xi′j
)
xij − Ci(xi)−
∑
j tijxij
s.t. :
∑
j xij ≤ xi (λi),
where pj is a monotonically decreasing continuous inverse demand function of market j,
xi is the production volume of i and Ci is a non-decreasing continuous cost function. As
each player i has to solve this maximisation problem simultaneously, the solution to this
market game cannot be derived by a single optimisation problem. However, the game
can be solved in its complementarity format by deriving the equilibrium conditions from
the Lagrangian of each player’s optimisation problem:
∑
j xij ≤ xi, λi ≥ 0, λi
(∑
j xij − xi
)
= 0,
pj(.) ≤ −∂pj(.)∂xij xij + tij − λi, xij ≥ 0, xij
(
pj(.) +
∂pj(.)
∂xij
xij − tij + λi
)
= 0, ∀j
−C ′(xi)− λi ≤ 0, λi ≥ 0, xi (−C ′(xi)− λi) = 0.
The well-known feature of the Cournot model is the zero conjectural variation assump-
tion
∂xi′j
∂xij
= 0 for all i 6= i′. In this case the term ∂pj(.)∂xij simplifies to p′j
(∑
i′ xi′j
)
, which
is nothing other than the slope of the inverse demand function. The solution to the
game is given by the vector that solves the equilibrium conditions for all players simul-
taneously. The solution in this case is a Nash equilibrium, as no player has the incentive
to individually deviate from its chosen strategy. The complementarity format thus is a
powerful tool to model strategic behaviour in markets. Due to the existence of efficient
solution algorithms (e.g.: Ferris and Munson, 1998), this format has been used in many
recent empirical market structure studies as for example in Graham et al. (1999), Chen
et al. (2006), Lise and Krusemann (2008) or Egging et al. (2010).
Several arguments support that the Cournot assumption is quite appropriate for inves-
tigating market conduct in the global coal market: Assuming competition in volumes
seems to be appropriate because mining companies manage their collieries by setting
production targets and several large national players such as China and Indonesia issue
coal production and export volume targets which their domestic coal industries have
to meet (or not exceed). While mid- to long-term contracts exist, their share has been
dwindling in recent years as especially China sells and procures only on spot markets.
The absence of such dominating long-term index-priced contracts, as can be found in
natural gas market, also speaks for competition in volumes.
The simultaneous move assumption also is appropriate, because until now no individual
coal market player has achieved such a dominant market position in which he knows
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and also processes the reaction functions of all other players ex-ante as required by a
sequential-move game setup.
Other researchers such as Abbey and Kolstad (1983) and Haftendorn and Holz (2010)
followed a similar argumentation and also relied on the Cournot model for analysing the
coal market’s structure in their works. In the scope of the Chapters 3 to 5, which focus
on the analysis of market conduct, we will therefore test for Cournot competition in the
global coal trade.
1.3 Thesis outline
The main part of the thesis consists of four essays which are all analysing different facets
of the impact of Chinese coal sector policy on global coal market economics. Each essay
is represented by a chapter and can be read fairly independently, although they are
related to each other.
The essay in Chapter 2 covers a scenario analysis for different coal transport strategies
in China and possible repercussions on world trade using a dynamic equilibrium model.
It has been published in (Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011) and I have been the leading author
of the paper.
Chapters 3 and 4 are interlinked, as they both contain a static analysis of non-competitive
coal market behaviour. This strand of research was developed jointly with Johannes
Tru¨by. In Chapter 3, we conduct a market structure analysis which focuses on the
main exporters of the international steam coal trade market. The corresponding pa-
per is (Tru¨by and Paulus, 2011) and I have been a contributing author. In Chapter
4, we expand our previous market structure analysis as we also include domestic coal
markets and differing test scenarios. This approach expands results from Chapter 3
and yields some interesting conclusions regarding the economic consistency of Chinese
export quota volumes. This work has been published in (Paulus et al., 2011) and I have
been the leading author of the paper.
Chapter 5 is based on the former market power analyses and expands them to a dynamic
setting. In this essay, I investigate the impact of uncertain future imports and potential
market power on investment decisions of other market players. This essay has been
published in (Paulus, 2012) and I am the sole contributor. The main body of the thesis
is organised as follows:
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In the essay in Chapter 2: Coal lumps vs. electrons: How do Chinese bulk en-
ergy transport decisions affect the global steam coal market?, we demon-
strate the ways in which different Chinese bulk energy transport strategies affect the
future steam coal market in China and in the rest of the world. An increase in Chinese
demand for steam coal will lead to a growing need for additional domestic infrastruc-
ture as production hubs and demand centres are spatially separated. Coal transport
has so far been mostly handled by railways. However, railway transportation becomes
more and more costly as mining operations move to the west of China, due to the
cheapest deposits getting exhausted. If domestic railway transport capacity is available
only at elevated costs, Chinese power generators may turn to the global trade markets
and increase steam coal imports. Increased Chinese imports could then yield signifi-
cant changes in steam coal market economics on a global scale. Applying direct current
electricity transmission in combination with mine-mouth coal-fired power plants could
potentially reduce Chinese coal supply costs and make investments into rich, yet very
distant coal deposits in the west of China attractive. In fact, the 11th and 12th Five-Year
Plan of China already features plans to transport electricity, not mass. Nevertheless,
these plans do not seem to have been pursued in earnest until today. To analyse the
impact of this transport strategy, we conduct a scenario analysis and compare a setting
in which coal is mainly transported by railway with a setting in which coal energy is
transported in the form of electricity to assess the long-term change of costs in the coal
sector. For this purpose, we develop a spatial equilibrium model for the global steam
coal market. The model is dynamic in the sense that we project the coal market until
2030 in both scenarios and that we account for endogenous capacity investments. Costs
of capacity investments have to be covered by the sum of future discounted scarcity
rents. The market is represented as a network in which supply regions, demand hubs,
and export terminals are represented by nodes and transport routes by arcs. The model
delivers the cost minimal allocation of investments and the corresponding dispatch of
coal trade flows. One major finding is that when coal is converted into electricity early
in the supply chain, worldwide marginal costs of supply are lower than when coal is
transported via railway. Furthermore, China’s dependence on international imports is
significantly reduced in this context. Allocation of welfare changes particularly in favour
of Chinese consumers while rents of international producers decrease. However, to give
a good chance of rapid realisation of such a large-scale national infrastructure project,
the national government would have to cut into the well-established web of local deci-
sion makers and form a central energy planning institution which has enough executive
power.
The discussion in Chapter 3: Market structure scenarios in international
steam coal trade, deals with the non-competitive market behaviour of players in the
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steam coal trade market. Several market fundamentals changed in the last years, which
may have lead to the exertion of market power; demand has grown fast, important new
players have emerged, and since 2007 prices have increased significantly and remained
relatively high. Several nations have started to tighten their control of their coal exports
and consortia consisting of large multinational mining companies control vital bottle-
necks in the global coal supply chain. We analyse static spatial steam coal trade market
equilibria during the years 2006 and 2008. We test for two possible market structure
scenarios: perfect competition and an oligopoly setup with major exporters simulta-
neously competing in quantities (Cournot-Nash strategies). For modelling oligopolistic
behaviour, we derive the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and insert a term in the pricing equa-
tion of each oligopolist which accounts for its conjecture about how exports of other
players change, given a change in its own output. We then compare price levels and
trade flows with the reference values in both years. We find that the assumed oligopoly
scenario cannot explain market equilibria for any year. While we find that the com-
petitive model simulates market equilibria well in 2006, the competitive model is yet
not able to reproduce real market outcomes in 2008. The analysis shows that not all
available supply capacity was utilised in 2008. The elasticity analysis also confirms that
a Cournot market structure for trade market players is not able to explain the market
outcome in 2008 satisfactorily. However, objections regarding competition in steam coal
trade remain; Indonesia and China have recently developed national coal strategies that
give their national authorities tighter control over production and exports and thus the
potential to restrict exports. Both countries have intervened in resource markets be-
fore - Indonesia as a former member of OPEC and China as the dominant supplier of
rare earth elements. We conclude that either unknown capacity bottlenecks or more
sophisticated non-competitive strategies were the cause for the high prices in 2008.
In Chapter 4: Nations as strategic players in global commodity markets:
Evidence from world coal trade, we expand upon our analysis from Chapter 3
by explicitly accounting for integrated seaborne trade and major domestic markets and
testing different non-competitive setups. We explore the hypothesis that export policies
and trade patterns of national players in the steam coal market are consistent with
non-competitive market behaviour. We test this hypothesis by expanding the model
from Chapter 3 to an equilibrium model which is able to model coal producing nations
as strategic players who maximise a payoff function which is the sum of producer and
consumer surplus plus export revenues. The model also implements a true graph theory
design in which path variables are used to represent individual players’ flows through
the network. The global steam coal market is then simulated under several imperfect
market structure setups focusing on the non-competitive market behaviour of China
and Indonesia, two of the largest players in the market with the tightest control on
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export regimes. Using several non-parametrical tests and other statistics to validate
model results we find that trade flows and prices in a China - Indonesia duopoly fit
the real market outcome best. Additionally, real-world Chinese export quotas in 2008
were consistent with simulated exports under a Cournot-Nash strategy. Our analysis
also shows that China has the potential to act as a cushion against global coal demand
shocks, were it to act competitively. However, we can reject the assumption of perfect
competition. China may pursue a trade policy of withholding domestic capacity from the
global market, driving up international coal prices and avoiding domestic price increases.
Thus, it is crucial to account not only for coal trade markets, but also for the domestic
markets respecting their interactions and feedbacks if one analyses potential market
power in global commodity markets.
In the essay in Chapter 5: How are investment decisions in the steam coal
market affected by demand uncertainty and buyer-side market power?,
we analyse how profitablity of new investments of international mining companies may
be affected through uncertain future Chinese coal consumption and coal imports. we
develop a dynamic multi-stage stochastic equilibrium model which is able to simulate
investments under uncertainty and market power a´ la Cournot. Main coal exporting
countries are modelled as investors which have to decide on investments into coal ex-
port capacities before Chinese coal demand is revealed. Risky demand is represented in
extensive form, meaning it can be represented through a scenario tree. We specifically
account for risk aversion on the exporter’s side by letting them price the systematic risk
of their investments consistent with CAPM theory. Haurie et al. (1990) showed that
such a stochastic equilibrium programming approach yields a special class of strategies
which the authors call S-adapted open-loop. This solution concept is situated between
the open-loop and the closed-loop equilibrium solution and, while it is still not subgame
perfect, can be useful in analysing long term supply and demand decisions under un-
certainty without running into the computational challenges of determining closed-loop
strategies. The S-adapted open-loop concept has been employed in several recent articles,
such as (Genc et al., 2007) or (Pineau and Murto, 2003). Using this stochastic investment
model, we investigate a scenario in which China behaves as a price taker and another
scenario where China exerts market power. As China has changed to become one of the
largest net importers of coal since 2009, we focus on the effects of demand side market
power (although supply side market power is accounted for). We find that accounting
for Chinese demand uncertainty generates significant costs for investors compared to the
perfect foresight benchmark and also leads to a spatial and temporal reallocation of in-
vestments. If we also account for Chinese demand side market power, overall investment
activity is lower. Furthermore, the value of perfect information for China increases if it
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behaves as a monopolistic player as investments become more costly in the stochastic
model due to the risk aversion of investors.

Chapter 2
Coal lumps vs. electrons: How do
Chinese bulk energy transport
decisions affect the global steam
coal market?
2.1 Introduction
Steam coal5 sourcing and costs have not presented a real challenge during the last
decades. However, this situation could change. The center of gravity and price setting
in the global steam coal trade market have been shifting to Asia since 2005 (Ritschel,
2011). An important driver for the future evolution of steam coal market economics
will be China as Chinese demand today already makes up 45% of the global market
volume6. Established energy projections show that Chinese demand will rise by 80% to
130% until 2035 compared to 2007 levels (EIA, 2010b).
In addition to the challenges of providing an additional 2 billion tonnes of steam coal
mining capacity until 2030 and significantly increasing exploration efforts to generate
proven, marketable reserves, the main challenge is that steam coal supply and demand
are spatially separated in China (Minchener, 2007). The majority of the country’s
5Steam coal is hard coal of bituminous and sometimes subituminous or anthracite quality which is
almost exclusively used in electricity generation.
6The global steam coal market is defined as total global steam coal production and demand worldwide
including domestic markets. The global steam coal trade market on the other hand consists of the
internationally traded volumes (mostly by sea transport) which only make up a small fraction of the
global market. The global steam coal trade market volume was 658 mt while the global steam coal
market volume was 5000 mt in 2009 (IEA, 2011a).
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coal reserves lie in the North-central Chinese provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi and Inner
Mongolia as well as far in the west, in the province of Xinjiang. Inland transport
distances from these regions to the coastal demand centers around Beijing, Hong Kong
and Shanghai total up to 3500 km. Coal transport in China mainly takes place by
rail, river barges and coastal shipping, which significantly increases costs of supply to
the coastal demand centers. Approximately 60% of Chinese coal output was hauled via
railway along distances of more than 500 kilometers to coal-fired power plants in 2005
(CCII, 2006). Transport costs make up more than half of delivered costs for domestic
coal in the southern provinces. Chinese demand centers are located along the coast and
have the opportunity to procure steam coal volumes on the global trade market. Thus,
high domestic transport costs combined with rising mining costs have recently led to an
increase in foreign steam coal imports (Ritschel, 2011).
Future Chinese steam coal demand can be satisfied either through additional domestic
steam coal production or by significantly increasing steam coal imports. One important
driver for determining the Chinese supply mix is the future domestic transport costs
between the coal-bearing regions in North-Central China and the coastal areas.
The primary energy carrier coal can be transported via railway or can be converted
on-site to electricity which is then transported via HVDC lines to the main consuming
regions. Currently, China mainly relies on railway expansion projects to significantly
increase its coal transport capacity (Minchener, 2004, Sagawa and Koizumi, 2007) from
the West to the Eastern regions. Even though China has been able to rapidly expand
its railway infrastructure during recent years to cope with the majority of the rising coal
transport, railway transport is comparatively expensive (Minchener, 2004).
Another transport option for China is investment into large-scale HVDC transmission in
combination with mine-mouth coal-fired power plants in the North-Central coal-bearing
provinces. Such an energy transport system could significantly reduce variable trans-
port costs and could supply coal-based energy to the Chinese coastal demand centers.
Unfortunately, large-scale deployment has so far been hindered by weak central energy
planning institutions as well as regulatory schemes that provide few incentives for Chi-
nese grid companies to invest in power transmission (APERC, 2008, MIT, 2007).
Nevertheless, the need for a coherent domestic energy transport strategy remains press-
ing, particularly regarding the continuing consolidation process in the Chinese coal in-
dustry (Wuyuan and Peng, 2011). Initiated by national reform efforts to enhance work
safety and efficiency of the entire industry, recent policy implementation has led to the
closing or merging of small and inefficient coal mines, thus improving economies of scale
(NDRC, 2007, Zhao and Creedy, 2008). Consequently, the share of small coal mines in
total domestic production dropped significantly from 19.9% (342 mt) in 2003 to 2.1% (55
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mt) in 2008 (CCII, 2008). In addition to the permanent increases in national coal trade
volume in recent years, this might have proven to be an additional burden to the preva-
lent energy transport system, since the restructuring process results in a concentration
of production in remote regions in the North and North West of China (Lester and Ste-
infeld, 2006). Taking these implications of the policy of increased efficiency in the coal
industry into account, setting up HVDC transmission lines might as well be regarded as
a logical extension in an overall strategy for improvement of energy efficiency.
The analysis focuses on the two effects of the two outlined bulk energy transport in-
vestment strategies in China: firstly, how is the future Chinese steam coal supply mix
affected by different bulk energy transport modes? Secondly, what are the implica-
tions of the change in the Chinese coal supply mix for the world steam coal market?
Hence, the paper will look at the future Chinese coal supply mix, at the global long-run
marginal costs of steam coal in China and several important world market regions, at
the worldwide mining investments and utilisation as well as at the global welfare effects.
To analyse these parameters, a spatial equilibrium model which minimises total costs of
global steam coal demand coverage is developed and presented. This global modelling
approach makes it possible to obtain answers to the proposed research questions, in-
cluding feedbacks and interdependencies between worldwide market actors. The model
is validated for reference years 2005 and 2006. Then, two scenarios for possible future
transport infrastructure investment decisions in China are investigated: one scenario
assumes further investment in railroad transport to move coal energy to the demand
centers. The second scenario assumes large-scale investment in HVDC transmission
lines combined with mine-mouth coal-fired power plants and transmission of electricity
to the demand hubs. Then, steam coal flows and marginal supply cost patterns for both
scenarios are projected up to 2030.
The remainder of the paper is structured to include seven sections: after a round-up of
relevant literature regarding supply cost modelling and coal market analyses in section
two, the current situation in the steam coal trade market will be shortly described in
section three. Then, the model is introduced in section four. Section five describes
the underlying dataset. Section six depicts the scenario assumptions, and section seven
reports model results. Section eight concludes the paper.
2.2 Related literature
The most obvious characteristic of the steam coal world market is its spatial structure.
Steam coal demand regions are not necessarily at the location of the coal fields (Ritschel,
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2011). Coal fields are dispersed widely over the globe, and internationally traded coal
is usually transported over long distances to satisfy demand.
Researchers have scrutinised the economics of such spatial markets in depth. In an
early approach, Samuelson (1952) combines new insights from operations research with
the theory of spatial markets and develops a model based on linear programming to
describe the equilibrium. Using marginal inequalities as first-order conditions, he models
a net social welfare maximisation problem under the assumption of perfect competition.
Based on Samuelson’s findings, Takayama and Judge (1964) developed an approach
that uses quadratic programming. Moreover, they present algorithms that are able
to efficiently solve such problems also in the multiple commodity case. Harker (1984,
1986a) is particularly concerned with imperfect competition on spatial markets. He
extends the monopoly formulation as presented by Takayama and Judge to a Cournot
formulation which yields a unique Nash equilibrium and suggests algorithms to solve
the generalised problems. Yang et al. (2002) develop conditions for the Takayama-
Judge spatial equilibrium model to collapse into the classical Cournot model. They
demonstrate that, in the case of heterogeneous demand and cost functions, the spatial
Cournot competition model is represented by a linear complementary program (LCP).
One research venue on steam coal market economics has centered on analysing market
conduct either in the global trade market (which only accounts for a fraction of the total
world wide market) or in regional markets. Abbey and Kolstad (1983) and Kolstad
and Abbey (1984) analyse strategic behaviour in international steam coal trade in the
early 1980s. In both articles, the authors’ model demonstrates an instance of a mixed
complementary problem (MCP), derived from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that
the modelled market participants face and a series of market clearing conditions. In
addition to perfect competition, they model different imperfect market structures. Labys
and Yang (1980) develop a quadratic programming model for the Appalachian steam
coal market under perfectly competitive market conditions including elastic consumer
demand. They investigate several scenarios with different taxation, transport costs,
and demand parameters and analyse the effect on steam coal production volumes and
trade flows. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) developed a model of the steam coal trade
market where they model exporting countries in a first scenario as Cournot players and
in a second scenario as competitive players. They found no evidence that exporting
countries exercised market power in the years 2005 and 2006.
Literature on how bulk energy transport modes influence underlying resource or electric-
ity markets is scarce, at best. However, related analyses of such effects on a regional level
exist: Quelhas et al. (2007a) and Quelhas et al. (2007b) develop a multi-period network
flow model for a one-year time period in the integrated energy system in the United
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States. They model system-wide energy flows, from the coal and natural gas suppliers
to the electric load centers and identify that actors can increase energy system efficiency
if they overcome informational and organisational barriers. Empirical studies include
for example Bergerson and Lave (2005), who investigate in a case study the lifecycle
costs and environmental effects for transporting coal-based energy between the Powder
River Basin (Wyoming) to Texas. They discovered that, depending on energy volumes
and utilisation of existing railway infrastructure, HVDC electricity transmission is a cost
efficient option for long distance transport. Oudalov and Reza (2007) describe a bulk en-
ergy transport model for technology assessment and comparative analysis of bulk energy
transport systems. They concluded that for long-distance transport early conversion of
coal into electricity and transmission with HVDC technologies demonstrates significantly
improvements over conventional overland transport. There has been no apparent pub-
lication so far on how large-scale infrastructure investments involving a combination of
HVDC lines and mine-mouth power plants influence the coal supply mix. None of the
mentioned articles venture into the feedbacks of coal energy transport decisions in China
and the global steam coal market including feedbacks of the global market. The goal
of this paper is to understand how different future bulk energy transport configurations
for China could shape the steam coal supply mix and market economics worldwide.
2.3 Structure of the global seaborne steam coal trade
Considerable changes have occurred during recent years in the market for steam coal.
The global seaborne hard coal trade market amounted up to 839 mt in 2008 - an increase
of 58% compared to the totals from the year 2000. The majority of global seaborne hard
coal trade consists of steam coal (639 mt in 2008). The seaborne trade market can be
divided into the Pacific market region and the Atlantic market region7.
The Pacific market basin saw a large increase not only in domestic production and
demand but also in seaward traded volumes (Table 2.1). This region has been surpassing
the Atlantic basin in terms of relative market size growth during the last few years.
On the supply side,Indonesia and Australia especially have significantly increased their
exports between 2000 and 2008. New players on the demand side have included India
and especially China, whose import volumes are growing rapidly.
The Atlantic market region is dominated by three large net exporters, Colombia, Russia
and South Africa (Table 2.2). The U.S. has been a swing supplier in the Atlantic basin,
7From a market integration perspective, the steam trade coal market can be considered well integrated
(Li, 2008, Warell, 2006). Nevertheless, this labeling is used in a qualitative way in the scope of this paper
to better structure our analysis of market actors.
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Table 2.1: Main players in the Pacific basin for 2008 in mt (Source: IEA, 2011a).
Country Production Consumption Import Export Net-Export
Indonesia 214.9 41.9 0 173 173
Australia 185.3 70 0 115.3 115.3
Vietnam 39.9 19.9 0 20.6 20.6
PR of China 2334 2340.1 34.2 42.7 8.5
India 461.9 491.7 30.9 1.1 -29.8
Taiwan 0 60.2 60.2 0 -60.2
Korea, South 2.8 80.9 75.5 0 -75.5
Japan 0 128.2 128.2 0 -128.2
and mid- to high-cost U.S. mines have been marginal suppliers for Europe in recent
years (Kopal, 2007). Main net importers are mostly found in Europe, with the United
Kingdom and Germany at the top. The overall demand for steam coal is likely to
stagnate or slowly decline due to carbon emission restrictions and public opposition.
The efforts to phase out of German coal mines by 2018 and the decline in Polish and
British coal production will counter or even overcompensate for this effect and will
most likely expose Germany, Poland and other Eastern European nations even more to
procurements from the world trade market (IEA, 2011a, Ritschel, 2011).
Table 2.2: Main players in the Atlantic basin for 2008 in mt (Source: IEA, 2011a).
Country Production Consumption Import Export Net-Export
Colombia 77.3 3.7 0.0 73.6 73.6
Russia 181.9 121.9 25.8 85.8 60.0
South Africa 234.2 172.9 2.9 61.3 58.4
Venezuela 8.8 2.4 0.0 6.4 6.4
United States 949.2 937.1 29.3 35.1 5.8
Brazil 0.2 6.6 6.4 0.0 -6.4
Denmark 0.0 7.1 7.6 0.2 -7.4
Netherlands 0.0 8.3 14.7 6.5 -8.2
Israel 0.0 12.8 12.8 0.0 -12.8
France 0.3 11.9 14.0 0.2 -13.8
Turkey 1.0 16.0 14.9 0.0 -14.9
Spain 7.3 20.8 17.6 1.8 -15.8
Italy 0.1 19.2 19.0 0.0 -19.0
Germany 8.6 45.3 36.9 0.6 -36.3
United Kingdom 16.2 50.2 37.4 0.4 -37.0
2.4 The model
The global steam coal market is modelled as a spatial intertemporal equilibrium model.
There are three types of model entities: mine owners, port operators and coal consumers.
Nodes representing port facilities, mine regions and demand regions are assigned to each
Chapter 2. Coal lumps vs. electrons: How do Chinese bulk energy transport decisions
affect the global steam coal market? 19
actor8. The nodes are interconnected by arcs representing inland transportation and
sea routes. It is assumed that there is perfect competition between all actors in the
market and that all regional markets are cleared in every period. Mine owners and port
operators decide on optimal levels of production, transport and investments in capacity.
Transport cost fees represent haulage tariffs which cover full costs9. The global steam
coal market is generally considered to be well integrated10.
2.4.1 Notation
In this section, the sets, parameters and variables used in the model formulation are
described. The time horizon of the model T = {2005, 2006, . . . , t, . . . , 2040} includes
one-year time periods from 2005 until 2015 and five-year time periods from 2015 to
204011. The model consists of a network NW (N,A), where N is a set of nodes and
A is a set of arcs between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into three
subsets N ≡ P ∪M ∪ I, where m ∈ M is a mining region, p ∈ P is an export terminal
and i ∈ I is a demand node. The three different roles of nodes are mutually exclusive
P ∩M ≡ P ∩ I ≡ I ∩M ≡ ∅. The set of arcs A ⊆ N ×N consists of arcs a(i,j) where
(i, j) is a tuple of nodes i, j ∈ N . Model parameters and variables are depicted in Table
2.3 and Table 2.4, respectively.
The mine production cost Cm,t is a potentially non-linear function of production volume
Sm,t and is modelled according to Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995). In their paper, the
authors present a production cost function for which the marginal supply cost curve has
an intercept αm,t ≥ 0, that then follows a linear trend with slope βm,t ≥ 0 until produc-
tion reaches almost capacity limit. As soon as the supply level approaches production
capacity limits, the marginal costs can increase exponentially depending on parameter
γm,t ≤ 0. The economic intuition behind using this functional form for marginal costs is
that prices during periods with higher demand are in reality often set by older mine de-
posits. Coal mining conditions decline over time as cumulated coal production increases
and the cheapest reserves have been exploited. Coal mines may push their production
capacity limits within a certain extent by increasing their labor and machinery inputs
8Besides the trade market, domestic markets in China and the U.S. with their respective mining
regions and demand regions are also modelled.
9In China for example, fees of state-operated railway companies include charges for the Railway
Construction Fund which contribute to investment costs for future railway projects.
10Empirical evidence for steam coal market integration is for example given in Li (2008) or Warell
(2006). Haftendorn and Holz (2010) find no empirical evidence for market power of exporting countries
in the international steam coal trade market for the years 2005 and 2006. However, it has so far not been
investigated whether single countries that control large state-owned mine enterprises may exert market
power through volumes or through taxes.
11Model results will only be analysed until 2030 to ensure stability of results
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Table 2.3: Model parameters.
Parameter Dimension Description
cI,Mm,t mn. USD2009/mtpa Investment costs in region m for mine investments
cI,Pp,t mn. USD2009/mtpa Investment costs in region p for port investments
Cm,t mn. USD2009/mt Mine production cost function in region m
cS,Mm,t mn. USD2009/mt Marginal mine production cost function in region m
cTa(i,j),t mn. USD2009/mt Specific transport costs on arc a(i,j)
CapMm,t mtpa Existing mine capacity in region m
CapM,maxm,t mtpa Max. mine capacity investment potential in mine region m
CapPp,t mtpa Port capacity in port p
cPp,t mn. USD2009/mt Specific turnover costs at port p
CapTa(i,j),t mtpa Transport capacity between node i and node j
Di,t mt Steam coal demand at import region i
dt - discount factor
above planned levels or by mining a coal seam that only becomes profitable if market
prices rise to certain levels.
The marginal supply cost function cS,Mm,t of Cmt is then defined as:
cm,t(Sm,t) = αm,t + βm,tSm,t + γm,t ln
(
CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′ − Sm,t
CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′
)
, (2.1)
for Sm,t ∈ [0, CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′) and αm,t, βm,t ≥ 0, γm,t ≤ 0.
Table 2.4: Model variables.
Variable Dimension Description
Sm,t mt Amount of supply in mine region m
IMm,t mtpa Mine capacity investment in mine region m
IPp,t mtpa Port capacity investment at export harbor p
Ta(i,j),t mt Total transport volume on arc a(i,j)
µn,t mn. USD2009/mt marginal costs of supply in node n
λm,t mn. USD2009/mt capacity scarcity rent in mining region m
p,t mn. USD2009/mt capacity scarcity rent for export terminal p
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2.4.2 Model formulation
The spatial equilibrium in the global steam coal market is modelled by minimising the
total discounted system costs under a set of restrictions. This formulation is the dual
problem within the welfare maximisation problem in spatial markets if demand elastic-
ities are set to zero and require that demand has to be satisfied in every period and
region. The resulting equilibrium corresponds to a perfectly competitive market with
marginal cost-based allocation at each model node n ∈ N and cost-based trade flows
and investments in the network. The objective function consists of terms for production,
transportation, turnover and investment costs that every producer and port operator
minimises with respect to satisfaction of demand. Producers sell their coal at export
terminals to exporters and traders who ship the coal via bulk carriers on a least-cost
basis to the demand centers. Turnover costs at coal export terminals are interpreted as
marginal costs. With the mentioned assumptions in mind, this corresponds to minimis-
ing the sum of all cost components:
min
x∈Ω
O(x) =
∑
t∈T
dt
[ ∑
m∈M
(
Cm,t(Sm,t) + c
I,M
m,t I
I,M
m,t
)
+
∑
a(i,j)∈A
cTa(i,j),tTa(i,j),t +
∑
p∈P
(
cPp,t
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t + c
I,P
p,t I
I,P
p,t
)]
, (2.2)
with the decision vector x = (Sm,t, Ta(i,j),t, I
M
m,t, I
P
p,t) and Ω being the set of all feasible
solutions. The objective function is convex, as cm,t is a convex function for γ ≤ 0
(which is always the case), and all other cost components are convex in their respecting
variables. The set of all feasible solutions Ω is constrained by a set of model constrains:
For mining nodes, steam coal production has to equal shipments to the export terminals:
Sm,t −
∑
p∈P
Ta(m,p),t = 0 (µm,t) ∀m, t. (2.3)
For port nodes, all inflows of steam coal from the mining regions have to match outgoing
volumes:
∑
m∈M
Ta(m,p),t −
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t = 0 (µp,t) ∀p, t. (2.4)
Steam coal shipped to the import regions has to match demand:
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∑
p∈P
Ta(p,i),t −Di,t = 0 (µi,t) ∀i, t. (2.5)
Mine production is restricted by mine capacity limits. However, endogenous mine in-
vestments are possible from 2011 onward:
Sm,t −
t∑
t′=2011
IMm,t′ − CapMm,t ≤ 0, (λm,t) ∀m, t. (2.6)
The same holds for port capacities:
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t −
t∑
t′=2011
IPp,t′ − CapPp,t ≤ 0, (φp,t) ∀p, t. (2.7)
Furthermore, mine capacity expansions are limited by geographical, geological, political
and economic parameters. While such potentials are hard to estimate, they are necessary
in order to prevent the most cost efficient mine regions from expanding beyond all
realistic bounds. Typical estimates can be derived from expert opinions and market
analyses. Maximum investment potential is based on Ritschel (2009) so that it is possible
to restrict:
t∑
t′=2011
IMm,t′ − CapM,maxm,t ≤ 0, (m,t) ∀m, t. (2.8)
The objective function and the restrictions (2.3) to (2.8) form the minimisation problem
WCM . WCM is a convex minimisation problem with a non-empty set of feasible
solutions. Such a model can be solved by standard non-linear programming solvers
available in the programming package GAMS12.
2.5 Database
To fully specify the model equations, data on costs and capacities are required. The
process of data acquisition is a challenging task in itself, as information on steam coal
markets is available only from a multitude of heterogeneous sources. While there are
12Another option is to programme the model in GAMS in the mixed complementarity format by
deriving its equilibrium conditions (for MCP programming with GAMS see also Rutherford (1995) or
Ferris and Munson (1998)). The equilibrium conditions can provide insights of what variables marginal
costs of supply are composed of. The necessary equilibrium conditions can be found in the appendix.
Both approaches yield the same optimal solution.
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some publications on steam coal markets available from public institutions like the IEA
((IEA, 2011a) or the EIA (EIA, 2007, 2010a,b), comprehensive information is espe-
cially obtained from the published reports of the IEA Clean Coal Center: e.g., Baruya
(2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008). Furthermore,
Ritschel (2011) and Schiffer and Ritschel (2007) are publishing annual reports on the
developments in the hard coal markets. Further publications include analyses from em-
ployees working for international utilities; for example, Bayer et al. (2009), Rademacher
(2008) and Kopal (2007). Industry yearbooks and governmental reports provide useful
information as in the case of China (CCII, 2007, CMR, 2010, NBS, 2008). National
statistics bureaus and mineral ministries provide high quality information; as for exam-
ple, ABARES (2011) and ABS (2006). Not mentioned is a larger number of coal com-
pany annual reports as well as information based on expert interviews. Furthermore, the
present analysis is based on several extensive research projects at the Institute of Energy
Economics at the University of Cologne. Tru¨by and Paulus (2010) calculates marginal
cost functions and freight costs for the international trade market for steam coal. This
analysis is based on these cost functions for the international trade market. Eichmu¨ller
(2010) derives mining and transportation cost estimates as well as mining capacities for
domestic markets in China and the U.S., which are used in the model within this paper.
To account for the varying steam coal qualities worldwide, the WCM converts mass
units into energy flows. All model outputs are therefore given in standardised energy-
mass units with one tonne equaling 25120,8 MJ (or 6000 kcal per kg). Information on
average energy content is based on IEA (2011a), Ritschel (2011) and BGR (2008).
2.5.1 Topology
Table 2.5 gives an overview of all 65 model nodes. To account for their dominant role
in the global steam coal market, domestic markets of China and the U.S. have been
explicitly modelled. Both countries together constitute around 75% of the global steam
coal market supply and demand. For all other mining regions, the export production
capacity is modelled as a residual of total production capacity minus domestic con-
sumption. Each export port can ship coal to each of the import regions. The term new
mine regions refers to mine-type nodes that represent still-untapped mining potential
in the respecting regions. Mining regions are connected by arcs which represent inland
transport infrastructure to the respective export ports in their country.
Transportation routes exist down the value stream from mining regions to the export
terminals and then to the demand centers. All together, 287 transport routes have been
modelled.
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Table 2.5: Model topology.
Mine regions Export terminals Demand regions New mine regions
QLD UG QLD North-western Europe Australia invest
QLD OC NSW Mediterranean Europe South Africa invest
NSW OG South Africa Japan Indonesia invest
NSW UC Indonesia South Korea Russia invest
South Africa OC Russia Baltic Taiwan Colombia invest
South Africa UG Russia Pacific India west coast USA invest
Indonesia Russia med India east coast Venezuela invest
Russia Donezk Colombia U.S. - North Atlantic China - Xinjiang invest
Russia Kuzbass China U.S. - South Atlantic PRC - Shaanxi invest
Colombia U.S. east coast U.S. - SE central
China - Shaanxi Venezuela U.S. - SW central
China - Shanxi Vietnam U.S. - Central
China - Shangdong U.S. - NW central
China - Henan U.S. - Western
China - IMAR Other Asia
China - other Brazil
U.S. - Northern App. Chile
U.S. - Southern App. China - Beijing
U.S. - Illinois basin China - Shanghai
U.S. - Northern PRB China - Hong Kong
U.S. - Southern PRB China - West
Venezuela China - North
Vietnam
2.5.2 Mining costs
Costs for mining include coal extraction costs, costs for coal processing and washing
as well as transportation costs within the coal pits. However, public information on
the cost breakdown is mostly (if at all) only available for mine mouth or free-on-board
costs. The data on mine mouth costs was obtained through annual reports of coal
companies, expert interviews and literature sources. The available data of mine mouth
cash costs and mine capacity is fitted to the marginal cost function described in section
4.3 by ordinary least squares (an overview of marginal mining costs can be found in the
appendix in Table A.1). In this way, it is possible to extract the characteristics and the
absolute level of the production costs for each mining region.
For the projection of marginal mining costs until 2030, future mining costs are calculated
by escalating the input factor prices for mining in accordance to their relative importance
in the production process. The relative importance of input factors is derived from a
number of sources. Table 2.6 gives an overview of the relevance of different input factors
on mine production costs in 2005. In underground mining mostly longwalling and room-
and-pillar technologies are applied. Open-cast mining sees dragline and truck-and-shovel
operations. For a more detailed description of mining technologies refer to Hustrulid
(1982) or Simpson (1999).
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Table 2.6: Input factors by relative importance for coal mining production costs in
2005 (Source: Tru¨by and Paulus, 2010).
in % Diesel Explosives Tyres Steel products Electricity Labor Chemicals
Room/Pillar 5-8 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-39 8-13
Longwalling 5-10 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-45 4-8
Dragline 14-18 15-20 5-10 22-28 5-12 18-32 1-4
Truck/Shovel 18-26 17-22 8-12 19-26 0-3 18-35 1-4
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Figure 2.1: Influence of different oil price projections (left) on the marginal mining
costs in Shanxi, China in 2030 (right).
Many of the relevant input factor prices for mining, including those for explosives, chem-
icals, and diesel, are correlated to the oil price. This is obvious, as the main production
input for explosives (in this case ANFOs: Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil), chemicals and
diesel used in coal mining is oil. Therefore, a high correlation of these input factor
prices with the oil price for the future is also assumed. The analysis is based on the
reference oil price projections published in EIA (2010b) as well as historical input factor
price evolutions to estimate future factor prices. This methodology enables us to get
consistent mining cost projections depending on different oil price projections. Figure
2.1 demonstrates how the oil price projections of the EIA for the ’high’, ’reference’ and
’low’ oil price cases influence marginal mine production costs for Shanxi (PR of China)
in the year 2030.
2.5.3 Demand
For the necessary demand projections up to 2030, hard coal demand growth projections
of EIA (2010b) are used. The growth projections were taken from the reference case.
Demand figures shown in Table 2.7 are absolute demand figures for China and the U.S.
For the other demand regions, these figures should be interpreted as import demand.
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Table 2.7: Demand figures in mt for 2005 and 2006 and demand projections until
2030 (Source: EIA, 2010b).
Region 2005 2006 2020 2030
Europe 168 181 168 166
Japan 126 119 104 98
South Korea 63 60 95 111
Taiwan 61 58 69 81
India 22 25 72 107
Latin America 10 11 18 22
the U.S. 990 978 914 968
People’s Republic of China 1761 1932 3127 4190
2.6 Scenario setup
In the scenario analysis, the feedbacks which two different Chinese bulk energy transport
strategies have on the coal supply mix in China and the kind of feedbacks that occur
on the global steam coal market are investigated. Bulk energy transport costs are an
important determinant for the competitiveness of Chinese steam coal supply in the
coastal demand centers where an opportunity for foreign coal imports exists. High
domestic transport costs could lead to increased amounts of steam coal imports. This
expansion of imports leads to higher global production and mines with higher costs
becoming price setting. The slope of the global steam coal supply function determines
how high the increase in marginal costs is.
Two scenarios are investigated: in the first scenario, it is assumed that current railway
expansion plans continue and that regulatory and organisational hurdles for large-scale
HVDC investments are not overcome. Additional coal transportation will then be han-
dled by investment into railway capacity between the coal-bearing provinces and the
coastal demand centers. In the second scenario, it is assumed that China rapidly over-
comes the current barriers for HVDC investment by developing efficient incentive regimes
for transmission operators and by empowering a national energy planning institution
which is able to coordinate stakeholders and execute such a nationwide infrastructure
project. Demand growth for coal transportation will therefore be covered by the instal-
lation of mine-mouth power plants in combination with HVDC transmission lines. Then
the analysis shows how these bulk energy transport configurations affect the future Chi-
nese steam coal supply and global steam coal market economics, focusing on marginal
cost effects and on mine investments. Welfare effects accrued in China and worldwide
between both scenarios including the investment cost of the HVDC transmission lines
will also be considered. Both scenarios can be interpreted as bounds for a possible range
of future market evolutions with regard to energy transport decisions in China.
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2.6.1 Scenario ’coal-by-train’
In the first scenario, called ’coal-by-train’, it is assumed that China will rely mainly
on additional railway capacity to transport the additional coal production from the
coal-bearing regions to the consumption areas. This will require massive amounts of
investments into railway tracks, engines, rolling stock and into the railway electricity
grid. The investments into transport capacity will mainly take place from the central
coal-bearing regions to Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing (Figure 2.2). While the mining
capacity limits in the central Chinese regions can still be further extended, many of the
mines are already operating deep underground at elevated costs. As Dorian (2005) and
Taoa and Li (2007) state, future prospects could lie in the desert province Xinjiang,
where coal reserves are plentiful and could still be mined in cost-efficient open-cast
operations. Therefore, further investments will take place between the western coal
fields in Xinjiang and the central provinces. This scenario is in line with a number of
railway expansion projects that have been issued by the Chinese government over the
course of recent years to cope with the rising coal transport demand (APERC, 2008,
Sagawa and Koizumi, 2007). While railway transportation tariffs are high, these tariffs
already include mark-ups for investment costs for railway expansion projects13.
2.6.2 Scenario ’coal-by-wire’
In the second scenario, called ’coal-by-wire’, it is assumed that, for new mine capacity
in Shaanxi and the Autonomous Republic of Inner Mongolia (IMAR), China will build
mine-mouth coal-fired power plants in combination with HVDC lines which transport
the electricity to the demand centers in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Mine-mouth
coal-fired power plants in combination with large-scale HVDC lines which transport elec-
tricity to the coastal demand centers already exist to some degree and are increasingly
the focus of Chinese grid planning authorities (Qingyun, 2005, Yinbiao, 2004). How-
ever, until now, long-range HVDC infrastructure from the West to the East has not been
expanded on a very large scale in China for several reasons: so far, transmission and dis-
tribution tariffs are not necessarily determined competitively or cost-based so that
the state-oriented grid companies have little direct incentive to increase infras-
tructure investment (APERC, 2008, Minchener, 2007). China lacks a central energy
planning institution necessary for the large-scale efficient realisation of HVDC grid in-
frastructure. Approval of large infrastructure investment projects is divided among
13Transporting one tonne of coal from Shanxi to Hong Kong costs about 36 USD/t by railway in 2005
(CMR, 2010). The Chinese Ministry of Railways publishes annually their tariff quotas and the main
components of these tariffs. They state one component for ”railway expansion projects” that reflects
the costs necessary to cover full operating costs, including investments.
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Figure 2.2: Topology of the scenario setup for China.
many different departments. The weakness of central Chinese institutions promotes the
assertion currently decisions regarding the energy system in China are often made on
the grass-roots level, which has so far partly hindered the fast implementation of HVDC
transmission lines (MIT, 2007).
The benefit of this approach is that the variable costs for transporting electricity via
HVDC lines are practically zero. However, electricity losses apply, which are up to
3% depending on transmission distances (Bahrmann and Johnson, 2007). The western
province of Xinjiang is not suited for direct HVDC line connection as it is an arid, almost
desert-like region. Therefore, it is unlikely that enough water for the cooling circuits of
large-scale coal-fired generation capacity will be available there. It is assumed in this
scenario that coal energy from Xinjiang will therefore be transported by a combination
of transport modes; first coal will be moved via railway to the mine-mouth power plants
in Shaanxi/IMAR. As a second step, the western coal will be burnt, and the generated
electricity will be transported with HVDC lines to the demand centers along the coast.
As only the steam coal market is modelled, all numbers on coal trade flows in the coal-
by-wire scenario from the new mining regions Shaanxi/IMAR invest and Xinjiang invest
to the demand regions have to be understood as electricity equivalents. These coal trade
flows are used in electricity generation at the mine-mouth power plants in Shaanxi/I-
MAR, and generated electricity is afterward transported via HVDC transmission to the
coastal demand centers.
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Table 2.8: Domestic steam coal transport costs for new-built mines in both scenarios.
2005 2020 2030
in USD2009/t by-wire by-train by-wire by-train
costs from new mines in
Shaanxi/IMAR invest to:
Hong Kong 36 0 59 0 69
Shanghai 26 0 43 0 53
Beijing 6 0 11 0 13
costs from Xinjiang invest
to:a
Hong Kong 67 51 85 59 108
Shanghai 59 51 74 59 95
Beijing 54 51 69 59 87
aNote that in the ’coal-by-wire’ scenario railway costs still apply for transporting coal volumes from
Xinjiang to the mine-mouth coal fired power plants in Shaanxi/IMAR.
2.6.3 Scenario parameters
Domestic transportation costs on the selected routes change between both scenarios as
HVDC lines operate with zero variable transport costs. This does not reflect full costs of
the HVDC lines, as costs are allocated typically to electricity consumers. Later, welfare
effects and the required HVDC investments will be compared. Secondly, transmission
losses caused by the long-distance electricity transmission will be accounted for. Table
2.8 shows how transport costs differ between both scenarios.
The parameter settings for production costs, demand, port costs and all other transport
costs remain unchanged in both scenarios. Regarding the assumptions of future oil price
evolution, the oil price projection of the reference case of EIA (2010b) is used in the
analysis.
2.7 Results
In this section, the main model results for the two analysed scenarios, coal-by-train and
coal-by-wire, will be outlined. The model is validated for the base years 2005 and 2006.
Then the effects of the different Chinese bulk energy transport configurations on the
future steam coal supply mix in China as well as on investments and welfare worldwide
for 2020 and 2030 are analysed. A comprehensive overview of model trade flows and
marginal costs for all model regions can be found in the appendix.
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Table 2.9: Steam coal production, imports and exports in China.
2005 2006 2020 2030
in mt Ref.a Model Ref.a Model by-wireb by-train by-wireb by-train
Shaanxi 154.4 143.8 184.9 149.5 132.2 171.1 177.0 177.0
Shanxi 426.7 417.6 454.9 478.3 540.8 605.6 650.5 662.9
Shandong 125.1 116.7 125.5 121.3 122.5 137.2 140.4 143.6
Henan 176.0 164.8 183.2 171.3 193.7 201.7 167.0 202.8
IMAR 165.3 198.1 192.1 207.7 185.0 210.7 228.4 246.1
China - Other 771.5 760.9 779.6 791.0 930.0 936.4 936.4 936.4
Shanxi invest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 659.9 639.1 1259.8 1220.1
Xinjiang invest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 397.8 45.6 758.9 355.9
Imports:
Indonesia 13.0 2.7 13.4 26.1 0.0 101.8 0.0 88.9
Australia 2.3 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 145.4 0.0 150.6
Chinac n/a 140.4 n/a 159.1 0.0 650.5 0.0 1155.4
Viet Nam 11.5 17.9 22.1 29.1 11.7 24.9 0.0 24.9
Exports:
South Korea 18.5 62.9 17.2 44.2 16.2 95.3 68.5 22.9
Taiwan 20.9 0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chinac n/a 140.4 n/a 159.1 0.0 650.5 0.0 1155.4
Japan 15.9 0 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
aThe reference data for the years 2005 and 2006 stem from NBS (2009) and CCII (2007) and may
include some coking coal volumes.
bEnergy equivalents for HVDC transmission losses are included in the figures for Shaanxi/IMAR
invest and Xinjiang invest for the years 2020 and 2030.
cChina also comprise Chinese coastal coal shipping by river barges or handysize bulk carrier vessels.
Typically, the coal comes from the northern Chinese coal export terminals of Qinhuangdao and is shipped
to the southern Chinese demand centers.
2.7.1 Coal supply in China
The results for the years 2005 and 2006 show that the model is fairly accurately calibrated
and can reproduce the historic transportation flows; the mean percentage error of all
model trade flows in 2005 (and 2006) is 8.4% (8.6%). The root mean squared percentage
error of all model trade flows in 2005 is 8.8% (8.5%).
Table 2.9 shows how Chinese coal demand is covered in both scenarios until the model
year 2030. Model results for Chinese export volumes are less diversified than real export
figures14.
In the coal-by-train scenario, the main coal suppliers are the central Chinese provinces
Shanxi, Shaanxi and IMAR in 2030. A large portion of the coal production is hauled
14In addition to statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversions, coal quality is a factor
which may let model results deviate from real trade patterns. In Japan and South Korea, newer coal
fired power plants are highly efficient but very limited in the types of steam coal that they may use
for generation. Coal specifications on sulfur, ash content, moisture and volatile matter are important
determinants especially for newer coal-fired power plants. This dependence may sometimes lead to long-
term bilateral contracts between single mines and plant operators as well as a certain price inelasticity of
demand for certain coal types. Trade patterns caused by such coal quality requirements are not explicitly
modelled and are beyond the scope of this analysis.
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via railway to the coastal demand centers. About 1155 mt of Chinese production is
transported to the northern export terminals of Qinhuangdao and shipped via handysize
bulk vessels or coastal barges to the Shanghai and Hong Kong demand regions. Western
coalfields in Xinjiang province supply roughly 355 mt of steam coal via land transports
in 2030. The production in the rest of China amounts to approximately 936 mt and is
therefore slightly above todays levels.
Imports play a significant role in the coal-by-train scenario, amounting to up to 264 mt.
While this seems to be a fairly small volume compared to overall Chinese demand of
more than 4 billion tonnes in 2030, it will make up 30% of the seaward traded steam coal
market. Main importers into China are Australian mines with 151 mt and Indonesian
mines with 89 mt. Indonesian mines will experience significant cost increases until
2030 because of rising production costs. This is mainly caused by rising diesel prices
as Indonesian mining operations are mostly open-cast truck-and-shovel operations and
therefore are greatly exposed to oil price increases. Furthermore, Indonesian coal mining
faces deteriorating geological conditions of coal deposits and qualities. Due to these
elevated costs, Indonesia is the marginal supplier into China in the coal-by-train scenario
and Indonesian mining costs plus transport charges constitute the marginal costs of
supply into the Shanghai and Hong Kong regions.
In the coal-by-wire scenario, the situation is different. Investment in the western province
of Xinjiang is significantly higher. The construction of HVDC lines between central
China’s coal-bearing provinces and the coastal areas has reduced transportation costs
for the western provinces and therefore incentivises investments. Therefore, the scenario
results show a strong increase in mining capacity in the west as the mining costs in this
region are fairly low, lying in the range of 11 - 22 USD2009/t by 2030. With the reduced
transport cost burden, these mines belong to the cheapest suppliers in China in the
scenario coal-by-wire in 2030. Re-imports do not play a role, as inland transportation of
coal-based electricity is far more cost competitive than coastal shipping. Imports from
foreign countries will be replaced completely by cheaper domestic production by 2030.
In this scenario, China is even able to export 69 mt.
2.7.2 Long-run marginal costs of steam coal supply
With the different allocation of volumes between both scenarios, the marginal costs of
supply also change15. As cheaper volumes become available, high-cost suppliers are
pushed out of the market and the marginal costs of supply to import regions decline.
15Marginal costs deducted from the model can be interpreted as the cost for supplying an additional
unit of coal to a specific geographical region. They therefore cover all costs in the model: mine production
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Table 2.10: Evolution of long-run marginal costs of supply for demand regions in
Europe, China and Japan.
2005 2006 2020 2030b
in USD2009/t (of coal) Ref.
a Model Ref.a Model by-wire by-train by-wire by-train
Beijing 52 51 50 54 63 67 76 97
Shanghai 62 60 58 63 83 88 84 122
Hong Kong 62 60 58 63 83 93 84 126
PRC - West n/a 53 n/a 56 72 81 108 112
PRC - North n/a 40 n/a 44 81 85 97 118
Japan 63 60 63 63 83 90 97 121
North-Western Europe 69 67 69 67 97 102 110 120
Mediterranean Europe 73 66 69 67 88 93 102 121
aThe reference data for the years 2005 and 2006 stem from IEA (2011a) and from EIA (2007). The
IEA only publishes an average import price for each country. The reference country for the model region
’North-Western Europe’ are the Netherlands, while the reference country for ’Mediterranean Europe’ is
Italy. The EIA publishes only consumer prices for coal in general not distinguishing between anthracite,
lignite and bituminous coal. The reference price for China in 2005 and 2006 is estimated on the basis
of coal reports from McCloskey. Note that deviations may arise as model results are standardised
energy-mass units (25,120 MJ per tonne) while IEA data is in metric tonnes.
Table 2.10 depicts the evolution of long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of supply for both
scenarios until 2030. Two observations can be made: firstly, the LRMC are growing
more similar over time in China, Europe and Japan in both scenarios. Secondly, the
LRMC are different in the two scenarios, with the coal-by-train scenario generally having
higher marginal costs.
The two main drivers for the cost increase over time are the input price evolution of
mine costs and the growing global demand for steam coal. The increase in input prices
is mainly linked to the assumptions made on the oil price evolution, which affects coal
mining costs. The increase in demand leads to increasing investment in mine capacity
and a higher utilisation of existing mines. Both drivers have a cost-raising effect, as
investments have to be refinanced and the higher utilisation of mines or utilisation of so
far extra-marginal mines raises marginal production costs.
The lower LRMC in Europe, Japan and especially China in the scenario coal-by-wire
in 2030 are caused by the additional Chinese mine capacity which is opened up in
the western province of Xinjiang. This mine capacity becomes highly cost competitive
through the installation of HVDC lines within China that reduce transport costs of
steam coal. However, the gap in LRMC between both scenarios is different for China
and for Europe; the marginal cost supplier for Europe in this scenario changes from the
U.S. to Russia. Russian mines are operating in a very broad cost range between 27 and
91 USD2009/t in 2030. However, long railway haulage distances to the export terminals
in the Black Sea, the Baltic sea or the Pacific significantly increase costs of supply.
costs, transport costs, turnover costs. The projected marginal costs for 2020 and 2030 also cover mine
and port capacity investments.
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Figure 2.3: Cumulated mine investments in mtpa in the global steam coal market
until 2030.
Therefore, the difference in marginal costs of supply to Europe of Appalachian mines
and the Russian mines is not too large. The difference in European LRMC between both
scenarios of approximately 10% to 20% can be basically interpreted as the difference of
marginal costs of supply to Europe between the U.S. Appalachian mines and Russian
mines in 2030.
The situation for China, however, is different. Here, the marginal supplier changes from
high-cost import mines to lower-cost domestic Chinese mines. The difference in LRMC
of supply between those foreign imports and Chinese mines is significant and in the
range of 37 - 42 USD2009/t in 2030.
2.7.3 Investment and utilisation of mines
Figure 2.3 shows the cumulated mine investments for both scenarios until 2030. Global
mine capacity additions in the coal-by-train scenario amount up to 1927 mtpa and in the
coal-by-wire scenario up to 2254 mtpa. The difference in mine investments between both
scenarios is largely explained by the higher investments in Xinjiang. Investments into
mine capacity in west China are by about 380 mt higher in the coal-by-wire scenario.
Mine investments in the rest of the world are approximately 50 mtpa lower in the coal-
by-wire scenario. Fewer investments take mainly place in the U.S., Russia and Indonesia.
The difference in mine investments leads to a change in mine utilisation. On a global
scale, supply and demand intersect in the flat part of the global supply cost curve in the
coal-by-wire scenario due to the availability of additional mine capacity. Existing high-
cost mines have a lower production output as the new, cheaper Chinese capacity coming
on line partly crowds them out. Table 2.11 shows mine utilisation levels for Chinese
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Table 2.11: Utilisation levels of U.S. and Chinese mines.
2020 2030
in [%] coal-by-wire coal-by-train coal-by-wire coal-by-train
U.S. - Northern Appalachia 57 62 69 84
U.S. - Southern Appalachia 64 69 75 89
U.S. - Illinois basin 100 100 100 100
U.S. - Northern PRB 97 97 98 99
U.S. - Southern PRB 39 39 64 86
Shaanxi 75 97 100 100
Shanxi 82 91 98 100
Shandong 85 96 98 100
Henan 96 99 82 100
IMAR 75 86 93 100
and US mine regions for both scenarios. The main differences in mine utilisation can
be found in the Appalachian regions, the Southern Powder River Basin and the Chinese
provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi and Shandong. Supply-wise, the Appalachian mines belong
to the most expensive capacities available. In China, particularly the high-costs mines
in Shanxi, Shandong and IMAR provinces, experience a decrease of utilisation levels in
2020. Shanxi coal deposits have already been mined for a long time with most operations
being deep underground at elevated costs. Therefore, the cheaper Western mines reduce
the output of existing Chinese mines by 160 mt in 2020 and another 70 mt in 2030.
2.7.4 Welfare effects
Lower worldwide marginal costs in the coal-by-wire scenario lead to welfare effects and
changes in the spatial distribution of rents16 (Figure 2.4). In total, gross welfare effects
are positive and amount to 248 billion USD2009 in 2030. However, while consumers,
especially in China, benefit with regard to allocation of welfare changes, producer rents
are shrinking worldwide. As the intersection of global demand and supply moves to
the flat part of the global supply cost curve, producer rents decrease. In the coal-by-
wire scenario, producer rents in the countries besides China are dropping by 163 billion
USD2009. This is mainly caused by lower global marginal cost levels as well as lower
utilisation of high-cost U.S. mines, which cut into producer surpluses. Producer rents
for China also slightly decrease in the scenario coal-by-wire. If argued from the point of
view of the coal-by-train scenario, producers outside China benefit from high prices and
the Chinese need for imports.
Consumers benefit on a global scale in the coal-by-wire scenario. The difference in
consumer rent makes up 456 billion USD2009 cumulated until 2030. The biggest portion
16Spillover welfare effects for downstream electricity markets are not accounted for.
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Figure 2.4: Cumulated net present welfare and cost effects between both scenarios
until 2020 and until 2030 (horizontal axis represents the coal-by-train scenario).
of this increase is allocated to China, as the difference in marginal costs of supply between
both scenarios is the largest there.
To analyse welfare effects of HVDC investments, the net present value of welfare gains
or losses and investment costs is computed17. The additional HVDC grid which inter-
connects the mine-mouth coal-fired power plants at new mines in Shaanxi and IMAR
with the coastal demand regions of Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong amount to 186
billion USD2009 until 2030. While these investment figures seem to be high, one must
keep in mind the assumption that China is facing an increase of steam coal demand of
2 billion tonnes until 2030. This means an increase of roughly 40% of the current global
steam coal demand which only takes place in China.
On a global scale, the ’coal-by-wire’ configuration leads to cumulated net present welfare
gains of -5 billion USD2009 by 2020 and 62 billion USD2009 by 2030. This may seem
quite modest compared to the investment costs and welfare changes involved. However,
if the welfare analysis just focuses on China, the picture changes; cumulated net welfare
surplus including HVDC investments for China amounts to 28 billion USD2009 by 2020
and 149 billion USD2009 by 2030. Producers in the rest of the world would be worse off
in the coal-by-wire scenario. Production of high-cost mining companies in the U.S. could
17HVDC investment cost data as well as loss ratios for HVDC configurations are based on Bahrmann
and Johnson (2007). They investigate different configurations for power transmission between coal
production sites in Utah and California. A +2x 500 kV double bipole DC configuration with maximum
transmission losses of up to 3.35% at full load depending on transmission distance is assumed. HVDC
investments are annuised over a period of 30 years. All welfare effects are present values discounted
with a 7% interest rate. Discount rates aligned to values for less-developed countries with high growth
rates found in (Evans and Sezer, 2005). It is also assumed that new coal-fired power plants in China
realise 6,800 full load hours on average and efficiency levels of 43%. Avoided investments into railway
capacity are not accounted for, as the transport rates used in the model runs already reflect full costs
of operation, including railway construction costs.
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be crowded out, and cost-competitive suppliers in Australia, South Africa and domestic
U.S. suppliers could face severely reduced profits as a results of the price pressure induced
by new mines in Xinjiang, Shaanxi and IMAR.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper analyses the influence of Chinese bulk energy infrastructure investment de-
cisions on the steam coal supply mix in China and on investment and welfare spillover
effects in the world market. A spatial equilibrium model which includes domestic mar-
kets for China and the U.S. as well as the main importers and exporters is presented.
Proxies for future marginal costs of supply are based on a rigid cost structure decom-
position which allows us to deduct future supply cost estimates based on assumptions
of input price evolutions. The paper then analyses two scenarios with different assump-
tions of future Chinese energy transport investment policy; in one scenario it is assumed
that current railway expansion will continue in the future as rapid realisation of HVDC
transmission lines is hindered by existing organisational and regulatory barriers. In the
other scenario, it is assumed that hurdles for HVDC investments in China are reduced.
Thus, rapid implementation of transmission lines in combination with new coal-fired
power stations close to the mines can take place on a very large scale.
According to the results, such infrastructure decisions yield a significant change in LRMC
for China by up to 33% in 2030. China is able to feed its domestic steam coal demand
through own production in the scenario with HVDC build-up. Therefore, it crowds out
foreign steam coal volumes mainly originating from Australia and Indonesia. In the case
of coal transport by railway, China will have to import significant quantities that make
up about 30% of the steam coal trade market volume in 2030. LRMC for steam coal in
Europe and Japan change only moderately between both scenarios. The reason for this
is that one high-cost supplier (U.S.) is exchanged for another (Russia).
Analysis shows that large-scale investments into HVDC transmission until 2030 yield
mostly positive economic effects, especially for China. This result should encourage
Chinese policy makers to rapidly overcome the hindrances this large-scale infrastructure
project currently faces; China’s national institutions engaged in energy are fragmented
and do not coordinate well. Aspects like setting electricity and fuel prices as well as the
approval of large infrastructure investments are divided among many different depart-
ments. To give such a large-scale national infrastructure project a good chance of rapid
realisation, the national government would have to cut into this well-established web of
local decision makers and form a central energy planning institution which has enough
executive power.
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As steam coal consumers profit on a global scale of the Chinese HVDC transmission
lines, results should encourage large utilities or energy-intensive industries to support
Chinese grid investment efforts. Support could mean either helping to finance such
projects or to provide, if needed, technological expertise in the field of high-voltage or
even ultra-high-voltage transmission.
International mining companies will face increasing price pressure from the higher com-
petitiveness of Chinese steam coal supply in the case of HVDC investments. This im-
plicates the need for mining companies to strengthen their exploration efforts in order
to generate proven reserves which are cheap to mine.
It is suggested that further research investigate in more detail how the steam coal supply
mix of the other main world market actors like Europe, Japan and the U.S. is influenced
by Chinese infrastructure decisions. In this context, it would be especially interesting to
see how such feedback affects power plant investment decisions in the important import
regions in the long run. Another research venue could be to investigate how potential
future market players like Mozambique, Botswana or Madagascar influence these results,
especially regarding spatial distribution of mine investment decisions.

Chapter 3
Market structure scenarios in
international steam coal trade
3.1 Introduction
Behind oil but ahead of natural gas, coal is the second-most important primary energy
source. It is mainly used for electricity and heat generation. About 36% of the global
electricity generation is based on hard coal (IEA, 2011a). Although most of the coal
is produced and consumed domestically, international steam coal trade is on the rise18.
Price volatility has increased too, and the years 2007 and 2008 both saw unprecedented
price spikes. Steam coal prices in North Western Europe reached a maximum of 210
USD/t in mid-2008 and averaged 147 USD/t for the whole year; this is more than 130%
above the average price of 64 USD/t in 2006 (Ritschel, 2011). Prices decreased with
the fall of the financial crisis in the second half of 2008 but remained relatively high
throughout 2009 and 201019.
The price increases on the spot markets for internationally traded coal in recent years
were paralleled by significant structural changes on the demand and the supply sides.
During the last decade total trade volume grew by more than 60% between 2000 and
2009 on the seaborne market. This development is mainly caused by a strong growth
of energy demand in Asian economies. Recently, India and South East Asian economies
have become major importers in the Pacific market. Moreover, China, a major net
18The classification of hard coal (distinct from lignite) comprises steam coal and coking coal. Steam
coal (or thermal coal) is mainly used in electricity generation whereas coking coal is used for metallurgical
purposes.
19The Asian marker (North Western European marker) was 79 USD/t (70 USD/t) in 2009 and 105
USD/t (92 USD/t) in 2010.
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exporter at the beginning of the last decade has drastically increased imports since
2005.
The supply side is dominated by countries with mainly export-oriented mining indus-
tries like South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and Colombia. The latter two countries are
relatively new players in this market and have expanded their supply capacity quickly
during the last decade. Moreover, in some countries, governments have developed na-
tional coal strategies during the last years, often tightening their control of coal exports,
for instance in China or Indonesia20. Due to governmental control in some countries or
the influence of large company consortia and industry associations in other countries,
steam coal supply tends to be aggregated on a national level rather than on a firm level.
In this context, the international steam coal trade market structure appears oligopolistic.
Given the growing importance of several new suppliers, the emergence of national en-
ergy and coal strategies in several countries and the dramatic recent steam coal price
evolutions, we test whether market structures in 2006 and 2008 can be described either
through competitive or oligopolistic conduct. To do so, we develop an optimisation
model for computing spatial market equilibria in competitive and oligopolistic interna-
tional trade markets. The equilibrium modelling approach was introduced by Samuelson
(1952), with his work on the programming of competitive equilibria in spatial mar-
kets and generalised for various non-competitive market structure scenarios: e.g., by
Takayama and Judge (1964), Harker (1984, 1986a) and Yang et al. (2002). The model is
implemented as a mixed complementarity programme (MCP) with the software GAMS
and based on a unique coal market dataset of EWI. This dataset comprises inter alia
supply capacities and costs, including time-dependent supply cost functions based on
input price evolutions to account for recent supply cost increases.
We find that actual prices in 2006 are in line with the competitive benchmark in Europe,
but prices in Asian importing regions exceed marginal costs. In 2008, prices and vol-
umes are not consistent with the competitive benchmark. Furthermore, trade flows are
more diversified in the real market than in the competitive scenario. However, for both
years, actual prices were lower than the oligopolistic prediction. Generally, the results
indicate that competitive models are not able to fully reproduce coal market equilibria,
particularly in 2008.
Literature on market conduct in international steam coal trade is relatively scarce.
Abbey and Kolstad (1983) present a qualitative analysis of the potential to exert market
power in steam coal trade. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the first to quantitatively
20China constantly reduced export licenses (from 80 mt in 2005 to less than 20 mt in 2011). Fur-
thermore, the Chinese government started a programme to restructure and consolidate the coal mining
industry (Wuyuan and Peng, 2011). In Indonesia only Indonesian companies or consortia are eligible
for mining concessions (Baruya, 2009).
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analyse strategic behaviour in international steam coal trade in the early 1980s using
an equilibrium model. In addition to perfect competition, they model various imperfect
market structures. The authors find that a non-competitive market structure consisting
of a duopoly and a monopsony effectively simulates the actual trade patterns. However,
since that time the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. We follow the
approach of Kolstad and Abbey (1984) by using an equilibrium model and update their
research with recent data. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) produced a paper most closely
related to ours. They model a number of major seaborne coal trade routes and apply a
mixed complementarity model to test if the trade volumes on these routes fit competi-
tive or Cournot-Nash behaviour in the years 2005 and 2006. They conclude from their
results that the steam coal trade market is better represented by perfect competition.
We add to three important aspects to their analysis. First, while their research focuses on
selected major trade routes, we extend the analysis to cover the full seaborne steam coal
trade market21. Second, we use a different database and generalise the model for multi-
plant players to account for cost differences in mining regions and mining technologies.
It is reassuring that, for 2006, in an independent approach we find qualitatively similar
results to those of Haftendorn and Holz (2010). Third, and most important, by extending
the time considered up to 2008, we are able to show that the actual market equilibrium
deviated significantly from a perfectly competitive benchmark equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we will briefly outline the
current situation on the seaborne steam coal trade market. Section three proceeds with
a detailed description of the model and its properties. Then, in section four the supply
and demand side data input is described. The scenario design is outlined in section
five. Section six presents the model results. Section seven discusses results for 2008, and
finally, section eight concludes the paper.
3.2 The seaborne steam coal trade market
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and con-
sumed in domestic markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production reached 5850 mt22.
The two largest domestic markets are China and the U.S., together comprising more than
21The larger coverage might not only be an advantage in terms of higher completeness. Note that
the omitted volumes in Haftendorn and Holz (2010) stem from smaller producers and are accounted
for in our oligopoly model as part of the competitive fringe. This systematically leads to lower prices
compared to just ignoring these quantities. Furthermore, a higher demand side coverage leads to a
higher production of exporters that are modelled in both analyses. With an increasing marginal cost
function, this systematically raises prices compared to ignoring these demand regions.
22See Ritschel (2011); includes coking coal.
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65% of total production. About 13% of the global steam coal production is traded in-
ternationally, and more than 90% of international steam coal trade is seaborne. In this
submarket, two different types of suppliers interact with each other: countries that have
a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiefly inland-oriented
mining industries23. The former type primarily comprises South Africa, Colombia, Aus-
tralia, and Indonesia and represents most of the supply capacity for the international
trade market. These export industries usually have a cost advantage over domestic in-
dustries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs, and economical access to transport
infrastructure. The latter type primarily consists of China, the U.S., and Russia. These
countries have some dedicated export collieries, but most of the potential export capacity
can serve both the national and the international markets. Depending on the relation
of export prices, to domestic prices these mines supply either domestic consumers or
maritime trade markets (swing suppliers). The majority of domestic mines are always
extramarginal to international markets due to low coal quality, contractual obligations,
high supply costs, or lack of access to infrastructure.
The seaborne trade market can be divided into Pacific and Atlantic market regions24.
Major importing regions in the Atlantic market are the U.S. and Europe (including
neighbouring Mediterranean countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany at the
top. Traditionally, these importing regions are primarily supplied by South Africa,
Colombia and Russia.
The Pacific market has grown faster in recent years. High quantities are imported by
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, all three of which have virtually no indigenous coal
production and therefore rely heavily on imports. However, most of the growth has
come from emerging import regions like India, South East Asia, and China. The supply
side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia, although the sustained high prices in Asia
have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa, and very recently, also from
Colombia.
3.3 Model description
We develop a spatial equilibrium model for the seaborne steam coal market in which
exporters and importers trade with each other. Coal exporters control one or more
coal-producing regions (including the infrastructure), and coal importers are assigned to
demand regions. These players trade steam coal with each other via bulk carrier shipping
23See e.g. Kopal (2007) or Rademacher (2008).
24During the last decade trade flows between the two regions grew considerably and recent research
has pointed out that the global steam coal market is well integrated (see e.g. Warell (2006) or Li (2008)).
Nevertheless, we use these terms in this paper in a geographical sense to better structure our analysis.
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routes. It is assumed that the exporters’ objective is to maximise their respective profits.
Importers are assumed to act as price takers25. The optimisation model is formulated as
a mixed complementary problem (MCP) by deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. In equilibrium, the set of prices and quantities simultaneously satisfies all
maximisation conditions.
The model consists of a network NW (N,A), where N is a set of nodes and A is a
set of arcs between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into two subsets,
N ≡ E ∪ I , where i ∈ E is an export region and j ∈ I is a demand node. Players z ∈ Z
control export regions i ∈ Ez. Export regions can only be controlled by one player,⋂
z∈Z Ez ≡ . The set of arcs A ≡ Ez × I consists of arcs f(z,j). Table 3.1 gives an
overview of demand regions, export regions, and the corresponding players as modelled
in this paper26.
Table 3.1: Model regions.
Export regions Players Demand regions
New South Wales/open cast Australia Europe (including Mediterranean)
New South Wales/underground Australia Japan
Queensland/open cast Australia South Korea
Queensland/underground Australia Taiwan
Mpumalanga/open cast South Africa China
Mpumalanga/underground South Africa India
Kalimantan & Sumatra Indonesia Latin America
Kuzbass & Donbass Russia North America
Eastern Kuzbass, Yakutia and far East Russia South East Asia
Colombia Colombia
Shanxi China
Central Appalachia U.S.
Venezuela Venezuela
Vietnam Vietnam
Poland Poland
Spitsbergen Norway
Mining costs, average inland transport costs, and port terminal costs add up to a
quadratic free-on-board (FOB) supply function27 depending on the produced quantity
qi per export node Si(qi). Seaborne transport costs τz,j per unit xz,j shipped. However,
the transport cost parameter τz,j(dz,j) depends on the distance dz,j between z and j.
25Since all coal flows are adjusted to a calorific value of 25.1 MJ/kg coal is a homogenous good for the
importers. Importers are not able to influence market prices through strategic (oligopsonistic) market
behaviour.
26The model export nodes cover about 98% of real market exports. The remaining 2% of exports is
divided among the model regions according to their share of total production. Import side coverage is
about 95%. The import balance is divided among the import regions according to their share of total
imports.
27Quadratic marginal functions had the best fit when regressed against a dataset of mining costs.
Furthermore, quadratic marginal cost functions capture important characteristics of steam coal supply
e.g. an increasing increment of marginal costs the more capacity is utilised.
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Individual transport cost functions were calculated for every year based on historical
data28. Import demand is represented by a linear function of the form:
pj
(∑
z
xz,j
)
= aj − bj ·
∑
z
xz,j (3.1)
where pj denotes the price in region j subject to the imported quantity. The parameter
aj denotes the reservation price, and parameter bj specifies the slope of the demand
function. Production costs Wi in node i ∈ E correspond to the integral under the
quadratic FOB supply function:
Wi(qi) =
∫ qi
0
Si(q)dq =
1
3
· αj · q3i +
1
2
· bi · q2i + ρi · qi (3.2)
The amount of coal supplied by player z ∈ Z to region j ∈ I is defined as xz,j ; let us
define x˜z,j as the quantity supplied by all other producers to region j ∈ I:
x˜z,j =
∑
k∈Z
k 6=z
xk,j (3.3)
Producer z’s profit maximisation problem Ωz consists of the objective function Fz and
the constraints (3.5)-(3.7):
Fz =
∑
j
pj (x˜z,j + xz,j) · xz,j − xz,j · τz,j −Wi(qi) → max
x,q
! (3.4)
Subject to:
∑
i
qi ≥
∑
j
xz,j (µz) (3.5)
Ci ≥ qi (γi) (3.6)
qi ≥ 0 (3.7)
28Bulk carrier freight data were provided by McCloskey Coal Information, Frachtkontor Junge & Co.,
and Baltic Exchange. See section 3.4.2 for a detailed description of transport cost data.
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Restriction (3.5) states that production in i ∈ E has to be at least as high as the
total exports. The second restriction (3.6) ensures that production in i ∈ E does not
exceed the available capacity Ci. The strictly quasi-concave objective function (3.4) and
the convex restrictions (3.5)-(3.7) form an optimisation problem, which has a unique
solution. The first-order optimality conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for
deriving a unique optimum if the set of feasible solutions is non-empty. The equilibrium
conditions are derived using the first order derivatives of the Lagrangian of Ωz (KKT
conditions). The Lagrangian multipliers µz and γi are shadow prices for player z ∈ Z
and in region i ∈ E, respectively. The variable µz represents the value of a marginal
unit of exports, whereas γi corresponds to the value of a marginal unit of production
capacity. The KKT conditions can be expressed as follows:
τi,j −
(
∂pj
∂xz,j
+
∂pj
∂x˜z,j
∂x˜z,j
∂xz,j
)
xz,j − pj + µz ≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8)
∂Wi
∂qi
+ γi − µz = αi · q2i + bi · qi + ρi + γi − µz ≥ 0 ⊥ qi ≥ 0 (3.9)
−
∑
j
xz,j +
∑
i
qi ≥ 0 ⊥ µz ≥ 0 (3.10)
− qi + Ci ≥ 0 ⊥ γi ≥ 0 (3.11)
The derivative (∂pj/∂xz,j + ∂pj/∂x˜z,j · ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j) · xz,j in (3.8) expresses player z’s
ability to influence the market price in j ∈ I by strategically choosing the amount of
coal supplied, subject to his conjecture of the other producers’ reaction. In the case
of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly, ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j = 0 holds and KKT-condition (3.8) simplifies
to (8a) under the assumption of a linear demand function. In a competitive market,
however, a change of player z’s supply will be fully offset by the other producers, and
therefore, ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j = −1 holds. In the case of perfect competition and for fringe
suppliers condition, (3.8) simplifies to (3.8b).
τz,j − αj − 2bj · xz,j + µz ≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8a)
τz,j − αj − bj · xz,j + µz ≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8b)
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Equation (3.1), the first order conditions (3.8) and (3.9) as well as capacity constraints
(3.10) and (3.11) for all players z ∈ Z together constitute the optimisation problem.
The unique solution for this set of inequalities yields the equilibrium for this market.
This mixed complementary problem was implemented using the software GAMS29.
3.4 Dataset
The database used in this analysis stems from several extensive research projects con-
ducted at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. Steam coal
market data have been acquired from a multitude of different and potentially hetero-
geneous sources. Although steam coal market data seem scarce at first glance, vari-
ous institutions, researchers, experts, and companies have published useful information.
General steam coal market data are for example, published by institutions like IEA and
EIA30. Detailed data on supply chain costs, steam coal demand, and production of major
players are available from the IEA Clean Coal Centre31. Further publications include
analyses from employees working for international utilities and coal industry newslet-
ters32. National statistics bureaus and ministries concerned with minerals, energy, and
resources provide detailed information33. Furthermore, company annual reports and pre-
sentations related to the steam coal market have been evaluated and expert interviews
conducted. Moreover, our database is regularly discussed and reviewed with industry
experts.
3.4.1 Mining costs and export capacity
Costs for mining consist of overburden removal and extraction costs, processing and
washing costs, and transportation costs within the colliery. The data on mining costs
are based on expert interviews and the evaluation of annual reports and literature sources
as described above. Since these data stem from heterogeneous sources and are mostly
based on cost ranges and mining costs of representative mines, we regard our data only
as proxy for real mining costs. The lack of data on some mines might cause distortions if
we would model every single mine explicitly. Therefore, we fit the available data of mine
mouth cash costs and mining capacity to a quadratic marginal cost function by ordinary
29See Rutherford (1995) or Ferris and Munson (1998) for detailed information on complementary
programming in GAMS.
30See EIA (2010a,b), IEA (2011a).
31See Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008).
32See e.g. Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008), Bayer et al. (2009) and Ritschel (2011). The McCloskey
Coal Report is regularly reviewed.
33Notable examples are ABARE, US Geological Survey, Bundesanstalt fu¨r Geowissenschaften und
Rohstoffe, Australian Bureau of Statistics, DANE, BLS and Statistics South Africa.
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least squares. This method yields a supply curve that comprises the main characteristics
and cost levels of each mining region. Figure 3.1 gives an example of Colombian mining
costs and the approximated marginal cost function. As coal qualities vary between the
mining regions, calorific values are generally adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg using data from
Ritschel (2011), BGR (2008), and IEA (2011a).
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Figure 3.1: Example of FOB costs for Colombia and approximation of marginal cost
function for 2006.
These supply curves are complemented by country and technology-specific mining cost
structures and are escalated using input price data. These cost structures are derived
from a number of sources. Detailed information for Australian open cast and under-
ground mines is found in ABS (2006). Meister (2008), Baruya (2007), and Ritschel
(2011), for instance, provide information on cost structures on a global scale. Long-
walling and Room/Pillar are the predominant underground mining technologies, whereas
open cast operations rely either on draglines or truck/shovel or a mix of both technolo-
gies. The cost structures indicate how much diesel fuel, steel, explosives, tyres, chem-
icals, electricity, and labour is used per mode of technology. The proportions of these
commodities vary significantly between the four predominant extraction technologies
dragline, truck/shovel, longwalling, and room/pillar (see Table 3.2). Labour cost is one
of the factors that typically differ among the coal-producing countries. For example,
while salaries are low in countries like South Africa or Indonesia, they are considerably
higher in the U.S. or Australia.
Table 3.2: Input factors and relative importance in coal mining 2006. (Sources: ABS,
2006, Meister, 2008, Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011).
Diesel fuel Steel mill Industrial
in % & lubricants Explosives Tyres products Electricity Labour Chemicals
Room/Pillar 5-8 0-2 0 23-34 10-18 28-39 9-13
Longwalling 5-10 0-2 0 25-35 10-17 28-45 4-8
Dragline 15-19 15-21 5-10 22-27 6-11 18-33 1-4
Truck/Shovel 17-26 17-23 8-11 19-26 0-3 18-35 1-4
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The mining cost curves are escalated according to the cost structures using the price
index data for the above-mentioned commodities from various statistical offices. Fur-
thermore, productivity figures and country-specific exposures to fluctuations of exchange
rates are included. This method yields the shifts in supply curves for the period of 2006-
2008.
Generally, coal supply costs increased world-wide during 2006 and 2008 due to input
price escalation. Table 3.3 presents an overview of the cost increases for the model
mining regions. Clearly, mining cost escalation affected producers differently. Major ex-
porters with a large share of open cast production, like Indonesia or Colombia, generally
experienced higher cost increases. Producers with a high proportion of underground
mines, like the U.S., South Africa, or Australia, were less affected. This is due to the
different cost structures of underground mining operations. Underground mining tech-
nologies rely to a larger extend on labour costs, electricity prices, and locally sourced
materials. With the extension of steel products, which are also an important input in
deep mining, the increasing prices of fuel and oil derivatives, explosives, and tyres did
not raise underground mining costs.
Table 3.3: Average FOB costs in USD/t and export capacity adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg,
(Source: Bayer et al., 2009, Kopal, 2007, Rademacher, 2008).
Average costs Export capacity
2006 2008 2006 2008
Indonesia 33 44 33% 154 197 28%
Colombia 31 42 34% 59 74 25%
China (Shanxi) 34 44 30% 62 45 -27%
U.S. (Central Appalachia) 46 57 23% 25 31 25%
Venezuela 32 38 19% 9 9 0%
Vietnam 29 38 32% 27 22 -18%
Spitsbergen 41 52 26% 2 4 67%
Queensland/open cast 33 41 24% 33 37 13%
Queensland/underground 33 37 14% 8 8 5%
New South Wales/open cast 34 42 23% 52 59 12%
New South Wales/underground 34 41 21% 27 31 15%
South Africa/open cast 28 36 28% 45 46 4%
South Africa/underground 32 41 25% 24 25 5%
Russia (Baltic) 48 64 34% 61 69 14%
Russia (Pacific) 40 48 19% 15 19 22%
Poland 58 79 36% 8 5 -38%
Total 611 681 12%
Steam coal export capacity increased by about 12% between 2006 and 2008 (Table
3.3). In the Pacific basin, much of the growth came from Indonesia and Australia,
thus expanding their supply capacity. In the Atlantic market, Colombia increased its
export capacity by about 25 mt and became the largest steam coal exporter in the
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Atlantic market in 2008. Export capacity data were primarily derived from Kopal (2007),
Rademacher (2008), and Bayer et al. (2009) and adjusted for energy content.
3.4.2 Transport costs, port handling fees, and seaborne freight rates
Inland transport costs depend on the transportation mode and the distance from the
coal fields to the export terminal. Coal is mainly hauled by rail and truck and, in some
cases, by river barge. Inland transport costs vary between the mining regions. While
they are below 4 USD/t for the bulk of the Colombian production, they may be as
high as 25 USD/t for transport from the Russian Kuzbass basin to the Baltic ports.
We estimated the relative impact of diesel fuel and electricity cost escalation using
the relative importance of truck and railway haulage for main transport routes. Port
handling fees include costs for unloading, storage, and loading onto vessels. Country-
specific average inland transport cost and port handling fees are added to the mining
cost curve to derive FOB supply functions. Seaborne bulk carrier freight rates are a
major cost component of internationally traded steam coal. For determining seaborne
transport costs we use logarithmic freight cost functions based on distance, which is
regressed against a dataset of freight cost observations for both model years. We use
these cost functions to determine consistent freight rates for every possible shipping
route in the model.
3.4.3 Demand data
As described in Section 3.3 we assume linear steam coal demand functions for all im-
porting regions based on reference quantities and prices as well as elasticities (see Table
3.4 for reference volumes)34. A general shortcoming of the literature, on market conduct
in global steam coal trade is the treatment of the demand side. Usually, assumptions on
elasticities are drawn from empirical analyses found in the literature and subsequently
elasticity sensitivities are computed35. This paper presents an elasticity analysis for
Europe, the largest import demand region on the maritime market. Demand elasticities
for other regions are based on an extensive literature review.
34Reference quantities are based on Ritschel (2011) and IEA (2011a,c). We used the MCIS steam coal
markers for reference price data in the model.
35See e.g. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) who choose elasticities during the calibration process based on
Dahl (1993) or Graham et al. (1999) who test for several elasticities figures. Kolstad and Abbey (1984)
assume demand elasticities of -0.6 for all regions.
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Table 3.4: Steam coal reference demand in million tonnes adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg,
(Source: IEA, 2011a, Ritschel, 2011).
Europe Japan India L. America China Taiwan Korea N. America S.-E. Asia
2006 187 110 26 9 46 60 62 42 29
2008 184 118 35 16 46 60 72 38 36
Several econometric analyses on short-run steam coal demand elasticities and interfuel
substitution have so far been published (see Table 3.5 for an overview of the most im-
portant articles). Empirically estimated elasticities fall in the range of -0.05 to -0.57.
Although the analyses differ with regard to coverage, timeframe, and methodological ap-
proach, all authors find that price elasticity of steam coal demand is inelastic (|Elasticity|
< 1).
Table 3.5: Overview of short-run coal demand elasticities in the literature.
Article Methodology Time period Sector Region |Elasticity|
Dahl and Ko (1998) Panel data 1991-1993 Electricity U.S. 0.16-0.26
Ko (1993) Time series 1949-1991 Electricity U.S. 0.25
Kulshreshtha and Parikh (2000) Time series 1970-1995 Electricity India 0.34
So¨derholm (2001) Panel data 1984-1994 Electricity Europe 0.05-0.29
Masih and Masih (1996) Time series 1970-1992 all sectors China 0.25
ABARES (1991) Time series 1978-1988 Electricity OECD 0.16
Chan and Lee (1997) Time series 1953-1994 all sectors China 0.26-0.32
Ko and Dahl (2001) Panel data 1993 Electricity U.S. 0.57
Short-run steam coal demand elasticity depends on various factors, such as the power
plant mix, the price of alternative fuels (particularly natural gas and, in some regions,
fuel oil), the price of emission certificates, and total electricity demand, to name but a
few. Since these factors vary over time, it is likely that some of the figures presented in
Table 3.5 are outdated today.
We therefore conduct a steam coal demand analysis for Europe using the dispatch module
of Dispatch and Investment Model for Electricity markets in Europe (DIME). DIME is a
large-scale linear optimisation model for the European electricity market that simulates
hourly dispatch taking account of conventional and renewable generation technologies36.
We calibrate the model with actual data for the years 2006 and 2008, including the
European power plant fleet, gas, fuel oil, and CO2 emission prices as well as country-
specific load data. Then, we iteratively test a high number of (equidistant) steam coal
price points. The model computes the cost-minimal power plant dispatch and steam
coal consumption subject to the coal price. Subsequently, we fit a linear function to the
data using OLS, from which we derive the elasticity at the reference point. Steam coal
demand elasticity for the European electricity sector is estimated to be -0.12 in 2006
36See Bartels (2009). For applications of this model see e.g., Paulus and Borggrefe (2011) or Nagl
et al. (2011). A detailed description can be obtained from www.ewi.uni-koeln.de.
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and -0.43 in 2008. The difference between these two figures stems from the varying gas
and CO2 emission prices and thus their impact on the clean dark spread in the reference
point37. During 2006 the clean dark spread was favourable for coal-fired power plants,
whereas in 2008, with an increasing emissions price and a similar gas price as in 2006,
the clean dark spread decreased. Hence, around the reference point (high coal price in
2008; low coal price in 2006) the elasticity was higher in 2008 than in 2006.
However, these results cannot be generalised for all demand regions, since they depend on
a number of factors that usually differ regionally38. In this paper, we use the estimated
elasticities for Europe and assume a steam coal demand elasticity of -0.3 for all other
importing regions for both years. This assumption is based on the above-mentioned
literature review.
3.5 Simulation design
The focus of our analysis is on seaborne steam coal trade for which a spot market with
several well-established price indices exists39. Hence, we model only dedicated export
mining capacity40.
The supply structure in the steam coal trade market is heterogeneous. It consists of
large state-run mining entities, several privately-owned international mining companies,
and a large number of small national players. Furthermore, production regions are
widely dispersed over the globe, and so far no formal cartel such as the OPEC has been
established. Therefore, in one scenario we test for a competitively organised steam coal
trade market.
However, the majority of internationally traded coal is produced by only four countries
with a primarily export-oriented mining industry and a favourable cost situation: In-
donesia, Australia, South Africa, and Colombia. Indonesia was a member of OPEC until
2008, when its oil reserves were depleted. Very quickly it has become the world’s largest
steam coal exporter (Indonesian coal exports grew by 45% between 2005 and 2008).
37The clean dark spread is the margin that a coal-fired power plant earns given a certain electricity,
coal, and emissions price. European gas spot market prices were 22 EUR/MWh in 2006 and 24 EU-
R/MWh in 2008 (APX, 2010). CO2 emission prices were 17 EUR/tCO2 in 2006 and 22 EUR/tCO2 in
2008 (EEX, 2011).
38For instance, regionally differing gas prices or the installed capacity, availability, and efficiency of the
fleet. In some regions, the competing generating technology may not be gas-fired plants. Decreasing or
increasing electricity demand also has an impact on coal-demand elasticity. Moreover, emissions trading
systems are not implemented in all regions (the U.S., for example, has no GHG emissions trading system
but has an NOx trading system).
39See Ekawan and Ducheˆne (2006).
40Export capacity data are based on Kopal (2007) and Rademacher (2008) but are adjusted for energy
content and in some cases downgraded if other sources suggested so.
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The issue of mining concessions is government controlled and is nowadays only granted
to Indonesian companies41. Hence, currently, the majority of steam coal production
and infrastructure is controlled by large Indonesian conglomerates or the government.
International coal trade is an important national revenue earner, which may favour non-
competitive behaviour on a government level. Australia, Colombia, and South Africa
have privately owned mining industries42, but the crucial export terminals are con-
trolled by consortia consisting of the major players in the country43. Clearly, all of
these countries have the potential to act strategically and can be interpreted as national
oligopolists.
Similar to Kolstad and Abbey (1984), we assume that individual producers act as price
takers, but oligopolistic rent is accrued on a country level, for example through taxes,
royalties, quotas, or collusive port throughput agreements. This allows us to use aggre-
gate national supply functions44. The non-competitive scenario is designed as follows:
Australia, Indonesia, Colombia, and South Africa act as non-cooperative Cournot play-
ers. Additionally, China is assumed to act as a Cournot player. China is the largest
steam coal producer in the world and has the potential to influence the seaborne mar-
ket significantly. Chinese authorities have intervened regularly in resource markets and
have continuously reduced steam coal export quotas45. Russia, the U.S., Venezuela,
Vietnam, Norway and Poland act as price takers and constitute the competitive fringe.
All of these countries have a mining industry that primarily serves the domestic market
or is very small.
41See Baruya (2009).
42Nevertheless between 65% and 95% of steam coal exports of South Africa, Colombia and Australia
are controlled by six large multinational companies (Xstrata, AngloAmerican, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto
and Drummond). See Murray (2007) and Wacaster (2008).
43BHP Billiton and AngloAmerican, are major shareholders of the Newcastle Infrastructure Group,
which operates the Newcastle Coal Terminal, the main export hub in New South Wales. The largest
coal terminal in the world, Richards Bay (South Africa) is jointly owned by all major producers in
the country amongst them: BHP Billiton, AngloAmerican and Xstrata. The main export terminal in
Colombia, Puerto Drummond, and Puerto Bolivar are owned by Drummond and a consortium consisting
of Xstrata, BHP-Billiton, and AngloAmerican, respectively. Moreover, these companies are vertically
integrated and also own and operate the domestic coal transport infrastructure (Baruya, 2007).
44Our Cournot model formulation can be interpreted as a quota system that restricts exports to
the Cournot-Nash outcome. Other Cournot model formulations with taxes instead of quotas of course
produce equivalent outcomes (see e.g., Kolstad and Abbey (1984)).
45Chinese coal policy shares some interesting similarities with its policy on rare earths. Chinese
government has introduced an export limit on coal and on rare earths and has repeatedly cut these
limits (Hurst, 2010, Sagawa and Koizumi, 2008). Moreover, it restructures and consolidates both its
coal mining and its rare earths mining industries to gain more control (Hurst, 2010, Wuyuan and Peng,
2011). In the coal sector, companies have to qualify as exporters. So far only state-run companies are
eligible for export licences (Baruya, 2007).
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Simulation results for the year 2006
Figure 3.2 depicts actual price data and simulated model prices for the perfectly com-
petitive and the Cournot oligopoly scenario for four major importing regions46. Clearly,
the marginal cost-based price matches the actual import price in Europe. Actual prices
were, however, higher than marginal costs of delivery in Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea. From a price perspective, the hypothesis of Cournot-Nash behaviour can be
rejected, since oligopolistic prices exceed actual prices significantly in 2006.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2006.
Table 3.6 reports actual and simulated steam coal trade volumes between exporting and
importing regions for the year 2006 in million tonnes. In comparison to the price analysis,
the picture is less clear-cut when the focus is on trade flows. In general, trade flows in
the perfect competition setup fit the actual trade pattern better, since total supply
is too low in the non-competitive scenario. Main trade relations in the real market
match the major importer/exporter relations in the perfectly competitive scenario well
in the Atlantic market47. This supports the hypothesis that the international steam
coal trade market was, to a certain degree, subject to competitive market mechanisms
in 2006. However, the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one,
particularly in the Pacific Basin48.
46For reasons of consistency, we use the McCloskey’s Asian marker, North West European marker,
and Japanese marker for deliveries in the 90-day forward period. These markers are adjusted to 6,000
kcal/kg and serve as a spot price indicator.
47In reality, South Africa, Russia, the U.S., and Colombia are the main suppliers to Europe. Small
high-cost producers like Poland or Norway are located close to the European market and generally ship
their product to Europe. The North American demand region procures most of its imported coals from
Latin American suppliers.
48Several reasons may account for the deviations between the actual trade pattern and the competitive
pattern. First, economies with a high import dependency like Taiwan, Japan, or Korea may apply import
diversification strategies for reasons of security of supply. This may also explain the slightly higher prices
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Table 3.6: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in mt (energy adjusted).
SA RU VE VN IR CO PRC the U.S. AU PL NW
Actual 2006
Europe 56 59 2 1 17 28 3 6 3 8 2
North America 2 5 3 26 6
Latin America 2 1 2 3 1
China 1 22 14 1 8
Taiwan 2 29 16 13
Japan 9 3 23 16 60
Korea 3 1 20 17 20
India 3 17 5 2
South East Asia 1 2 24 2
Total 62 78 8 27 149 58 60 6 113 8 2
Perfect competition 2006
Europe 69 58 6 31 13 8 2
North America 9 28 5
Latin America 9
China 27 18
Taiwan 61
Japan 13 13 89
Korea 1 62
India 26
South East Asia 30
Total 69 71 9 27 154 59 62 13 103 8 2
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2006
Europe 17 61 2 20 17 11 19 16 8 2
North America 6 6 7 7 4 7
Latin America 2 1 2 1 1 2
China 6 1 10 5 7 8
Taiwan 8 9 12 6 8 10
Japan 13 15 9 20 11 15 17
Korea 8 5 13 7 10 11
India 4 1 6 3 3 5
South East Asia 4 3 7 3 4 5
Total 68 76 8 27 95 59 62 19 81 8 2
Actual Perfect Competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 571 577 506
Although the oligopolistic trade pattern differs substantially from the actual trade flows,
it features a higher degree of diversification. This diversification of exports stems from
the oligopolists’ profit maximisation: A Cournot player exports to a certain market until
marginal revenue equals marginal costs there. With a high market share in a certain
importing region, perceived marginal revenue for the exporter is low, thus making it
profitable to diversify the export structure. This may justify trade with regions that
would not occur cost-wise in a perfectly competitive market.
in the real market, since these economies would usually pay a premium for their import diversification.
Second, calorific values are indeed the most important quality parameter and are accounted for in the
analysis. However, the chemical composition of coals in regard to ash and sulphur content, moisture,
and volatile matter may be important efficiency determinants for power plants. Some power plants may
be adjusted to a specific coal type, or certain types of coal from different regions are often blended to
optimise coal quality at the import terminal. Third, long-term bilateral contracts are still quite common
in international coal trade. Finally, statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversion may
cause differences in statistics of traded volumes.
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Especiallly, major players in the Pacific Basin like Australia, Indonesia, and China have
an especially diversified supply structure in reality. Competitive behaviour would suggest
that China ships all of its exports to Korea, whereas in the actual market, China trades
the bulk of its exports with three Asian economies: Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Although
Indonesia’s supply structure is more diversified by nature due to its high production,
the cost-minimal solution would imply that Taiwan procures all of its imports from
Indonesia. Although Taiwan is a major importer of Indonesian coal, it sources its imports
from several exporters. In the non-competitive market structure setup, even high-cost
fringe producers like the U.S. or Russia increase their market share. Since oligopolistic
players withhold exports, prices rise and the fringe can capture rents by expanding its
supply.
The results for 2006 reveal a relatively high degree of competition, particularly in the
Atlantic market. In the Pacific market, we note that prices exceed marginal costs of
delivery and that the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one.
Hence, the market outcome is not fully efficient from a welfare perspective, suggesting
that some non-competitive mechanisms also apply. Furthermore, we reject our non-
competitive oligopoly with competitive fringe scenario. In this setup, too much quantity
is withheld, and consequently, prices are high when compared to actual data.
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) also find that prices deviate from marginal costs and real
market trade flows are more diversified than in the competitive scenario. Our results
are qualitatively consistent with their conclusion that steam coal trade is better charac-
terised by perfect competition than by a non-cooperative Cournot game in 2006.
3.6.2 Simulation results for the year 2008
Analysis of the seaborne steam coal market in 2008 reveals a different picture. In 2008,
steam coal import prices soared to very high levels of more than 140 USD/t on average in
the core demand regions (see Figure 3.3). Clearly, by comparing competitive (marginal
cost-based) prices of 2006 (see Figure 3.2) with corresponding prices of 2008 (see Figure
3.3), we see that marginal costs of supply increased significantly between 2006 and 2008,
too. However, the cost increment is not high enough to cause price spikes as those
seen in 2008. For example, import prices in Europe were 147 USD/t, while simulated
marginal cost prices (including seaborne freight rates) are 100 USD/t. Consequently, the
remaining spread of 47 USD/t between marginal costs and actual prices is too large to
justify perfectly competitive conduct on the seaborne trade market in this year. However,
we can also reject the hypothesis of the Cournot-Nash oligopoly with competitive fringe
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in this market from a price perspective. Oligopolistic mark-ups are too high, and prices
in the Cournot setup again exceed actual prices substantially.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2008.
With regard to trade patterns, we observe that (as in 2006) certain competitive mech-
anisms seem to apply (see Table 3.7). Trade relations in the Atlantic market are quite
accurately simulated in the competitive setup. The export structures of Colombia and
Russia, both major suppliers for Europe, are still well approximated by the competitive
model. However, the role of South Africa clearly changed. While South African ex-
porters shipped 90% of their production to Europe, this share has decreased to less than
70% in 2008. This shift of exports to the Pacific Basin is not efficient. The competitive
scenario shows that, from a cost minimisation perspective, South African coals should
be directed to the European market. Thus, in the real market, South African exporters
could accrue higher rents in the Pacific Basin, indicating that prices were inefficiently
high in Asian import regions.
Furthermore, U.S. exports to Europe deviate significantly with that of the U.S., sup-
plying about 15 mt more than in reality. This result may be explained by the neglect
of the U.S. domestic coal market in the model. Some of the export mining capacity
attributed to the U.S. in the model normally serves the domestic market but generally
has access to export infrastructure and the necessary coal quality to trade its product on
the maritime market. However, exports depend not only on prices in the international
market but also on domestic prices and contractual obligations. These issues can only
be addressed by explicitly modelling the domestic markets.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in mt (energy adjusted).
SA RU VE VN IR CO PRC the U.S. AU PL NW
Actual 2008
Europe 44 64 3 1 14 32 2 15 2 3 3
North America 1 2 2 31 1
Latin America 2 1 1 1 8 1 1
China 1 19 25 1
Taiwan 1 29 11 19
Japan 1 11 2 27 11 67
Korea 1 9 1 26 16 19
India 12 22 1 1
South East Asia 2 26 2 1 5
Total 64 87 6 23 172 73 42 16 116 3 3
Perfect competition 2008
Europe 72 69 25 31 5 4
North America 5 37
Latin America 4 12 2
China 22 29
Taiwan 67
Japan 133
Korea 19 17 45
India 38
South East Asia 41
Total 72 88 8 22 192 74 45 31 135 5 4
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2008
Europe 20 69 31 24 3 28 5
North America 4 5 7 6 2 5 7
Latin America 2 3 3 2 1 3
China 6 5 11 5 5 10
Taiwan 7 13 13 7 6 11
Japan 13 5 23 13 12 26 22
Korea 9 13 15 8 9 14
India 5 8 4 3 7 4
South East Asia 5 4 9 4 4 8
Total 72 88 9 22 119 74 45 31 109 5 4
Actual Perfect Competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 606 677 577
Simulated trade flows are again more distorted in the Pacific market. In reality, the
three major players in the Asian market, Australia, Indonesia, and China, decide on a
trade pattern that deviates significantly from the welfare efficient solution. Although
the trade pattern of 2006 already suggested this, the effects are more pronounced in
2008. In light of competitive prices that are considerably lower than actual prices, the
hypothesis of perfect competition on the seaborne market is arguable in 2008.
Moreover, in 2008, the efficient equilibrium quantity of 677 mt was not supplied. Instead,
the total trade volume stood at 606 mt, implying that not all available supply capacity
was in operation. There are, in fact, a number of possibile reasons that export capacity
may have been scarce during 200849. Although such short-run bottlenecks are hard
49The national market in the U.S. may have had an impact on exports due to contractual obligations
or high demand. U.S. exports remained under their nominal capacity potential. Secondly, some export
collieries may not have reached full production capacity due to strikes and bad weather conditions (see
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to quantify it seems unlikely that they add up to more than 70 mt. However, steam
coal allocation also does not appear to be non-competitive in terms of the selected non-
competitive setup of Cournot behaviour. As in 2006, the diversified supply structure
in the Cournot setup has some appeal, but total traded volumes are again too low and
simulated prices too high.
3.6.3 Sensitivity analysis
Different assumptions for demand elasticities can have a large impact on simulated prices
and traded volumes if the reference equilibrium deviates from the simulated equilibrium.
We will illustrate this effect in Figure 3.4. Let S be the linear marginal cost curve, D
and D’ the linear demand curve for different elasticity values, and Eref the reference
equilibrium. The reference equilibrium is determined by the reference quantity qref and
the reference price pref. The capacity limit is denoted as qmax. The graph on the
left depicts a situation in which the reference equilibrium coincides with a simulated
competitive equilibrium. In this case, different elasticity values have little or no effect
on prices and trade volume, as just the slope of the demand function changes, but not
the intersection of demand with the supply curve.
qq
p p
pref
SS
D
D’ D
D’
pref
qref qmaxqref qmax
Eref
Eref
E’
E’’
Figure 3.4: Comparison of competitive market equilibria under different elastiticity
assumptions.
Ritschel (2011) and Xstrata (2008)). Thirdly, interactions between the thermal coal market and the
coking coal market may have had an impact. As a small proportion of a specific steam coal quality may
also be upgraded to low quality metallurgical coal by washing, the boom on global steel markets in 2008
may have forced some steel mills to use coals that otherwise would have served as thermal coal.
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The graph on the right outlines a situation in which the real market equilibrium and
the simulated competitive equilibrium in 2008 do not coincide. In contrast to the first
setup, the reference equilibrium is not on the marginal cost curve, and different price
elasticity values have a large effect and imply different model-based equilibria E’ and
E”. In such a situation, a competitive model cannot reproduce the reference equilibrium.
Hence, either the capacity limit qmax was temporarily shifted to the left due to short-term
bottlenecks or prices were strategically raised over marginal costs.
Consequently, we test our results presented in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 for robustness by
performing a sensitivity analysis regarding price elasticities of importing regions. We
test for the following values, which broadly fall in the range presented in Table 3.5: -0.1,
-0.3, -0.5 and -0.6. Elasticities are assumed not to differ between the importing regions
in each simulation run. Figure 3.5 presents a model and real market prices for different
elasticity runs for the year 2006.
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Figure 3.5: Prices in USD/t for different elasticity values (eta) in the year 2006 for
oligopoly with fringe (left) and perfect competition (right).
Clearly, model prices are more robust with regard to different elasticity assumptions in
the competitive scenario, indicating that reference and simulated equilibrium are close
to each other. Prices in the non-competitive scenario are significantly above actual 2006
price levels for all tested elasticity values. Also, capacity utilisation remains stable at
95% to 96% (see Table 3.8) for different elasticities. These are indicators for competitive
mechanisms to have applied in the real market during this year.
Figure 3.6 presents corresponding simulation results for the year 2008. In this case, the
picture is less straightforward. In the competitive scenario, prices differ widely with
regard to different elasticity values, thus indicating that reference and simulated equi-
librium differ significantly. Also, simulated prices remain lower than actual prices for
any elasticity tested. Although the supply capacity limit is reached in the competitive
scenario for higher elasticities (-0.5 and -0.6), model prices are still below actual prices50.
50Actually, traded quantity (reference quantitiy) is lower than the competitive market volume in the
simulation runs. Hence, demand would have to be infinitely price elastic (horizontal demand curve) to
match competitive model prices with real market prices at the capacity limit (vertical part of the supply
curve).
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The simulated competitive market size is larger than the historic market volume (refer-
ence quantities).
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Figure 3.6: Prices in USD/t for different elasticity values (eta) in the year 2008 for oligopoly
with fringe (left) and perfect competition (right)a.
aNote that results for eta = -0.1 were omitted in the left graph for the sake of clarity. In this case,
prices are well above 280 USD/t in most demand regions.
Both the oligopolistic and the competitive scenarios show relatively robust prices for
higher elasticities (-0.5 and -0.6). However, oligopolistic prices fit actual prices better.
In the case of an elasticity value of -0.5, model prices are close to real market prices in
major importing regions (except for China), and total model market volume is close to
the real market outcome. However, trade flows are again distorted under the oligopoly
market structure and therefore we still reject the oligopolistic scenario as an explanation
for real market outcomes. See Appendix for a comparison of simulated trade flows with
actual trade flows in this case.
Table 3.8: Capacity utilisation for different values of elasticity, in percent.
Oligopoly with fringe Perfect competition
Capacity utilisation 2006 2008 2006 2008
eta = -0.6 85.9% 91.6% 96.0% 100.0%
eta = -0.5 85.3% 89.5% 95.9% 100.0%
eta = -0.3 83.9% 84.9% 95.5% 99.6%
eta = -0.1 82.2% 79.6% 95.0% 93.2%
Furthermore, coal demand elasticity of more than -0.3 might seem to be unrealistic for
major Asian importing countries. South Korean and Japanese coal-fired power plants
experienced a major cost advantage compared to natural gas-fired power plants during
most of 2008, which was also significantly higher than the cost advantage of coal in
Europe (Figure 3.7). As outlined in Section 3.4.3, a detailed bottom-up analysis yielded
a coal demand elasticity of -0.43 for the European power system in 2008. Due to the
even higher advantage of coal in power generation in Asian import regions, it is therefore
rather unlikely that coal demand elasticity for Asian importers has been as high as
in Europe. Even after taking into account ramping capabilities and long-term fuel
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contracts, such high-cost advantages would probably lead to lower elasticity figures of
around -0.3, the value we initially assumed in our base scenario for 2008. The cost
advantage of coal in Asia in power generation stemmed mostly from the very high oil-
indexed LNG prices in 2008. LNG imports in these countries comprise virtually the
total gas supply in Asian countries.









	

	 	
	 
	 
	
  
Figure 3.7: Cost advantage of coal vs. natural gas in power generationa, (Source:
EEX, 2011, IEA, 2011a, 2010).
aWe assume average coal power plant efficiencies of 41% (Japan), 40% (Germany), and 36% (Korea)
(IEA, 2010). Assumptions for average gas power plant efficiencies are 47% (Germany, Korea, Japan).
Carbon intensities are 0.335 tCO2/MWhth for coal and 0.201 tCO2/MWhth for natural gas (Nagl et al.,
2011).
3.7 Discussion of 2008 results
In general, the elasticity analysis confirms that competitive models are unable to repro-
duce real market outcomes in terms of prices and traded quantities in the year 2008.
This result is, however, dependent on the availability of supply capacity. The supply
capacity conducted by Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008), Bayer et al. (2009), as well as
Rademacher and Braun (2011) demonstrate that substantial capacity expansion projects
came on line in 2007 and 2008. According to our analysis, total (name-plate) supply
capacity would have been sufficient to meet demand in 2008 without rationing for elas-
ticities below -0.3. For higher elasticities, demand is rationed to some degree, but actual
prices still exceed model prices.
The elasticity analysis also confirms that a Cournot market structure for trade market
players is also not able to explain the market outcome in 2008 satisfactorily. However,
some objections regarding competition in steam coal trade remain: First, port ownership
structure in major exporting countries like Colombia or South Africa, where consortia
of multinational mining companies commonly operate the crucial export terminals, may
give them the potential to withhold quantities by adjusting coal through-put. Second,
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Indonesia and China have recently developed national coal strategies that give their
national authorities tighter control over production and exports and thus the potential
to restrict exports. Both countries have intervened in resource markets before - Indonesia
as a former member of OPEC and China as the dominant supplier of rare earth elements.
Other non-competitive strategies which differ from simple simultaneous-move Cournot
games might also help in explaining trade in 2008. In our opinion, another quite suitable
non-competitive concept is that of pivotal suppliers. In a tight market, one or several
individual suppliers may be pivotal in a sense that, without (part of) their supply,
capacity demand would have to be rationed. A prominent historical example of such
pivotal suppliers can be seen in the case of the Californian Electricity market during
summer 2000 (see e.g. Joskow and Kahn, 2002). In the steam coal trade market, short-
term bottlenecks may have additionally tightened supply in 2008 so that even individual
large companies may have been pivotal in this year51. Even though a supplier may be
pivotal occasionally, it is unclear if the exertion of market power is also profitable.
Profitability depends on the distribution of his assets along the global supply curve (the
slope of the individual marginal cost curve) as well as on the gradient of the demand
curve and thus the price increment a withheld unit yields. Such a strategy may explain
why international steam coal trade appears competitive in one year and non-competitive
in another year.
3.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the allocation and pricing of steam coal in the seaborne trade
market in a model-based approach. We tested for a competitive and an oligopolistic
market structure in the years 2006 and 2008. Our principal findings are three. First,
despite some distortions in the Pacific market, trade flows and prices in the competitive
scenario fit the actual market data well in 2006. This result is qualitatively consistent
with Haftendorn and Holz (2010) and is robust for different elasticity values. Second, the
competitive scenario is not able to reproduce real market outcomes in 2008. Generally,
prices are too low, market volume is too high, and trade flows show an unrealistically low
degree of diversification in this scenario. Third, the assumed oligopoly scenario cannot
explain market equilibria in any year either, but the trade pattern is generally more
realistically diversified in this scenario. Yet, model prices and total market volume fits
real market data well only under certain, quite unrealistic, demand elasticity assumptions
in the oligopolistic scenario.
51Other than electricity, steam coal generally is a storable commodity; however, there exist no large-
scale strategic stocks like those in oil and gas markets.
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The analysis illustrates that not all available supply capacity was utilised to satisfy
import demand in 2008. Name-plate supply capacity would have been sufficient for most
elasticity values to serve demand without rationing. However, it remains unclear whether
capacities were withheld strategically or if unknown bottlenecks restricted exports during
this year. Although bad weather conditions and social tensions may have hampered
coal exports locally, there is so far no evidence regarding the impact of such bottlenecks
on the whole steam coal market. However, in light of the sustained high prices for
internationally traded steam coal, it is arguable whether such bottlenecks have persisted
over several years.
In the context of the pivotal role of individual suppliers in times of high demand, the
importance of coal in energy supply and the inability of competitive models to repro-
duce recent market equilibria, further research on steam coal market economics may be
interesting. We suggest that future research focus on including domestic markets as well
as other non-competitive pricing strategies, such as pivotal supplier behaviour.

Chapter 4
Nations as strategic players in
global commodity markets:
Evidence from world coal trade
4.1 Introduction
Recently, the development of global commodity prices has given serious cause for concern
regarding the competitiveness of global commodity markets. This is especially true for
natural resource markets and the trade of fossil energy fuels in particular. While the
foundation of OPEC in the 1960s can be viewed as a well-known case for promoting
strategic trade- and resource policies, other markets for natural resources have just
recently been politicised. A prominent example is the rare earth elements industry
in China. Since 2008-2009, the Chinese government made significant efforts to bring
this resource sector under tight control through industry consolidation and creation of
strategic stocks and, most importantly, by imposing trade restrictions upon exports
of rare earth elements. Recent discussions have addressed whether the aim of this
policy was indeed the conservation of domestic resources or the preparation of monopoly
power exploitation against high technology nations such as Japan and the West (Hurst,
2010, Stone, 2009). Both examples also indicate the variety of trade policy instruments.
Next to cartelisation and export quotas, governments levy taxes on imports or subsidise
exports. In markets in which production takes place through a large number of small
units (e.g., for agricultural products), marketing of exports is often conducted by trade
associations. In other markets, exporting firms might be partly or entirely nationalised,
being subject to governmental strategic influence (e.g., natural gas exporters). Such
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trade policy instruments can be intended to increase national welfare by influencing the
market outcome in a non-competitive manner.
Another commodity market that has raised doubts regarding its competitiveness is the
market for internationally traded steam coal (Tru¨by and Paulus, 2011). For decades,
international coal trade has been considered competitive, since production is geographi-
cally dispersed and is carried out by a blend of multinational private mining companies,
large state-run entities, and various smaller national players (Kolstad and Abbey, 1984).
However, recent developments in international steam coal trade have lead to concerns
about market structure and conduct. Indeed, several institutional developments sup-
port the hypothesis of steam coal market distortion. Firstly, strong economic growth
in Asia has lead to increased coal demand and has thus shifted the center of gravity
and price setting from the Atlantic to the Pacific market area. Secondly, coal prices
soared between 2006 and 2008 and have since remained relatively high. Thirdly, several
recent adjustments of national resource strategies of the People’s Republic of China and
Indonesia indicate an increasing potential for strategic behaviour on a national level in
recent years52.
During the period of the 11th Five Year Plan (2005-2010), the People’s Republic of
China has adopted several national policies in an attempt to restructure and streamline
its domestic coal industry (NDRC, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese authorities have sig-
nificantly lowered coal export quotas and introduced export taxes for coal during this
period, thus increasing its tight control over exports (NDRC, 2008).
Moreover, Indonesian steam coal production and exports have undergone a rapid expan-
sion in recent years (IEA, 2011a). This development indicates a switch in the Indonesian
national resource policy from oil exports to coal exports. Indonesia pulled out of OPEC
in early 2009 in the eyes of diminishing oil stocks and production as well as strong do-
mestic oil demand. Therefore, Indonesia may be currently promoting the strategy to
become the dominant player in Asian coal markets to offset its declining oil revenues.
The implementation of national resource policies in China and Indonesia have led to a
structural shift of steam coal supply in the Pacific basin in recent years. This may have
given the authorities of either country the potential to exert market power on a national
level.
This paper therefore analyses the export patterns of major national players in the world
steam coal market to identify whether Indonesian and Chinese resource policies support
the hypothesis of strategic market behaviour on a national level. This analysis is broadly
52These developments have severely affected several OECD countries severely and have increased
concerns about security of supply, as the major coal consuming nations depend heavily on imports of
steam coal. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan import virtually all of their coals and Europe’s average
import dependency amounts up to more than 60%.
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related to the empirical literature on strategic trade policy, which has been developed
since the seminal theoretical papers of Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Gross-
man (1986) and others. A large part of the empirical contributions to this topic focus on
international markets for agricultural goods and make use of diverse methods of analysis
(see for example Reimer and Stiegert (2006) for an overview). A recent contribution was
made by McCorriston and MacLaren (2007), who analysed the effect of state trading
enterprises on international trade in an oligopoly setup. Their model calibration for
the global wheat market showed that countries are able to influence trade through such
enterprises and that these trade distortions yield significant welfare effects. The existing
literature on non-competitive market conduct of national players in international steam
coal trade so far focuses on maritime trade. Maritime trade is a submarket of the global
market and excludes domestic trade. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the first to apply
a partial equilibrium model to analyse strategic behaviour in seaborne steam coal trade
in the early 1980s. The authors find that a non-competitive market structure consisting
of a duopoly and a monopsony simulated the actual trade patterns well. However, since
then, the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. In a recent paper, Haften-
dorn and Holz (2010) analyse a number of major maritime coal trade routes and test
whether trade volumes on these routes fit competitive or oligopolistic behaviour during
the years 2005 and 2006. Their results suggest that steam coal trade market is better
represented by perfect competition in the analysed periods. However, Tru¨by and Paulus
(2011) model seaborne trade using an equilibrium approach and show that competitive
models are unable to reproduce the steam coal trade market equilibria in 2008.
We develop a static partial equilibrium model to test our hypothesis of non-competitive
market behaviour exercised through strategic trade policy in global steam coal trade.
The model allows us to simulate perfect competition as well as non-competitive market
structures in which players act under a Cournot behaviour assumption. We design the
model as a mixed complementarity programme (MCP) by deriving the first-order opti-
mality conditions of the associated optimisation problem. Modeling of spatial equilibria
in commodity markets has already been scrutinised since Samuelson (1952) who ap-
plied linear optimisation techniques for competitive market structures. Takayama and
Judge (1964) generalised spatial market economics for the non-linear case and multi-
commodity markets and Harker (1986a) and Yang et al. (2002) developed conditions for
various non-competitive spatial market equilibria. The application of such equilibrium
modelling techniques to analyse market conduct is an active field of commodities re-
search, e.g. in gas markets (Egging et al., 2010, Holz et al., 2008), in electricity markets
(Lise and Hobbs, 2008, Mu¨sgens, 2006) or in coking coal markets (Graham et al., 1999).
Using our model, we test different hypotheses on market conduct and validate model
results for the year 2008. In contrast to the majority of previous papers using equilibrium
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programming techniques, we validate our results applying a series of non-parametric
tests such as the Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient test
and the Theil inequality coefficient. Based on these statistics, our main finding is that
the perfect competition hypothesis can be clearly rejected while a market structure
setup with China and Indonesia acting as non-cooperative Cournot players best fits
observed trade flows and prices in 2008. Official Chinese steam coal export quotas in
2008 were consistent with simulated Chinese export volumes under a Cournot strategy.
Additionally, diversification of simulated Chinese exports streams are close to Chinese
real-world export patterns in this case.
Thus, our paper extends the existing literature in two important ways: First, we account
for interdependencies and feedback between domestic and international steam coal mar-
kets by explicitly modelling all relevant coal fields. Hence, we avoid strong assumptions
on export potentials and extramarginal supply costs on the seaborne trade market. Sec-
ond, we outline a rationale and provide empirical evidence for strategic trade policy on
a national level to profitably influence steam coal market equilibria in 2008.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 4.2 we outline what
implications a trade market-only vs. a global market analysis yields and then focus on
potentials for market power sources of several actors. We describe the model and data
used in section 4.3. Main findings are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes
the paper.
4.2 Steam coal market economics
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and con-
sumed in domestic markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production was 5850 mt (IEA,
2011a). The two largest domestic markets are China and the U.S. together comprising
more than 65% of total production. About 13% of the global steam coal production
is exported and traded internationally and more than 90% of international steam coal
trade is seaborne.
The seaborne export market can be divided into a Pacific and an Atlantic market re-
gion53. Major importing regions in the Atlantic market are the U.S. and Europe (in-
cluding neighboring Mediterranean countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany
at the top. Traditionally these importing regions are primarily supplied by South Africa,
Colombia and Russia.
53From a market integration perspective the steam trade coal market can be considered well integrated
(Li, 2008, Warell, 2006). Nevertheless, we use this labeling in a qualitative way in the scope of this paper
to better structure our analysis of market actors.
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The Pacific market has grown more dynamically in recent years. High quantities are
imported by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - all three of them having virtually no
indigenous coal production, and therefore they rely heavily on imports. However, most
of the growth has come from emerging import regions like India, Southeast Asia, and
China. The supply side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia, although the sustained
high prices in Asia have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa and very
recently also from Colombia.
In the export market two different types of suppliers interact with each other: Coun-
tries that have a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiefly
inland-oriented mining industries (Bayer et al., 2009, Kopal, 2007). The export-oriented
countries primarily comprise South Africa, Colombia, Australia and Indonesia and hold
most of the supply capacity. These export industries usually have a cost advantage over
domestic industries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs and economical access to
transport infrastructure. Countries with mainly inland oriented mining supply primar-
ily are China, the U.S., India and Russia. These countries have some dedicated export
collieries but a significant part of the mining capacity can serve both the national and
the international market. However, interaction between dedicated export mines with
domestic markets and domestic mines with export markets is most times limited; coal
exporters often face a geographical disadvantage in supplying domestic markets as they
are often located close to the coast within the vicinity of export terminals. Frequently,
these export mines are also not well integrated into the domestic transportation railway
system to allow for cost-efficient movement of coal to domestic power plants. Con-
versely, mines serving the domestic markets are often located deeper inland54 and face
high transport costs for moving coal to the export market. Furthermore, coal quality
requirements differ significantly between the export and domestic markets, which means
that coal upgrading, washing and drying could be necessary to bring domestic coals to
export standards.
4.2.1 Market structure
Before we formally investigate non-competitive behaviour in the steam coal market, we
informally discuss if there are indications of participants’ actual potential to exercise
market power. Market power potential may exist in the steam coal market in the form
of single large coal-producing and -exporting countries behaving in a non-competitive
manner. This holds especially true for China and Indonesia.
54e.g. the Powder River Basin in the U.S., the coal bearing regions of Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia in
China or several Russian coal production regions (Schiffer and Ritschel, 2007).
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China has increasingly made use of policy instruments, i.e. quotas and/or taxation,
to tightly control participation of Chinese firms in the international trade market in
recent years55. Firstly, political regulations require domestic mining companies to apply
for special licenses that allow for a defined export volume. Quotas on steam coal are
set and allocated by Chinese institutions on a yearly basis; nevertheless, they may be
subject to readjustments in case of political or economical requirements; e.g., the total
export volume restriction for steam coal in 2007 was 70 mt and has been reduced to 47.7
mt in 2008 (NDRC, 2007, 2008). Secondly, the Chinese government levies export taxes
on steam coal. In 2008 export taxes have been increased to 10% compared to no export
tariff for steam coal in 2007 (TRCSC, 2008). These taxes significantly increased the costs
of Chinese coal on the trade market and thus may have had an additional impact on
actual export volumes. Finally, political requirements in the coal industry consolidation
process have added heavy restrictions on market entry which have strengthened the
position of a few very large state-controlled coal companies (Sun and Xu, 2009).
While indications for market power executed on a nationwide level are less obvious in
Indonesia, there exists a mine ownership structure that is quite special: mining rights
have been awarded mostly to international mining companies in the early eighties. How-
ever, foreign investors were obliged to offer at least 51 percent of shares to Indonesian
companies or the government after 10 years of mine production (Baruya, 2009). Mining
rights awarded in the 1990s and later went exclusively to Indonesian companies. This
led to the current situation, where the majority of steam coal mine production facilities
in Indonesia are owned by large Indonesian consortia56 or by the government. Thus,
Indonesian policy makers have significant indirect influence on coal export volumes of a
majority of Indonesia’s coal mining sector. An additional influence is Indonesia’s geog-
raphy: a large amount of steam coal can be shipped by barges via the navigable rivers of
Kalimantan to offshore loading terminals or directly to Thailand or South China (Schif-
fer and Ritschel, 2007). This means that Indonesian export infrastructure is practically
not capacity constrained, an element that would have allowed Indonesia to export higher
volumes than it actually did in 2008. One possible explanation could be that Indone-
sia actively pursued limits on exports in order to keep international market prices at a
higher level.
The exertion of market power may be supported by important barriers to entry and ca-
pacity expansion restrictions in the steam coal market. Firstly, high political risk and/or
the lack of financial resources and technical capability are effective barriers against the
market entry of developing countries with so far untapped high quality coal fields such
55Similar government policies on various raw materials are documented by Hurst (2010).
56One example is PT BUMI Resources which owns the mining companies PT Arutmin and PT Kaltim
Prima Coal which together accounted for 54 million tonnes or 32% of Indonesian steam coal exports in
2007.
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as those in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Secondly, export capacity expansion
usually requires coordination of infrastructure and mining capacity upgrading with dif-
ferent stakeholders being involved. This process can be very slowly as the example of
South Africa shows, where mining companies upgraded production and export terminal
facilities but national railway expansion still lags behind. Such restrictions are particu-
larly delaying for greenfield projects which need access to transport infrastructure.
4.2.2 Implications of an export market analysis vs. an integrated anal-
ysis of export and domestic markets
In the case of the coal market, previous literature has so far focused on testing for non-
competitive behaviour in the export market. Even though interaction between domestic
supply and dedicated export supply is sometimes hampered by transport costs, limited
transport capacity or coal quality, we argue that interaction between domestic markets
and international trade does exist57. In the following, we consider that a strategic
national player is an entity that maximises welfare for a given commodity in its domestic
market plus its producer rent from sales to the export market less costs.
Proposition 4.1. If the export market price is sufficiently high, and dedicated export ca-
pacities are constrained, then dedicated domestic production will enter the global market
even if it has a cost disadvantage.
Proof: see Appendix.
Intuitively, domestic supply will enter the export market if marginal cost (including
the cost disadvantage of domestic production) equals marginal export revenues. If we
consider that the national player acts competitively, the marginal export revenue is
equal to export market prices. In this case, a setup that takes into account only the
trade market will be rendered inconsistent if export prices rise just high enough. If the
national player pursues a non-competitive strategy (e.g., a` la Cournot), the same holds
true. However, export market prices have to be higher, as in this case the national
player will account for the price reduction inferred by supplying additional volumes to
the export market. If we look at real coal prices in the export market and thus marginal
57This is especially true for some of the large domestic markets like China and the U.S. Historically,
both countries have adjusted their export volume depending on the difference between the export market
price and domestic market prices. Furthermore, transport infrastructure for domestic mines did not seem
to be a bottleneck in 2008: Chinese coal exports peaked in 2005 with exports of approximately 80 mt.
U.S. coal exports were around 100 mt in the early 1990s. Therefore, coal exports in 2008 of 54 mt in
the case of China and 74 mt in the case of the U.S. where most probably not constrained by transport
capacity.
Chapter 4. Nations as strategic players in global commodity markets: Evidence from
world coal trade 72
revenues, it can be observed that they were particularly high in 2008 (IEA, 2011a) which
makes an interaction between domestic supply and export markets quite likely.
Based on the information about the current market structure we define three hypotheses
for our investigation of potential non-competitive behaviour in the steam coal trade
market:
H1: steam coal market results in 2008 correspond to a perfectly competitive market
setting.
H2: Indonesia acts as a strategic national player in the steam coal export market against
a competitive fringe of other producers.
H3: China and Indonesia both act as non-cooperative strategic national players in the
steam export coal market besides a competitive fringe.
In the following, we will develop a large-scale empirical model to verify which hypotheses
we can reject.
4.3 The model
In this section, we develop the model and describe the data we used. We will also
outline our market structure scenarios and depict statistical methods we will use to
compare model results with actual data. The model is structured to allow us to find
the spatial equilibrium of prices and trade flows between a given set of players given
assumptions about their market conduct and objective functions. We model three types
of players: national producers, which maximise their producer rents from sales to the
export market in a Cournot fashion and at the same time maximise the overall welfare
in their domestic coal markets (strategic players); producers that act in a competitive
manner as price takers on the export market and also as welfare maximisers in their
domestic coal markets (competitive fringe); and demand regions without significant coal
production that act as price takers. All producers maximise profits subject to a number
of capacity constraints and energy balance equations58.
As demonstrated by Kolstad and Burris (1986), Salant (1982) and recently by Lise and
Krusemann (2008) and by Montero and Guzman (2010), different types of Cournot
58We model energy flows that account for consumers buying energy, not mass. All capacities and cost
functions for production and transport are normalised to a standard coal energy content in each mining
region. This methodology has already been used by Paulus and Tru¨by (2011). For the sake of simplicity
we suppress the energy-mass parameters in the model formulation.
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games can be mapped by a term that is a producer’s conjecture about the response of
other producers to a change in their production volume59. This term can be inserted
in the producers pricing equation to reflect that player’s degree of market power. This
term can be viewed as oligopolistic rent of the producer trading at a price above his
marginal costs of supply.
4.3.1 Model statement
The model contains a topology of nodes n ∈ N . All nodes can be subdivided into
mining regions m ∈ M , export terminals e ∈ E and demand regions d ∈ D so that
N = M ∪D ∪E. The roles of nodes are mutually exclusive M ∩D = ∅, M ∩E = ∅ and
D ∩ E = ∅. Furthermore, there exists a set of players p ∈ P . In our model, players are
nations with significant steam coal production. Players p ∈ P control mining regions
m ∈Mp, export terminals e ∈ Ep as well as demand regions d ∈ Dp. Mining regions can
only be controlled by one player Mp ∩Mp′ = ∅, ∀ p 6= p′, p, p′ ∈ P . This relation also
holds true for export terminals Ep ∩ Ep′ = ∅, ∀ p 6= p′, p, p′ ∈ P . Nodes are connected
through transport arcs (i, j) ∈ A ⊂ N ×N . Sets, parameters and variables of the model
are found in Table 4.1.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows: We first develop the optimisation
problem, then we state the corresponding first-order optimality conditions solved by
each player type. The first-order conditions together with the market-clearing conditions
define the Nash-Cournot game for the worldwide steam coal market.
The variables in parentheses on the right hand side of each constraint are the Lagrange
multipliers used when developing the first-order conditions. The complementary slack-
ness condition is indicated by a ⊥ sign, where 0 = x ⊥ y = 0 ⇔ xty = 0 for vectors x
and y.
Profit maximisation of producers
Player p ∈ P maximises his pay-off which is defined as producer rent from the export
market plus overall welfare from domestic coal markets minus costs for production,
shipping and turnover. The pay-off function POp (zp) : R
|Mp|+|A|+|D| 7→ R and the
corresponding decision vector zp can then be written as:
59 Our Cournot model formulation can be interpreted as a quota system that restricts exports to the
Cournot-Nash outcome. Other Cournot model formulations with taxes instead of quotas of course yield
the same equilibrium (see e.g. Kolstad and Abbey, 1984).
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Table 4.1: Model sets, parameters and variables.
Sets
n ∈ N Model region nodes
m ∈M ⊂ N Mining region nodes
e ∈ E ⊂ N Export terminal nodes
d ∈ D ⊂ N Demand region nodes
(i, j) ∈ A ⊂ N ×N Transport arcs
p ∈ P Model players
m ∈Mp ⊂M Mine regions controlled by player p
e ∈ Ep ⊂ E Export terminals controlled by player p
Parameters
Cpm Production cost function of player p in mine region m
CapMm Mining capacity in mining region m
CapEe Throughput capacity at export terminal e
CapT(n,n′) Transport capacity between node n and node n
′
cT(n,n′) Transport costs between node n and node n
′
cEe Turnover costs at export terminal e
ad Intercept of inverse demand function in demand region d
bd Slope of inverse demand function in demand region d
tp→d VAT adjustments for exports from player p to demand region d
rp→d Player p‘s aggregate conjecture for demand region d
Variables
spm Production of player p in mining region m
qp(n,n′) Transport volume of player p from node n to node n
′
vd Import price for player p in region d
xpd Trade volume from player p from mining region m to demand region d
λpn Dual variable associated with the energy balance constraint in node n
µpm Dual variable associated with the mine capacity constraint in region m
pe Dual variable associated with the export capacity constraint in port e
φ(n,n′) Dual variable associated with the capacity constraint on arc an,n′
max
zp∈Ωp
POp (zp) =
∑
d∈D−p
vd
(
X−d + x
p
d
)
xpd +
∑
d∈Dp
∫ Xd
0
vd(u)du
−
∑
m∈Mp
Cpm(s
p
m)−
∑
(n,n′)∈A
qp(n,n′)c
T
(n,n′) −
∑
(e,n′)∈A
qp(e,n′)c
E
e , (4.1)
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with X−d =
∑
p′∈P− x
p′
d . POp is continuously differentiable and concave in the case
that Cpm and vd are continuously differentiable and C
p
m is convex and vd is concave.
Profit maximisation for every producer p ∈ P is constrained by a set of restrictions for
transport and production capacities (dual variables in parentheses):
CapMm − spm ≥ 0, (µpm) ∀ m ∈Mp, (4.2)
CapEe −
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(n,n′) ≥ 0, (pe) ∀ e ∈ Ep, (4.3)
CapT(n,n′) −
∑
p′∈P
qp
′
(n,n′) ≥ 0, (φ(n,n′)) ∀ (n, n′) ∈ A. (4.4)
Our model incorporates a complex network topology that allows for routing of sales
volumes along different paths and several nodes; we use the notion of path variables
qp(n,n′) (Harker, 1986b). This concept enables us to map trade flows from mines to
demand regions along several intermediary nodes.
Energy balance equations have to hold for mining regions m ∈Mp:
spm +
∑
(n,m)∈A
qp(n,m) =
∑
(m,n)∈A
qp(m,n) (λ
p
m) ∀ m ∈Mp, (4.5)
for export regions e ∈ Ep:
∑
(n,e)∈A
qp(n,e) =
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(e,n) (λ
p
e) ∀ e ∈ Ep, (4.6)
and for demand regions d ∈ D:
∑
(n,d)∈A
qp(n,d) = x
p
d +
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(e,n) (λ
p
d) ∀ d ∈ D. (4.7)
The objective function (4.1) and equations (4.2) to (4.7) define the maximisation problem
Ωp. In the case that the objective function Pp is concave and all depicted constraints
are convex and all functions are continuously differentiable, the formulated optimisation
problem can be represented by its first order optimality conditions. In this case, the
first order derivatives constitute necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions.
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Producer optimality conditions
We develop the Lagrangian L of the original problem Ωp. In the following, we derive the
first order optimality conditions from L. The first order partial derivative w.r.t. export
volumes xpd between player p ∈ P and d ∈ D− is given by
vd(Xd)−
(
λpd −
(
∂vd
∂xpd
+
∂vd
∂X−d
∂X−d
∂xpd
)
xpd
)
tp→d ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ D−. (4.8)
The first term is the price in node d and the second term gives the marginal cost of
supply of player p to node d. The third term is the Cournot mark-up depending on
the marginal change of consumer price if player p changes xpd marginally. We adjust
prices by value added tax differences and royalties between different model regions by
multiplying export prices with the term tp→d. In equilibrium, if xpd ≥ 0, the achieved
price of exports pd has to offset marginal costs of supply to node d and the marginal
price decrease caused by this export flow in d.
The Cournot player perceives that the demand function in d is downward sloping and
thus can extract an oligopolistic producer rent by withholding volumes. His sales decision
for d also depends on his perception on how sales of competitors for d change, given a
change in his sales:
∂vd
∂xpd
+
∂vd
∂X−d
∂X−d
∂xpd
=
∂vd
∂xpd
(1 + rp→d). (4.9)
∂vd
∂xpd
= rp→d is the aggregate conjecture60 of player p on how export flows from all other
players p∗ ∈ P− change given a change in its own export trade volume to demand region
d. For perfect competition, rp→d equals -1 and for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium this term
equals 0.
P behaves as a welfare maximiser in his domestic national markets. First-order pricing
conditions for P ’s supply xpd in domestic markets d ∈ Dp are defined as:
vd(Xd)− λpd ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ Dp, (4.10)
which means that P is behaving as a price taker in its domestic markets.
60Kolstad and Burris (1986) for example elaborate more on this topic. Such games were applied in
equilibrium energy market modelling e.g. by Graham et al. (1999), Chen et al. (2006) or Lise and
Krusemann (2008).
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Single mining regions are assumed to behave competitively, supplying at marginal cost
levels plus scarcity rents for congested mining capacity
∂Cpm(s
p
m)
∂spm
+ µpm − λpm ≥ 0 ⊥ spm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mp. (4.11)
For the mine production cost Cpm, we choose a function of production volume s
p
m accord-
ing to Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995). In their paper the authors present a production
cost function, for which the marginal supply cost curve has an intercept αm ≥ 0 and then
follows a linear trend with slope βm ≥ 0 until production reaches almost the capacity
limit. As soon as the supply level approaches production capacity limits the marginal
costs can increase exponentially depending on a parameter γm ≤ 0. The economic in-
tuition behind this functional form for marginal costs is that prices during periods with
higher demand are in reality often set by older mine deposits. As geological conditions
decline, these mines face significantly higher costs and have to reduce their production
output due to geological constraints and limited reserves. These high-cost mine fields
serve as spare capacity during demand peaks and reduce their output if demand declines.
The marginal supply cost function ∂C
p
m(s
p
m)
∂spm
= cpm : [0, CapMm ) 7→ R+ for player p ∈ P
and mine m ∈Mp is strictly convex and continuously differentiable and is defined as:
cpm(s
p
m) = αm + βms
p
m + γm ln
(
CapMm − spm
CapMm
)
, αm, βm ≥ 0, γm ≤ 0. (4.12)
Price efficiency conditions have to hold for every transport connection (n, n′) ∈ A. For
transport connections going out from mining regions m ∈M and from demand regions
d ∈ D price efficiency occurs when marginal costs of supply λpn and λpn′ only differ
by transport costs and a possible markup for scarcity rents in the case of congested
transport capacity φ(n,n′) if q
p
(n,n′) ≥ 0.
λpn + c
T
(n,n′) + φ(n,n′) − λpn′ ≥ 0 ⊥ qp(n,n′) ≥ 0, ∀n, n′ ∈Mp ∪D ∧ (n, n′) ∈ A. (4.13)
similar conditions hold for transport connections going out from export terminals but
include an additional scarcity markup variable for congested export terminal capacity
pe,
λpe + c
T
(e,n) + φ(e,n) + 
p
e − λpn ≥ 0 ⊥ qp(e,n) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ Ep, ∧ (e, n) ∈ A. (4.14)
Chapter 4. Nations as strategic players in global commodity markets: Evidence from
world coal trade 78
Market clearing conditions
In addition to the derived first order optimality conditions we assume that there is
no market power on the demand side and that all markets in demand regions d ∈ D
are cleared when players have decided on their strategies. We choose a linear, strictly
decreasing demand function vd(Xd) : R
+ 7→ R+ of the form vd = ad + bdXd. The
slope bd is defined as bd =
vrefd
Xrefd
1
σd
, and the intercept ad can be written as ad = v
ref
d −
bdX
ref
d , where σd, v
ref
d and X
ref
d are the demand elasticity, reference price and total
reference consumption in demand region d, respectively. This leads to the following
inverse demand function:
vd = v
ref
d +
1
σd
(∑
p′∈P x
p′
d
Xrefd
− 1
)
, vd (free) ∀d ∈ D. (4.15)
We can now calculate:
∂vd
∂xpd
=
prefd
Xrefd
1
σd
= bd. (4.16)
Inserting (4.16) into the profit maximisation condition (4.8) yields to:
vd(Xd)−
(
λpd −
prefd
Xrefd
1
σd
(1 + rp→d)xpd
)
tp→d ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ D. (4.17)
If we bundle the equations (4.15) with the first order conditions (4.17), (4.11), (4.13),
(4.14) and capacity constrains (4.2) to (4.7) for all producers p ∈ P , the unique solution
to this set of (non)linear inequalities yields the equilibrium for the market. The resulting
system of inequalities is known as a mixed complementarity problem. This problem is
implemented in GAMS and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 1998).
4.3.2 Model parametrisation
Our assumptions regarding reference volumes, and for price elasticities of coal demand
in Europe are explained in detail in Tru¨by and Paulus (2011)61. Demand elasticities
for other regions are based on a broad literature review of econometric analyses on
61In this article, we use existing large-scale power sector dispatch models for Europe and iteratively
test a high number of steam coal price points. The model returns a minimum cost power plant dispatch
as well as steam coal consumption. The results show that the steam coal demand elasticity in the
European power sector was relatively low, -0.43 in 2008.
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inter-fuel substitution. While methodological approaches and the age of the reviewed
articles differ, all authors agree that the price elasticity of steam coal demand is inelastic
| σ |< 1. In this paper, we assume a price elasticity of steam coal demand of -0.3 for the
other world regions beside Europe.
Information on costs and capacities in the steam coal market is only available from a
multitude of heterogeneous sources. We use an extensive steam coal market database
in this analysis that has already been presented and used in one of our former analyses
(Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011)62.
We consider it crucial to capture not only isolated steam coal trade market economics
but also the interdependencies between the large domestic markets and the trade market.
Therefore, we have implemented a detailed network topology consisting of several dozen
mining regions, export terminals and demand regions (see Table 4.2). Note that our
model includes the two largest domestic markets, China and the US, which together
accounted for 65% of global hard coal production and 66% of global consumption. Other
major domestic markets are Russia and India which have also been taken into account.
Table 4.2: Model topology.
Mining regions & export terminalsa Demand regions
Australia 5 Russia 4
South Africa 3 U.S. 7
Indonesia 2 China 8
Russia 8 India 3
Colombia 2 Poland 2
Venezuela 2 Europe 3
Vietnam 2 Japan 1
U.S. 6 Korea (S.) 1
China 10 Taiwan 1
India 6 Asia, other 1
Poland 3
aBold faced entries are countries with large domestic steam coal markets that have been explicitly
modelled.
62Relevant publications on steam coal markets are available from public institutions like the IEA
(2011a) or the EIA (2007, 2010a,b). Comprehensive information is especially obtained from the published
reports of the IEA Clean Coal Center, e.g.: Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker
and Kowalchuk (2008). Furthermore, Ritschel (2011) and Schiffer and Ritschel (2007) depict recent
developments in the hard coal markets. Further publications include analyses from employees working
for international utilities as for example Bayer et al. (2009) and Kopal (2007). Industry yearbooks provide
useful information as it is the case for China (CCII, 2007, NBS, 2008). National statistics bureaus and
mineral ministries provide high quality information as for example ABARES (2011) and ABS (2006).
Not mentioned are a larger number of coal company annual reports as well as information based on
expert interviews. Information on average energy content is based on IEA (2011a), Ritschel (2011) and
BGR (2008). For Australia, ABS (2006) delivers detailed information, Baruya (2007) compares different
mining input factor structures on the global scale.
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4.3.3 Market structure scenarios
We simulate the global steam coal market trade for 2008 under four different assumptions
on market conduct and the nature of Chinese export quotas to test our hypotheses as
follows:
Perfect competition without Chinese export quota: This scenario assumes that
all producers and consumers act in a competitive manner. We further assume no
Chinese export quotas in this scenario in order to assess how unconstrained Chinese
export patterns would have looked like and how they would have influenced the
steam coal market.
Perfect competition with Chinese export quota: This scenario also assumes per-
fectly competitive behaviour of market players but incorporates the Chinese export
quota as a fixed export restriction. Thus, we assume that the export quota was
not necessarily set under strategic welfare maximisation objectives, but could exist
due to other political objectives like the conservation of domestic resources. With
this scenario, we may test for the competitiveness of the global steam coal market.
Indonesian monopoly with Chinese export quota: In this scenario we assume that
Indonesia, the largest exporter acts as a strategic national player besides a com-
petitive fringe of other market players. The Chinese export quota is modelled as a
fixed export restriction for the Chinese player who behaves as a price taker. This
scenario lets us test for the non-competitive behaviour of Indonesia.
China - Indonesia duopoly: Besides their large market shares, Indonesia and China
face special political, geographical and institutional characteristics that could po-
tentially support non-competitive behaviour. We therefore model both countries
as non-cooperative strategic players. With this scenario we may investigate if
Chinese export diversification and prices are consistent with a profit maximising
Cournot strategy, simultaneously with Indonesian market power.
4.3.4 Model validation using statistical tests
We assess the forecasting abilities of the model by comparing trade flows as well as trade
flow shares as a fraction of total trade with the actual values in 2008. We also validate
model prices with real price data.
In order to validate which of the market conduct scenarios fits the observed data best, we
employ a series of statistical techniques. Using common parametric tests in such a setup
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would lead to the violation of several assumptions, most importantly, that the error term
is normally distributed. Alternatively, it is possible to use non-parametric tests, which
do not make the same assumptions on distributions. We use two non-parametric tests
to validate our results: the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sign test and Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient test.
The Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test evaluates the signed-rank correlation between two sets on
the basis of a paired sample (Wilcoxon, 1945). We employ this test on the modelled
trade flow share matrix M and the observed trade flow share matrix O. (mpd, opd) are
the corresponding modelled and observed trade flow shares for all p ∈ P and d ∈ D.
The null hypothesis is that the model results predict actual trade.
An alternative test, that is also distribution-free is Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi-
cient test. Similar to Kolstad and Abbey (1984) and Graham et al. (1999) we try to
find if the observed trade shares and the error between predicted and observed values
has no rank-correlation, which would indicate that there is no association between the
error terms and the actual values. The regression of the observed values opd against the
predicted values mpd yields the following regression equation:
opd = α+ βmpd + uˆpd, ∀p ∈ P, d ∈ D
If our model would perfectly simulate each trade flow share, then β = 1 and α = 0.
To test for these parameter values, we let uˆpd = opd −mpd and test the extent of rank
correlation between opd and uˆpd by applying Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between observed values and the error
term between modelled and actual values or, equivalently, that the model predicts the
observed market outcome.
Furthermore, we also employ statistics without testing for interference: the Theil in-
equality coefficient is the root mean squared error of two datasets scaled to the [0, 1]
interval (Theil, 1966). It measures how distant both datasets are from each other in a
statistical sense. In case of the Theil coefficient equaling zero, the modelled trade shares
are exactly the same as the actual ones. Therefore, the lower the Theil coefficient, the
better the model is suited as an indicator for the real market. Further information can
be obtained by calculating the covariance proportion, the variance proportion and the
bias proportion of the mean squared error (MSE). A good-quality forecast should have
an MSE which is mostly explained by the unsystematic error. In this case, the bias and
the variance proportion should be close to zero and the covariance proportion close to
one.
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Table 4.3: Comparison of statistics of actual and modelled trade flows in 2008.
Test statisticsa Market structure
PC w/o ex-
port quota
PC w. export
quota
Indonesia
monopoly w.
export quota
China -
Indonesia
duopoly
ρSpearman 0.328** 0.259** 0.186 0.162
zWilcoxon 2.53** 1.80* 1.17 0.62
Theil 0.42 0.352 0.214 0.152
Error term decomposition:
-Covariance proportion 0.934 0.848 0.835 0.935
-Variance proportion 0.078 0.165 0.174 0.063
- Bias proportion 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.018
RMSPE - Trade [%] 23.5 16.9 11.6 7.9
RMSPE - Prices[%] 21.7 18.7 4.0 3.6
Results on market size in mt
Error Chinese exports vs. Quotab 165% - - 6%
Total trade volume (actual = 608) 732 659 645 628
aρSpearman is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, zWilcoxon is the statistic for the Wilcoxon sign
rank test, Theil is the Theil inequality coefficient and Uc is its covariance proportion. Bold case indicates
the lowest Theil statistic or that the covariance (variance,bias) proportion is closest to one (closest to
zero). The same holds for the root mean-squared percentage error (RMSPE). The null hypothesis for
both tests is that the model can predict trade in 2008.
∗Significant on the 90% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.213 and | zWilcoxon |=1.650.
∗∗Significant on the 95% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.253 and | zWilcoxon |=1.960.
∗∗∗Significant to the 99% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.329 and | zWilcoxon |=2.576.
Critical values are based on Zar (1972) and McCornack (1965).
bThe Chinese export quota has been set as an exogenous constraint for the scenarios PC with export
quota and Indonesia monopoly with export quota.
4.4 Results
Table 4.3 reports results on statistical inference, as well as on several other statistics in
the four simulated scenarios. Both perfect competition assumptions are rejected by the
Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test on the 90% confidence level (95% level in the scenario without
export quota). Both non-competitive scenarios cannot be rejected at any typical level
of confidence. The Spearman rank correlation test rejects the two perfect competition
scenarios as statistically significant estimators for the actual market outcome on the 95%
level. Again, both non-competitive scenarios cannot be rejected at typical confidence
levels.
The other statistics further confirm the non-competitive setups: the Theil inequality
coefficient as well as the RMSPE are far lower than in the perfect competition scenarios.
Above that, for both statistics the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario even outperforms
the Indonesia monopoly scenario. The values for covariance proportion and for the
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variance proportion are also the best in the China - Indonesia duopoly setup. The bias
proportion is the lowest (best) in the perfect competition with export quota scenario,
nevertheless, the bias proportion is also relatively low in the China - Indonesia duopoly
scenario being only 2%.
In our model, the amount of international seaborne trade is not predefined as in previ-
ous literature. Seaborne trade in the model thus results from the interaction between
exporters and importers taking into account that domestic supply may also enter the
export market, if demand is sufficiently high. We therefore compare how well the model
results for the total trade market volume fit the actual figures. In the perfect competition
without export quota scenario, the simulated trade market volume is 20% larger than
the actual market size in 2008. Modelling this yields to Indonesia and especially China
significantly increasing their exports to cover the high international demand in the year
2008. This leads to a drastic overestimation in traded steam coal volumes in the Pacific
area. In the perfect competition with export quota scenario, Chinese export volumes are
constrained which leads to a lower overall trade market volume estimate. The China
- Indonesia duopoly setting sees the best market volume fit with the estimated trade
being only 4% larger than in reality. China as the largest producer and Indonesia as the
largest trade market exporter withhold volumes in a Cournot manner. One interesting
spillover is that, under the Cournot assumption, simulated Chinese exports almost meet
the export quota. This means that the Chinese export policy was consistent with a
Cournot-Nash strategy63 in 2008. Additionally, in the China - Indonesia duopoly sce-
nario Chinese exports are rather similarly diversified as in reality, with Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan being the main destinations of Chinese coal exports64.
A similar observation can be made for Indonesia: Indonesian supply is similarly di-
versified as actual values in both non-competitive scenarios. In the China - Indonesia
duopoly scenario, simulated Indonesian exports (160.4 mt) almost match actual values
(157.4 mt, energy-adjusted). This is in contrast to the perfect competition scenarios,
in which Indonesia’s absolute exports are more than 30 million tonnes higher. Also, in
the competitive scenarios exports from Indonesia to China are strikingly higher than in
reality.
In general, the China - Indonesia duopoly setup clearly outperforms both perfect com-
petition scenarios. The China - Indonesia duopoly setup also performs better than the
63Of course this does not necessarily mean that China is a strategic player.
64Trade flows are more diversified in the non-competitive equilibrium compared to the perfectly com-
petitive market outcome. In the Cournot game firms with higher marginal costs of delivery (e.g. due
to high transport costs to distant demand regions) have lower market shares in the respective demand
regions. Lower market shares however imply higher perceived marginal revenues for a player. Since the
Cournot oligopolists equate marginal revenues to marginal costs, the higher perceived marginal revenue
may justify trade with regions that would cost-wise not occur in a perfectly competitive market. For a
more sophisticated analysis of this issue e.g. Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983)
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of actual and simulated prices for important import regions.
Indonesia monopoly with export quota scenario in all statistics except the bias propor-
tion. However, both non-competitive scenarios cannot be rejected as predictors of actual
market outcome.
A further relevant indicator from which to analyse model forecasting quality is prices.
The RMSPE for the perfect competition without export quota (with export quota) scenario
is 21.7% (18.7%). For the Indonesia monopoly with export quota scenario the RMSPE
is 4% and for the China -Indonesia duopoly scenario it is 3.6%. Figure 4.1 plots actual
against simulated prices. We observe that prices in the perfect competition setups are
approximately 15-20 USD/t lower in Europe and up to 40 USD/t lower in the main
Asian importing regions than observed prices. Simulated import prices in China are
higher than in reality.
Again, simulated model prices for both non-competitive scenarios fit the observed values
better than prices from the perfect competition scenarios. While simulated import prices
meet the actual European price levels, this scenario also fairly accurately replicates
actual prices in the Asian import regions. The best price fit for China has the China
- Indonesia duopoly scenario: here, the Cournot mark-up of Chinese exports leads to
a larger price difference between Chinese domestic demand regions and Asian import
regions. This protects Chinese domestic demand regions and reduces coal consumer
prices. Simulated Japanese import prices may not be completely explained even in
the China-Indonesia duopoly setup65. Besides these deviations, both non-competitive
65Besides statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversions, coal quality is a factor which
may let model results deviate from real trade patterns. Especially in Japan, newer coal fired power
plants are highly efficient but very limited in the types of steam coal that they may use for generation.
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scenarios deliver the most accurate reproduction of actual import prices.
Considering the actual and simulated trade flow matrices, the perfect competition setups
features structure of supply that is less diversified than the non-competitive scenarios
(see Table C.1 in the Appendix).
4.4.1 Welfare effects
Our results also allow conclusions on global welfare effects. In economic theory, perfect
competition (c.p.) leads to the highest overall welfare compared to a scenario with non-
competitive market behaviour. The reference for welfare effects is therefore the perfect
competition without Chinese export quota scenario, presented by the baseline in Figure
4.2.
In the perfect competition with Chinese export quota scenario, China accrues less welfare
due to its export restriction. Indonesian rents increase to a certain extend due to slightly
higher world market prices.
In the Indonesia monopoly with Chinese export quota scenario, Indonesian rents increase
by around 3 billion USD as the withholdings of Indonesian supply on top of the Chinese
export quota significantly increases consumer prices. In this scenario, Chinese welfare
effects are close to zero, as positive revenue effects that are due to higher Asian consumer
prices and negative effects due to the export quota compensate each other. Overall global
welfare effects are negative due to lower consumer rents especially in the main Asian
importing nations of Japan, Taiwan, and South-Korea but also in Europe.
In the China - Indonesia duopoly setup, China accrues additional rents of 1.4 billion USD
while oligopolistic rents of Indonesia decrease slightly. This is due to China’s capture of
market shares from Indonesia in higher priced regions, like Japan. Chinese rents increase
as exports are distributed with regard to export rent maximisation targets taking into
account the marginal export revenue generated in each importing country. This leads
to a broader (and more realistic) diversification of Chinese export flows among Asian
importing countries compared to the scenarios in which China acts as a competitive
player. Consumer prices for steam coal in China are slightly lower compared to the
Indonesia monopoly scenario, which positively affects Chinese consumer rents.
Coal specifications on sulfur, ash content, moisture and volatile matter are important determinants for
coal-fired power plants. This dependence may sometimes lead to a certain price inelasticity of demand
for certain coal types. Trade patterns and price effects caused by coal quality requirements beyond
energy content are not explicitly modelled and beyond the scope of this analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Welfare effects in the investigated scenarios (horizontal lines represents
the perfect competition scenario without export quota).
Summarising our findings, we conclude that hypothesis H1 (perfect competition) can be
clearly rejected based on the employed statistics (see Table 4.3). Prices and trade flow
patterns cannot explain the real market outcome.
We find that both non-competitive scenarios cannot be rejected as predictors of actual
trade. However, the China - Indonesia duopoly outperforms the Indonesia monopoly with
Chinese export quota scenario in all major statistics. Interestingly, the Cournot-Nash
strategy for China reproduces almost exactly the Chinese export quota while Chinese
export diversification is clearly closer to observed patterns. The duopoly scenario also
shows the highest welfare accruement for China. In the background of the general
proactive national energy resource security policy in China, we interpret this as support
for H3.
4.5 Conclusions
Due to the increasing demand for natural resources in recent years, several resource-rich
nations have reassessed and adjusted their national resource policies. They have applied
different instruments of trade policy, such as export quotas and taxes. However, it may
not always be clear if these policies serve conservation of natural resources or maximi-
sation of national rent inflows from resource exports. We empirically investigated this
question for the case of the global steam coal market by testing for the non-competitive
market conduct of China and Indonesia. Both countries have implemented or signifi-
cantly realigned their coal export strategies in recent years.
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For this purpose, we developed a partial equilibrium model, which allowed us to model
individual nations as strategic players, maximising welfare in their domestic market
as well as their rents from exports subject to a Cournot-Nash strategy. We described
how China and Indonesia could potentially exercise market power in reality and derived
two non-competitive market conduct setups from this investigation. We applied several
statistical tests to validate our modelling results. By that, we find that we cannot reject
two non-competitive market setups as predictors of the actual steam coal market in
2008. Additional test statistics indicate that the China-Indonesia duopoly scenario is
the better predictor than the Indonesia monopoly scenario. Another important result is
that Chinese export quotas are consistent with simulated Chinese export volumes under
a Cournot-Nash strategy and that Chinese export patterns are realistically diversified
in this setup. These results extend former works that did not reject the competitive
market structure assumption but whose analyses were limited to the export submarket.
Of course, one could also argue that there are potentially other non-competitive market
structure setups that may also be suited to explain trade in 2008. However, in case such
other setups exist, the challenge would be to find evidence for their real-world backing.
Additionally, our empirical tests support the hypothesis that actual market conduct can
be explained by our models.
We find that it is crucial to account not only for export markets, but also for the
domestic markets respecting their interactions and feedbacks if one analyses potential
market power in global commodity markets. Compared to perfect competition, export
market prices have to be higher in the case of strategic behaviour to redirect domestic
volumes to the export market. Our analysis shows that China has the potential to act as
a buffer against global coal demand shocks if it acts competitively. However, we find that
we can reject the assumption of perfect competition and that China may pursue a trade
policy of withholding domestic capacity from the global market, driving up international
coal prices and avoiding domestic price increases.
These results yield implications for policy makers in nations depending on coal imports;
future supply and prices for internationally traded coal might possibly not be as cheap,
stable, and secure as believed by most market participants if emerging Asian nations
increasingly pursue their national resource export strategies. This could make it neces-
sary to conduct a reevaluation of the future role of coal in energy consumption of such
countries.
Our findings also have implications on a more general level for other natural resources.
Markets that have been ravaged by high export prices and where national export quotas
or tariffs can be observed, little interaction between domestic and export trade may
not always be due to physical market frictions. In such cases, it may prove useful to
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analyse more closely whether export policies of individual players pursue maximisation
of national rent inflow or not.
Possible future research could extend the analysis of strategic national players to ac-
count for the complete fuel complex or to internationally traded non-energy minerals. A
multilateral market power analysis accounting for market power on the importer’s side
may also be an appropriate research venue.
Chapter 5
How are investment decisions in
the steam coal market affected by
demand uncertainty and
buyer-side market power?
5.1 Introduction
The optimal sizing and timing of investments in the light of an uncertain market envi-
ronment is one of the main challenges for capital intensive industries. A typical example
is natural resource markets which can require large lump-sum investments for accessing
and exploiting resource deposits.
Uncertainty in natural resource markets may be induced by human behaviour (e.g.,
economic activity or politics) or by natural effects (e.g., weather, floods). While both
types of uncertainty are important, major mid-term uncertainty induced by human
economic activity for many natural resource markets in recent years has been the speed
of Asian demand growth, especially in China. According to the IMF (2011), Chinese
economic growth in the first decade of the millennium was 10.2% per year on average.
The resulting demand boom regarding all kinds of natural resources to build up Chinese
infrastructure and industry incentivised investments into new rigs, mines and refineries
on a global scale. However, it is unclear how long the Chinese economy can sustain this
kind of growth rates. Investors face the challenge of correctly assessing when Chinese
resource demand will flatten out in order not to built up excess capacity.
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A rather representative example for a global resource market strongly influenced by
Chinese economic growth and resource policies is the global steam coal market. Since
2008, China has made a market shacking shift from one of the largest steam coal ex-
porters to the second-largest net importer of steam coal. However, it remains unclear
how imports will develop in the next years. This has created a risky environment for
coal mining investors which have to spend large sums upfront for mining equipment and
transportation infrastructure in order to set up new capacity (IEA, 2011b).
Furthermore, coal trade control regimes have recently been set up by the Chinese govern-
ment which further complicates the situation for international investors; coal shipments
to China face import duties and export quotas which can be reassessed on an annual
basis. It remains to be seen to what extent the Chinese government applies such in-
strument to influence trade in a strategic way, but doubts about competitive market
conduct already exist (Paulus et al., 2011, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2011).
The main contribution from this paper is an analysis of the projected impact of Chi-
nese market power in the future: We analyse how the interaction between uncertain
Chinese coal demand evolution and the opportunity of China to act strategically in the
international market affects decisions to invest in mines or infrastructure.
Literature on investments under uncertainty and market power in other resource and
commodity markets has a history dating back more than two decades. Haurie et al.
(1987) proposed a stochastic dynamic model with players acting in a Cournot manner
to simulate contractual agreements in the European gas sector. Murphy et al. (1982)
investigated power plant investments under load uncertainty. More recent works focus
on investigating how gas industry infrastructure investments are affected by uncertainty
and supply-side market power (Egging, 2010, Gabriel and Zhuang, 2006, Zhuang and
Gabriel, 2008). Literature on demand side market power has been scarce thus far. One
example of such a work is that of Kolstad and Burris (1986) who analyse demand-
side market power in agricultural markets. However, their model did not account for
investment decisions under uncertainty.
Existing work on steam coal market economics has so far included the analysis of policy
scenarios of different transport infrastructure investments regimes (Paulus and Tru¨by,
2011) and the analysis of interactions between climate policies and coal demand (Haf-
tendorn et al., 2011). Another research venue has been potential supply-side market
power. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) analysed strategic behaviour in seaborne steam coal
trade on the demand and the supply side. However, since then, the steam coal trade
market has changed substantially and several recent papers come to varying conclusions.
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) reject the hypothesis of non-competitive market behaviour
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in coal trade in 2005 and 2006, while Tru¨by and Paulus (2011) raise doubts about com-
petitive market conduct in 2008 and outline that market structure might have changed
due to the growing importance of several major Asian players, most importantly China.
Paulus et al. (2011) find that accounting for the interaction between the international
market and the domestic market implies that Chinese export policies are consistent with
a Cournot-Nash strategy. However, so far no article has focused on how demand side
market power and uncertain demand influence investments into coal production capacity.
For our analysis, we model the investment decision problem as a multistage spatial
stochastic equilibrium model with recourse. The stochastic perturbation is mapped in
extensive form, meaning that possible demand evolutions are represented by a scenario
tree and realisation probabilities. The model allows for simulation of competitive be-
haviour of actors as well as non-competitive market behaviour a´ la Cournot on the
demand as well as on the supply side. We especially account for risk-averse investment
behaviour by using stochastic discount factors to generate the deterministic equiva-
lent of uncertain payoffs. The model is designed as a stochastic mixed complementary
programme (sMCP) by deriving the first-order optimality conditions of the associated
stochastic optimisation problem. Haurie et al. (1987, 1990) found that the information
structure of players in such games, which they called S-adapted Open-Loop, lies between
the adaptive closed-loop and the nonadaptive open-loop information structure and de-
veloped conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium concept (Haurie and
Moresino, 2002).
Using an established coal market database described in Paulus and Tru¨by (2011), we
simulate how coal mining investment decisions are affected by uncertain Chinese coal
demand evolutions until 2020. We test two setups: in one, we extract the effect of
uncertain Chinese demand on international mine investments. All players behave as price
takers. In the other setup, we analyse the impact of Chinese market power on the demand
uncertainty effect from setup one. Here, China behave as a monopolist/monopsonist
regarding exports and imports in addition to the competitive fringe of other players. For
both setups we compute the Value of Perfect Information66 which can be interpreted as
the loss in rent for each modelled player due to uncertainty. We find that accounting
for Chinese demand uncertainty yields significant costs for investors of 18% of their
rents compared to a perfect foresight baseline. Investors reallocate their investments
spatially and temporally to hedge themselves against risky demand outcomes. If we
account for Chinese market power, China maximises its wellfare by withholding coal
imports from the international market to a certain extent. Lower Chinese coal imports
make international coal sector investments decrease. However, the Value of Perfect
Information is lower for investors in this case.
66Which we sometimes will refer to as ’Costs of Uncertainty’.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 5.2 we describe China’s
current energy policy and potential impacts on coal markets. Section 5.3 describes
analytical results, the methodology and the model in detail, while 5.4 outlines the com-
putational application. Section 5.5 shows and discusses the simulation results. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 China’s energy policy and its potential impact on global
coal markets
For decades, international coal trade has been growing at a moderate pace, involving a
blend of multinational private mining companies, large state-run entities, and various
smaller national players. China has a dominant role in the global coal market; during
the last decade, the domestic Chinese steam coal market increased to 2,800 mt in 2010,
which was five times more than the total global seaborne trade of 600 mt. Additionally,
China has switched from a net exporter of 21 mt in 2008 to a net importer of 80 mt
in 2010. This means that variations in domestic coal supply and demand which could
be considered as ’noise’ compared to the overall Chinese market size potentially amplify
and feed back by an order of magnitude to international steam coal markets.
Higher uncertainty with regard to future Chinese coal imports and prices increases the
risk for new coal market investments. A significant decrease in profitability could lead
international mining companies to decide to allocate investments in other, less uncertain
resource markets. Also, if investments are lower than expected, prices could increase and
bottlenecks could arise in the global coal supply chain which would also affect energy
policies in countries mainly depending on coal imports like many OECD economies.
This analysis therefore tries to determine the following in the first step:
• To what extent are investments of international coal market investors affected by
Chinese demand uncertainty?
• How large are the profit losses for international producers due to Chinese demand
uncertainty?
In addition to the uncertain future Chinese coal import demand, increasingly tighter
Chinese coal trade controls represent a second layer of complexity for investors. Such
trade controls might be used by the Chinese state to exert market power (Paulus et al.,
2011). China has increasingly made use of policy instruments (i.e., quotas and/or taxa-
tion) in recent years to tightly control coal exports and imports. As currently one of the
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largest coal importers, China has significant potential to exert market power through
its import taxes. Profitability of investments into new mines may be negatively affected
through import taxes, as China may be able to skim producer surplus. It is crucial for
international mining investors to know how the potential skimming would affect their
profitability and thus their investment plans. This leads us to another question within
our analysis:
• To what extent will the exertion of Chinese market power affect investments given
that demand is uncertain?
Furthermore, it is not intuitively clear if rent reductions of investors due to uncertainty
are higher or lower in a noncompetitive case compared to a competitive case, but this is
an important fact for investors to know. If, for example, Chinese import controls would
decrease costs of uncertainty, Chinese domestic coal demand fluctuations and energy
policies might not have such a profound impact on coal markets as in a competitive
market. If investors assume that China is exerting or will exert its market power,
analysing and forecasting Chinese trade controls patterns might be more important
for international investors than analysing the domestic Chinese coal market. Our last
question is therefore thus:
• How will the exertion of Chinese market power affect costs of uncertainty of inter-
national producers?
5.3 Methodology and model
In this section, we describe the general layout of our empirical model and the relevant
players. Finally, we formulate the model in terms of a simple multi-stage stochastic
programme and derive the necessary first order conditions.
5.3.1 Layout of the model
The empirical model is structured to find the spatial and temporal equilibrium of prices,
trade flows and investments between players given assumptions about their market con-
duct and objective functions. The model accounts for the following three different types
of players:
1. Investors I maximise their profits given uncertain future demand in a competitive
manner. Investments into additional capacity stock have to be decided prior to
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demand realisation. Production levels are recourse variables which are decided on
during the period in which the demand level is revealed. Investors are risk averse
in the sense that they price their systematic risk (see Section 5.3.2).
2. Consumers C maximise rents given a certain demand function. During recourse,
they decide on their consumption level and trade flows. Consumers behave in a
price-taking way.
3. Strategic player M jointly maximises both its consumer rent and producer rent
through its recourse variables of consumption, supply and trade flows. M is there-
fore a consumer as well as a producer in its own right. The development of its
demand and capacity stock is assumed to be given. Since we assume that capacity
additions for producing regions of M follow a predetermined schedule, M does
not have to make investment decisions. M maximises its payoff, given supply and
demand of a competitive fringe of other players. It therefore acts as a monopsonist
for investors I and as a monopolist for other consumers C. With this setup, we
model the Chinese export and import control system under the assumption that
they serve domestic welfare maximisation. It is important to note that, in our
setup, we assume that M is a national player (e.g., it exerts market power through
national export and import controls only vs. other players). Individual companies
on the demand and the supply side do not exert market power and behave in a
price-taking manner.
Figure 5.1 depicts the possible interactions of model players as well as the timing of
investment decisions and the information structure. We assume that investors have to
decide if they want to invest into new capacity before they know the precise demand
level. To model this situation, we introduce uncertainty into the model by assuming that
demand level of M is not foreseeable by investors I when capacity investments have to
be taken. However, we assume that the distribution of future demand of M , and thus
realisation probabilities, are given and known to investors. The first stage thus includes
the investment decision stage for investors given a future demand distribution. In the
second stage, capacity investments are realised and all players engage in a trading game
in which the strategic player exerts market power both versus investors and consumers
while the other actors behave as price takers. As demonstrated by Kolstad and Burris
(1986), Salant (1982) and recently Lise and Krusemann (2008) and Montero and Guzman
(2010), different types of Cournot games can be mapped by a term that is a producer’s
(consumer’s) conjecture about the response of other producers (consumers) to a change
in their production (consumption) volume67. The two-stage stochastic model concept
67Our model formulation can be interpreted as a quota system that restricts exports or imports to
the Cournot-Nash outcome. Other formulations with taxes instead of quotas of course yield the same
equilibrium (see e.g.: Kolstad and Abbey, 1984).
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Figure 5.1: Setup of modelled players (top) and timing of investment decisions and
information structure for a three-period example (bottom).
can be easily generalised to a multi-stage setup as shown in Section 5.3.3. The model
is formulated in its extensive form; e.g., all considered futures n ∈ N , or scenarios,
and their respective realisation probabilities ωn, are explicitly accounted for and known.
This allows us to represent the information structure of the model as a so-called scenario
tree.
Haurie et al. (1990) showed that such a stochastic equilibrium programming approach
yields a special class of strategies which the authors call S-adapted open-loop. It can
basically be regarded as an open-loop equilibrium with uncertainty, where strategies
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are conditional on the realisation of a stochastic underlying model parameter68. The
equilibrium is not subgame perfect and players commit themselves to their decisions
at the beginning of the game. The equilibrium concept can be useful in analysing
long term supply and demand decisions under uncertainty without running into the
computational challenges of determining closed-loop strategies. Genc et al. (2007) and
Genc and Zaccour (2011) further analysed investment dynamics under uncertain demand
and the equilibrium concept has been used in several recent empirical studies, as in
Pineau and Murto (2003), Genc et al. (2007) or Bernard et al. (2008).
5.3.2 Risk-adjusted discount factors
As demand realisation is risky, we allow investors I to price their systematic risk in
accordance to standard CAPM theory (e.g.: Armitage, 2005). Pricing in systematic
risk69 will cause investors in our model to assume risk-averse behaviour in a sense that
they will demand a higher (lower) capital return from expected payoffs of scenario nodes
with high (low) market returns rmn and low (high) realisation probabilities ωn. In our
case, scenarios with high market returns coincide with high Chinese coal demand as both
are driven by economic growth. Thus, the relative weight of expected payoffs from such
high demand scenarios diminishes in our model, as they are discounted more strongly.
Vice versa, the relative weight of low demand scenarios increases.
For implementation, we rely on a methodology described by Fama (1977) to compute
deterministic equivalents of risky cash flows using linear stochastic discount factors.
Stochastic discount factors ds(n) are defined such that a cash flow vector X(n) accruing
in a later time period has the value E[ds(n) ×X(n)] at time period 0. If one relies on
the theories and assumptions of CAPM, such a vector may be determined ex-ante if the
vector of market returns and the risk-free interest rate rf are known. Using stochastic
discount factors enables us to compute the equivalent deterministic cash flows in each
scenario so that any further intertemporal discounting of pay-offs may be done at the
risk-free interest rate. A very comprehensive overview of how to implement the notion of
deterministic equivalent cash flows into stochastic equilibrium models has been provided
by Ehrenmann and Smeers (2010). In this analysis, we largely follow their approach.
68But not on realisations of other players decisions.
69Systematic risk is the not diversifiable risk that is associated with aggregate market returns. In
contrast, unsystematic risk is company or industry-specific and is not correlated with market returns.
It may be reduced through portfolio diversification (Armitage, 2005).
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5.3.3 Model formulation
The information structure of the model is represented by a scenario tree which consists
of a set of scenario nodes n ∈ N . Let succ(n) represent the set of all successor scenario
nodes to scenario node n and let pred(n) be the set of all predecessor scenario nodes of
n. The spatial topology of the model consists of export regions e ∈ E, demand regions
d ∈ D and transport routes (e, d) ∈ A ⊂ E ×D. Each investor i ∈ I controls a set of
export regions e ∈ Ei and each consumer c ∈ C controls a set of demand regions d ∈ Dc.
The monopolist M = {m} controls export regions as well as demand regions. We assume
quadratic costs functions and linear demand functions as well as constant investment-
and transport costs. An overview of all sets, decision variables and parameters can be
found in Table 5.1.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows: We develop the optimisation
problems and the corresponding first-order optimality conditions for each player type.
The first-order conditions together with the market-clearing conditions bundled together
form the stochastic equilibrium model.
The variables in parentheses on the right-hand side of each constraint are the Lagrange
multipliers used when developing the first-order conditions. The complementary slack-
ness condition is indicated by the perpendicular sign ⊥, where 0 = x ⊥ y = 0⇔ xty = 0
for vectors x and y.
The investors’ problem
Each investor i ∈ I maximises its profit which is defined as revenue minus costs of supply
and minus investment costs. Investors behave as price takers in the market. The payoff
function ΠIi (zi) is defined as:
max
zi∈Ωi
ΠIi (zi) =
∑
n∈N
ωnd
S
nd
F
n
∑
e∈Ei
[
pExe,nse,n −
(
ae,nse,n +
1
2
be,ns
2
e,n + c
Inv
e,n xe,n
)]
, (5.1)
where zi is the corresponding decision vector of i. Ωi is the set of feasible solutions of zi
and is defined by constraints for maximum supply:
CapStarte +
∑
n′∈pred(n)
xe,n′ − ge
∑
n′∈pred(n)
se,n′ − se,n ≥ 0, (e,n) ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N,
(5.2)
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Table 5.1: Model sets, variables and parameters.
Sets
e ∈ E export regions
d ∈ D demand regions
i ∈ I Investors
c ∈ C Consumers
e ∈ Ei export regions controlled by investor i
d ∈ Dc demand regions controlled by consumer d
d ∈ DM and e ∈ EM demand and export regions of strategic player M
n ∈ N scenario nodes
n ∈ succ(n′) set of all scenario nodes which are successor nodes to n′
n ∈ pred(n′) set of all scenario nodes which are predecessor nodes to n′
Primal variables
xe,n investments
se,n supply
t(e,d),n trade flows
yc,d,n consumption
pExe,n export price
pImd,n consumer price
ae,n marginal cost intercept
be,n marginal cost slope
kMd,n total sales volume of M
lMe,n total import volume of M
Dual variables
e,n dual variable for investments
λe,n dual variable for supply
µe,n dual variable for maximum capacity
ρd,n dual variable for consumption
σd,n dual variable for total sales volume
δe,n dual variable for total import volume
Parameters
ωn probability of scenario node n
dSn stochastic discount factor of scenario node n
dFn risk-free discount factor of scenario node n
CapStarte initial capacity of export region e
CapMaxe maximum capacity of export region e
CapMe,n capacity of strategic player M in export region e
aStarte initial marginal cost intercept of export region e
bStarte initial marginal cost slope of export region e
ge exploitation factor of export region e
he investment effect on marginal costs of export region e
ue,n input cost increase of export region e
cInve,n investment costs for export capacity of export region e
cT(e,d) transport costs on transport route (e, d)
vd,n demand intercept for demand region d
wd,n demand slope for demand region d
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and by constraints for maximum investments:
CapMaxe +ge
∑
n′∈pred(n)
se,n′−CapStarte −
∑
n′∈pred(n)
xe,n′ ≥ 0, (µe,n) ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N. (5.3)
Each investor thus faces a dynamic multistage investment problem where investments
have to be decided upon before demand is realised in later scenario nodes. The first-
order conditions of the investors’ problem can then be summarised by constraints (5.2)
and (5.3) as well as the following:
ωnd
S
nd
F
n
(
pExe,n − ae,n − be,nse,n
)− e,n − µe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ se,n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N, (5.4)
ωnd
S
nd
F
n c
Inv
e,n −
∑
n′∈succ(n)
e,n′ ≤ 0 ⊥ xe,n ≤ 0, ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N. (5.5)
We implement the concept of dynamic short run marginal costs functions which has first
been described by Haftendorn et al. (2010). In their work, the authors model marginal
costs endogenously as a function of cumulative supply and investments. Increases in cu-
mulative supply increases the marginal cost intercept as the cheapest reserve deposits get
exhausted. Increases in cumulative investments may have ambiguous effects depending
on the age of the mining basin and the remaining reserves. In their paper, Haftendorn
et al. (2010) apply their methodology to a linear marginal cost function, and we follow
the same approach. The endogenous evolution of the marginal cost intercept is then
described by:
ae,n = ue,n
aStarte + ge ∑
n′∈pred(n)
be,nse,n
 , (free) ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N, (5.6)
and the evolution of the marginal cost slope by:
be,n = ue,n
bStarte + he ∑
n′∈pred(n)
xe,n
 , (free) ∀ e ∈ Ei, n ∈ N. (5.7)
We assume that there is no arbitrage between supply and trade and that the mass
balance in all export regions of investors always has to be satisfied:
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se,n =
∑
d∈D
t(e,d),n, (free) ∀ e ∈ E\EM , n ∈ N. (5.8)
The consumers’ problem
We assume that consumers behave in a competitive manner such that they take prices
as given70. We further assume that consumers cannot generate savings or build up
coal stocks. Therefore, in each scenario node n ∈ N each consumer faces a static
maximisation problem, as there are no intertemporal decisions to be taken. Consumer
payoff is defined as gross surplus less costs of procurement. The payoff function ΠCc (zc)
is defined as:
max
zc∈Ωc
ΠCc,n(zc) =
∑
d∈Dc
[ ∫ yd,n
0
pImd,n(u)du
−
∑
e∈E\EM
(
pExe,n + c
T
(e,d)
)
t(e,d),n −
∑
e∈EM
pMd,nt(e,d),n
]
, ∀ n ∈ N. (5.9)
Each consumer procures his consumption directly from the investors I (first term of
second line (5.9)), thus paying export prices plus shipping costs. In case of procure-
ments from M , consumers pay the respective import price pMd,n that M is setting. This
will later become important when we derive the conditions for the equilibrium. Linear
inverse demand is defined as pImd,n(yd,n) = vd,n + wd,nyd,n. We compute the parameters
of the demand function using a reference demand level Dref , a reference price pref , and
elasticity e. The slope of the demand function can then be expressed as wd,n =
pref
Dref
1
e
and the demand intercept through vd,n = pref − wd,nDref . Assumptions on reference
volumes, prices and elasticities can be found in the Appendix. Consumers face the
constraint that inbound trade flows have to be greater or equal to consumption:
∑
e∈E
t(e,d),n − yd,n ≥ 0, (ρd,n) ∀ d ∈ Dc, n ∈ N. (5.10)
First-order conditions for consumer c are equation (5.10) and:
pImd,n (yd,n)− ρd,n ≤ 0,⊥ yd,n ≤ 0, ∀ d ∈ Dc, n ∈ N, (5.11)
70As consumers represent a large number of national utility companies as well as many different
energy-intensive industries we conclude that there is little potential for consumers to exercise market
power on the international coal market.
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ρd,n − pExe,n − cT(e,d) ≤ 0 ⊥ t(e,d),n ≤ 0, ∀ d ∈ Dc, n ∈ N, e ∈ E\EM , (5.12)
ρd,n − pMd,n ≤ 0 ⊥ t(e,d),n ≤ 0, ∀ d ∈ Dc, n ∈ N, e ∈ EM . (5.13)
The strategic player’s problem
The strategic player M controls demand regions as well as export regions. Demand
regions of M are specified through linear demand functions (similarly as for consumers),
and supply regions are specified by quadratic cost functions and a capacity limit. Poten-
tial imports or exports balance M ’s supply and demand. M uses its imports and exports
as strategic variables to maximise its total welfare, the joint surplus of production and
consumption. Its maximisation problem is static, as we assume a fixed trajectory for its
export capacity evolution71, therefore no intertemporal decisions are taken72. Its payoff
ΠM (zM ) is defined as:
max
zM∈ΩM
ΠMn (zM ) =
∑
d∈D\DM
pMd,n (.) k
M
d,n −
∑
e∈EM
(∑
d∈D
cT(e,d)t(e,d),n + ae,nse,n +
1
2
be,ns
2
e,n
)
+
∑
d∈DM
∫ yd,n
0
pImd,n(u)du−
∑
e∈E\EM
 ∑
d∈DM
cT(e,d)t(e,d),n + p
Ex
e,nl
M
e,n

∀n ∈ N. (5.14)
M ’s total welfare is defined as export sales to consumers C less transport costs for
outbound flows and production costs (first line of (5.14)) plus total gross consumer
surplus minus transport costs for imports and procurement costs from investors I (second
line of (5.14)). M ’s production capacity constraint is:
CapMe,n − ge
∑
n′∈pred(n)
se,n′ − se,n ≥ 0, (e,n) ∀ e ∈ EM , n ∈ N. (5.15)
71This will be explained in more detail in Section 5.4.
72We therefore neglect that M might be able to anticipate how production cost functions of investors
I are affected given M ’s consumption and import decisions. If M decides to import more in earlier
periods production costs among investors increase as the cheapest seams get exploited (modelled through
equation (5.6)). This would increase M ’s cost for importing in later periods. While this mechanism seems
to be worthwhile to investigate further, it is beyond the scope of this analysis.
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The energy balance for M ’s production regions is:
se,n −
∑
d∈D
t(e,d),n ≥ 0, (pExe,n) ∀ e ∈ EM , n ∈ N. (5.16)
The energy balance for M ’s demand regions is:
∑
e∈E
t(e,d),n − yd,n ≥ 0, (ρd,n) ∀ d ∈ DM , n ∈ N. (5.17)
The energy balance for all exports of M to consumers I is:
∑
e∈EM
t(e,d),n − kMd,n ≥ 0, (σd,n) ∀ d ∈ D\DM , n ∈ N, (5.18)
and the energy balance for all imports of M from investors I is:
∑
d∈DM
t(e,d),n − lMe,n ≥ 0, (δe,n) ∀ e ∈ E\EM , n ∈ N. (5.19)
The first-order conditions of M with respect to supply, physical trade flows and con-
sumption are:
pExe,n − e,n − (ae,n + be,nse,n) ≤ 0 ⊥ se,n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ EM , n ∈ N, (5.20)
σd,n − cT(e,d) − pExe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ t(e,d),n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ EM , d ∈ D\DM , n ∈ N, (5.21)
ρd,n − cT(e,d) − pExe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ t(e,d),n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ EM , d ∈ DM , n ∈ N, (5.22)
δe,n − cT(e,d) − pExe,n + ρd,n ≤ 0 ⊥ t(e,d),n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ E\EM , d ∈ DM , n ∈ N, (5.23)
pImd,n(yd,n)− ρd,n ≤ 0 ⊥ yd,n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ E , d ∈ DM , n ∈ N. (5.24)
The first-order condition w.r.t export sales kMd,n of M is given by:
pMd,n +
∂pMd,n
∂kMd,n
kMd,n − σd,n ≤ 0 ⊥ kMd,n ≥ 0, ∀ d ∈ D\DM . n ∈ N, (5.25)
We can now further simplify this pricing equation. We know due to equations (5.11) and
(5.13) that pMd,n = p
Im
d,n (yd,n) if t(e,d),n and yd,n are greater zero. Both yd,n and k
M
d,n can
be substituted by t(e,d),n (see (5.18) and (5.10). As we also know the functional form of
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pImd,n (yd,n), we can substitute:
∂pMd,n
∂kMd,n
=
∂pImd,n
(∑
e∈E t(e,d),n
)
∂kMd,n
= wd,n ∀ d ∈ D\DM , n ∈ N, (5.26)
which is the usual result that monopolists perceive demand downward sloping and can
thus extract a rent by withholding volumes. As we assumed a linear inverse demand
function, M ’s markup is a function of the demand slope wd,n in each demand region.
Given equilibrium condition (5.21) we can now rewrite (5.25):
pImd,n (yd,n)+wd,nk
M
d,n−cT(e,d)−pExe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ kMd,n∧t(e,d),n ≥ 0, ∀ d ∈ D\DM , e ∈ EM , n ∈ N.
(5.27)
The first order condition w.r.t import procurements lMe,n of M is given by:
− ∂p
Ex
e,n
∂lMe,n
lMe,n − δe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ lMe,n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ E\EM , n ∈ N. (5.28)
Equation (5.28) can be simplified in a similar manner as (5.26). According to (5.4), pExe,n
is, among others, a function of se,n. se,n and l
M
e,n can both be substituted through t(e,d),n
(equations (5.8) and (5.19)) so that we may write:
∂pExe,n
∂lMe,n
=
∂pExe,n
(∑
d∈D t(e,d),n
)
∂lMe,n
= be,n ∀ e ∈ E\EM , n ∈ N. (5.29)
Oligopsonists perceive the production cost function upward sloping and can thus extract
a rent by consuming less (e.g., through implementing import taxes (Kolstad and Abbey,
1984)). For a linear marginal cost function, M ’s markup depends on the marginal cost
slope be,n. Given equilibrium conditions (5.23) and (5.24), (5.28) may be written as:
pImd,n (yd,n)− be,nlMe,n− cT(e,d)− pExe,n ≤ 0 ⊥ lMe,n ∧ t(e,d),n ≥ 0, ∀ e ∈ E\EM , d ∈ DM , n ∈ N.
(5.30)
The combined equilibrium conditions of investors, consumers, and the strategic player
yield a unique equilibrium. The resulting set of inequalities is known as a mixed com-
plementarity problem.
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5.4 Computational application
To illustrate how uncertainty and demand side market power affect investors, we conduct
a case study for the global steam coal market for reference years 2015 and 2020. China
takes over the role of the strategic player M . Other coal importers are modelled as
consumers and the major coal exporters as investors. We use a large existing database
on global coal markets which has been extensively presented in Paulus and Tru¨by (2011),
Tru¨by and Paulus (2011) and which has also been used by IEA (2011b). Based on the
present data, we make assumptions on the projected evolution of parameters such as
reference demand and reference prices in consumer regions, and mining input factor
prices. The model consists of more than 30 demand and export regions. A detailed
overview of these parameter assumptions can be found in the Appendix.
The model has been implemented in GAMS and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris
and Munson, 1998).
5.4.1 Scenario tree definition
Evolution of China’s demand is described by a set of scenarios which describe a wide
range of possible trajectories. The basis for developing the demand scenarios is the
Chinese 12th 5-Year Plan. The plan sets very challenging targets to be reached by
2015, including a reduction of energy intensity by 16% and an increase of non-fossil
energy production to 11%. Most importantly, the target for economic growth was set
to 7% p.a., down by 2% from the last 5-year plan (real economic growth rates were
even higher, according to IMF (2011), more than 10% between 2005-2010). Chinese
coal demand is driven by economic growth, energy intensity, and the ramp-up speed of
renewables and other energy sources in China. Therefore, achieving the plan’s targets
would significantly reduce coal demand growth. However, reaching these goals would
also be very challenging. Additionally, these targets are not considered ’binding’ in the
plan and therefore may be demoted to achieve other targets (e.g., inflation containment).
Taking the Chinese 12th 5-Year Plan as the reference scenario for the lowest coal demand
evolution until 2015 (scenario node l in Figure 5.2), we construct two further scenarios
for 2015. In one scenario, we assume economic growth to be 9% (scenario node m) and
in another other scenario, we also assume 9% economic growth and additionally reduced
gains in energy efficiency (scenario node h). Coal demand73 is derived from multiplying
73The term ’coal demand’ refers to a reference coal demand that is consumed at a certain reference
price. Together with an assumption on demand elasticity, it is possible to construct linear demand
functions. Reference coal demand, reference prices, and elasticities for all regions are provided in the
Appendix.
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the different GDP trajectories with energy intensity assumptions and deducting the pro-
jected expansion of renewables and other fossil fuels. The remainder of energy demand
has to be covered by coal. In the next time step until 2020, we assume economic growth
to either be 8% p.a. (scenario nodes hh, mh and lh) or 6% (scenario nodes hl, ml and
ll). Altogether, the ten scenario nodes form six scenarios paths, which we label s1 to
s6. We assume realisation probabilities are uniformly distributed. A summary of the
Chinese energy balances can be found in the Appendix.
s
h
hh
hl
m
mh
ml2364 mtce
3391 mtce
3062 mtce
4388 mtce
3872 mtce
3827 mtce
0.33
s1
s2
s3
2
l
lh
ll2651 mtce
3115 mtce
3358 mtce
2664 mtce
s4
s5
s6
2010 2015 2020
Decision
variables:
Information:
•Investment in 2015
•Supply & Demand in 2010
•Supply & Demand in 2020
•Investment in 2015 realises
•Demand in 2015 is revealed
•Investment in 2020 realises
•Demand in 2020 is revealed
•Investment in 2015
•Supply & Demand in 2015
Figure 5.2: Scenario tree structure and information structure of the model. Demand
figures are given in million tonnes of coal equivalent [mtce] and have to be understood
as reference demand levels given a certain reference price.
The expansion of coal supply of China is outlined in the 12th 5-Year Plan. We assume
that the ambitions and incentives of the Chinese coal industry to fulfil the plan’s targets
are a more important driver than just pure market economics. Therefore, Chinese coal
supply capacity in the model follows the production targets of the 12th 5-Year Plan.
Supply is projected to increase by another 30% between 2010 and 2015. This is already
an ambitious target, as the Chinese coal industry is currently undergoing a profound
restructuring process. Thus, China is expanding its domestic capacity at the fastest rate
possible.
To compute stochastic discount factors, we assume a risk-free interest rate of 3.5%.
Market returns are assumed to be correlated with Chinese economic growth. For details
regarding the stochastic discount factors please refer to the Appendix.
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5.4.2 Scenarios and outline of result discussion
For model discussion, we test two setups. In the first scenario, we assume that the
strategic player M behaves as a simple price taker both on the export and the import side
(competitive setup). Thus, M basically becomes a player of the consumer type with an
attached supply base. In the second setup, M behaves as a monopolistic/monopsonistic
player for exports and imports (Monop setup). We will structure the comparison of
the scenario results into two steps. First, we will investigate how investment decisions
of investors change. Second, we will analyse how costly uncertainty is for investors by
computing the Value of Perfect Information (VPI). In both steps we will compare the
stochastic model to its deterministic version.
5.5 Simulation results and discussion
Model results for investments and payoffs are summarised in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. We first
compare the stochastic competitive setup with its deterministic equivalent. For this, we
compute the expected model results under perfect information, which means we sum up
the weighted outcomes of the deterministic model run for each of the scenarios s1 to s6
and compare them to the stochastic model run. The weighted deterministic results for
the competitive setup are referred to as ’comp-det’ and for the Monopoly setup as ’mon-
det’, respectively. The results of of the stochastic model are referred to as ’comp-stoch’
and ’mon-stoch’.
5.5.1 Investments
Two effects are noteworthy if we look at the model results for investments: In the com-
petitive setup, the expected total amount of investments of 395 mtpa does not essentially
change compared to the deterministic baseline (see ’weighted sum’ and lines ’comp-det.’
and ’comp-stoch.’ in Table 5.2). However, investments change with respect to their
spatial as well as their temporal allocation. In the first investment stage s, total in-
vestments with 198 mtpa are 8% lower in the stochastic model compared to those of
its deterministic counterpart. The investors hedge themselves against risky demand by
delaying investments until a later stage where they have a higher certainty that their
investments will become profitable. This effect is strengthened by the fact that investors
price their systematic risk and thus emphasise asset returns of the lower demand scenario
nodes higher than the ones from the higher demand nodes.
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Table 5.2: Investments in export capacity in mtpa, stochastic model runs and deter-
ministic equivalents.
Countriesa: IR VN SA CO PL VE QLD NSW R e. R w. US
∑
sb comp-det 90 11 10 32 1 10 0 59 2 0 0 214
(2010) comp-stoch 76 11 0 32 0 11 0 69 0 0 0 198
mon-det 30 11 0 32 0 10 0 39 0 0 0 122
mon-stoch 12 11 0 32 0 11 0 20 0 0 0 85
l comp-det 81 2 18 5 2 1 0 38 0 0 0 146
(2015) comp-stoch 0 2 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
mon-det 80 2 2 5 0 1 0 50 0 0 0 140
mon-stoch 12 2 0 5 0 1 0 46 0 0 0 66
m comp-det 50 2 35 5 7 1 34 8 31 16 8 196
(2015) comp-stoch 72 2 35 5 9 1 53 7 44 24 14 267
mon-det 102 2 8 5 2 1 0 32 0 0 0 151
mon-stoch 132 2 35 5 4 1 0 54 0 0 0 233
h comp-det 21 2 4 5 7 1 53 8 37 30 26 194
(2015) comp-stoch 72 2 35 5 11 1 55 7 44 34 28 295
mon-det 105 2 16 5 3 1 0 26 0 0 0 157
mon-stoch 132 2 22 5 4 1 0 54 0 0 0 219
wtd. comp-det 140 12 30 36 6 12 30 76 26 15 11 395∑
comp-stoch 127 12 25 36 7 11 38 74 31 20 14 395
mon-det 126 12 8 36 2 12 0 75 0 0 0 272
mon-stoch 108 12 21 36 3 11 0 72 0 0 0 263
aCountry abbreviations: IR - Indonesia, VN - Viet Nam, SA - South Africa, CO - Colombia, PL -
Poland, VE - Venezuela, QLD - Queensland (Australia), NSW - New South Wales (Australia), R e. -
Russia east coast, R w. - Russia west coast, US - United States.
bInvestments take place with a time lag of one time period: investment decisions taken in 2010
(scenario node s) become available in 2015 (scenario nodes l, m, and h). Investments decisions taken in
2015 become available in 2020 (scenario nodes ll, lh, ml, mh, hl and hh).
The picture becomes somewhat more complex in the second investment stage (scenario
nodes l, m, and h). In scenario nodes m and h, where higher demand has been realised
investors in the stochastic model catch up their investments which they have been delay-
ing thus far. Investments in m and h are 36% and 52% higher than in the deterministic
model, respectively. On the contrary, investments in the stochastic model in scenario
node l, where low demand is realised, are close to zero and significantly below those of
the deterministic counterpart. This is also due to the hedging decision investors faced
in s; as investors do not want to forego possible returns from m and h completely, they
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invest at a level in s which is above the optimal value for scenario node l. In contrast,
investors in the deterministic models invest 40% less in s for the low demand trajectory.
In addition to the intertemporal hedging effect changing spatial allocation of invest-
ments is also driven by a technological hedging effect. Export regions are characterised
by their (linear) marginal cost function and their investment costs for capacity addi-
tions. Roughly, export regions can be classified as either belonging to a low-cost type or
a high-cost type; low-cost types have low investment costs, low marginal cost intercepts
but higher marginal cost slopes (marginal costs rising fast). High-cost types have high
investment costs, higher marginal cost intercepts but lower marginal cost slopes. Nat-
urally, the low-cost type regions are more suited to handle low demand scenarios and
the high-cost type regions are better fitted for high demand scenarios. Of course, some
regions are a mix of both types. Investors in the stochastic model invest in a portfolio
of export capacities given their valuation of expected payoffs to hedge against different
potential demand levels. This can be seen from the distribution of investments over
regions ( see lines ’comp-det.’ and ’comp-stoch.’ in Table 5.2): Indonesia and South
Africa capture smaller shares of investments in the stochastic model, while investments
in Queensland, Russia and the U.S. increase by 20% to 30%.
Expected investments in the Monopoly setup are 272 mtpa and 263 mtpa - around
30% lower than in the Competitive setup (in the deterministic and in the stochastic
case). In the Monopoly setup, China behaves in a Monopolistic fashion both on the
export and the import side. Due to high demand compared to supply in practically
all scenarios nodes, exports of China are mostly negligible; this means that supply-side
market power potential is low. On the other hand, imports of China vary widely between
the Competitive setup and the Monopoly setup, indicating the demand-side market power
potential of China. This leads to a reduction of its procurements from investors, lower
export prices, and thus a reduced incentive for investors to invest in new capacity.
Also, the temporal hedging effect is even stronger here; in the first investment stage s,
total investments are 31% lower in the stochastic model compared to its deterministic
counterpart, while they were 8% lower in the Competitive setup.
The driver for lower investments in the Monopoly setup is that China accrues monopo-
listic rents by withholding consumption from the market. This reduces rents of investors
due to lower overall seaborne demand and trade market prices (an overview of import
region prices is provided in the Appendix). It is thus less attractive for investors to
invest in new capacity in the Monopoly setup, as they anticipate that China will adjust
its imports and thus reduces payback for their investments. The amount of monopolistic
rents accrued by China depends on the slope of investors’ marginal cost functions and
the slope of the Chinese demand functions, which both vary by region.
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In summary, we may therefore conclude that investors reallocate their investments spa-
tially and temporally to hedge themselves against risky Chinese demand outcomes. How-
ever, under the assumed parameter setup, the amount of investments is not affected. On
the other side, the exertion of Chinese market power in fact leads to lower investments,
as China’s welfare maximising strategy is to withhold foreign imports, thus lowering
seaborne prices and trade market demand and making investments less profitable.
5.5.2 Value of Perfect Information
As described, investors in the stochastic model adapt their investment decisions to risky
demand outcomes. This means that the portfolio of investment decisions generates the
highest returns, given all demand scenarios and their respective realisation probabilities.
However, investment decisions are not optimal with respect to each individual scenario.
The associated costs are commonly referred to as the value of perfect information, or
VPI74, and are calculated by subtracting the payoff of the stochastic model from the
probability weighted sum of payoffs of the deterministic models for each scenario (Birge
and Louveaux, 1997). Table 5.3 shows the VPI as a ratio of deterministic payoffs of the
different models and players.
In the Competitive setup, all players exhibit a positive VPI. Investors have the highest
VPI, making up 17.6% of the payoffs in the deterministic models (see Table 5.3 section
’Comp’, line ’Investors’ right hand column), as they have to decide on investments under
risky demand. The high costs of uncertainty for investors is explained by the range of
Chinese coal demand evolutions and their underlying assumptions; as China continues
to expand its coal mining capacity at the fastest rate possible, any excess demand has
to be covered by imports. However, given the very large market size of China and the
strong correlation between economic growth and energy demand Chinese imports vary
widely, between 123 mtce in the ll scenario node and 519 mtce in the hh scenario node
in the Competitive setup. These variations in imports are very large compared to the
relatively small size of the seaborne trade market, which is composed of the investors
and consumers. In the ll scenario node, Chinese imports make up 15% of total trade
against 46% in the hh scenario node. As investors have to decide on their investments
ex-ante, they hedge against this very large spread of Chinese import demand by delaying
investments and forgoing a part of the payoffs that they would realise in the deterministic
models.
The hedging effect of investors can also be seen in Table 5.3; the VPI for most investors
is strongly negative in scenarios with low demand evolutions (l, ll, ml and hl), meaning
74In the following we will use the terms VPI and costs of uncertainty interchangeably.
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that investors actually have higher payoffs in the stochastic model. However, the VPI
for these investors is also strongly positive in the scenarios with high demand evolutions
(h, lh, mh and hh). If we observe the demand scenarios belonging to each model
stage (’2015’, ’2020’), the effect is partly netted away. Investment costs accrue in the
predecessor scenario node, and investors adapt to risky demand by investing more in
the low scenario nodes than in the deterministic baseline, and vice versa. As the higher
investment costs are not represented in the VPI of nodes where investments are realised,
the VPI in low demand nodes can be negative. Additionally, risk aversion strengthens
this effect; investors maximise risk-adjusted payoff streams, which means they evaluate
payoffs from ’negative’ demand scenarios more highly than from more favourable demand
scenarios.
At first thought, consumers and China should actually have zero costs of uncertainty,
as they face static payoff maximisation problems, which means a lack of intertemporal
decision variables. Nevertheless, consumers and China have a positive VPI making
up 2% and 4% of deterministic payoffs, respectively. The reason for this lies in the
interaction of consumers and China with the investors through imports, which leads to
a spillover of costs of uncertainty from investors to the other players. Investors hedge
their investment portfolio against risky demand in the stochastic model by delaying
investments and changing their spatial allocation. This leads to higher costs of supply
as well as a tighter trade market, which both increase imports costs for consumers and
for China. The VPI is high in the high-demand scenario nodes, because investments in
the stochastic model are lower than in the deterministic ones for high capacity (’s1’ and
’s2’). This means that capacity is scarcer and consumers are paying a higher scarcity
rent for constrained export capacity to investors. Vice versa, the VPI is negative in the
low-demand scenario nodes, because investments in the stochastic model are higher in
this case.
If we now compare the Monopoly setup with the Competitive setup, we can observe that
the distribution of costs of uncertainty among market players change. In the Monopoly
setup, the VPI of investors makes up only 10.2% of payoffs compared to 17.6% in the
Competitive setup. In absolute terms this difference makes up around 10 billion USD2010.
On the other side, the VPI of China is 7.3%, significantly higher in the Monopoly setup
compared to perfect competition. The absolute increase in VPI for China makes up 27
billion USD2010. Total costs of uncertainty for all market players are 14 billion USD2010
or 7 billion USD2010 higher in the Monopoly setup.
The increase of the VPI for China is driven by the risk aversion of investors; in the
stochastic model, investors require a risk premium on the paybacks of their investments.
This means that, in the high-demand scenario nodes, prices have to be higher to generate
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Table 5.3: VPI as a ratio of deterministic payoffs in [%] (a positive number means
the VPI is greater zero).
2015 2020
Countrya: l m h ll lh ml mh hl hh sum
comp JA -2.6 2.9 11.0 1.3 11.2 -1.6 0.7 -0.6 1.2 1.9
KR -2.4 2.7 10.3 1.2 10.5 -1.5 0.7 -0.6 1.1 1.8
TW -2.4 2.7 10.1 1.1 10.3 -1.4 0.7 -0.6 1.1 1.8
OA -2.2 2.5 9.5 1.1 9.8 -1.4 0.6 -0.6 1.0 1.8
IN -2.6 3.0 11.2 1.3 11.5 -1.6 0.7 -0.7 1.3 2.4
EU -3.0 3.4 12.9 1.5 12.0 -1.8 0.9 -1.7 1.4 2.2
U.S. -3.1 3.5 13.0 1.5 12.1 -1.8 0.9 -1.6 1.5 1.0
LA -3.1 3.5 13.1 1.5 12.2 -1.8 0.9 -1.5 1.5 2.3
Consumer -2.6 3.0 11.2 1.3 11.1 -1.6 0.7 -0.9 1.2 2.0
mon JA 0.5 2.2 2.6 3.9 6.6 -2.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 1.0
KR 0.5 2.0 2.5 3.7 6.2 -1.9 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.9
TW 0.5 2.0 2.4 3.6 6.0 -1.8 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.9
OA 0.4 1.9 2.3 3.4 5.7 -1.7 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.9
IN 0.5 2.2 2.7 3.9 6.7 -2.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 1.2
EU 0.6 2.6 3.1 4.3 7.6 -1.7 -1.2 -0.4 -0.3 1.2
U.S. 0.6 2.6 3.1 4.3 7.6 -1.3 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.6
LA 0.6 2.6 3.1 4.3 7.7 -1.4 -1.2 -0.5 -0.3 1.3
Consumer 0.5 2.2 2.7 3.9 6.7 -1.9 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 1.1
comp IR -106.3 75.8 28.0 -16.9 49.8 2.1 61.8 -9.1 61.7 17.9
AU -102.1 73.5 6.6 -19.9 36.7 0.9 61.8 -9.5 61.6 18.3
VN -74.2 74.5 18.1 -19.3 43.7 30.0 62.0 20.8 61.9 18.1
RU -18.4 69.8 -8.7 -56.2 -8.9 -19.9 62.1 -10.4 61.2 18.9
SA -86.2 72.9 45.4 -21.6 58.8 -3.0 61.8 -8.9 61.7 18.3
CO -72.6 74.3 16.2 -19.9 44.0 -2.8 61.8 -4.7 61.8 14.3
U.S. -26.6 70.3 -54.7 -46.5 -20.1 -10.7 59.6 -15.3 65.1 16.3
PL -85.8 75.0 51.5 -29.4 53.2 -4.8 60.3 -5.3 60.8 20.9
VE -66.0 73.6 11.9 -24.0 37.0 13.5 61.6 36.5 61.6 20.0
Investors -88.3 74.4 20.0 -20.1 43.5 1.0 61.8 -6.5 61.8 17.6
mon IR -115.6 77.1 37.9 -23.6 59.0 -0.7 65.3 -9.3 63.2 10.7
AU -98.7 77.8 41.0 -47.4 44.2 6.0 65.6 -8.9 63.3 12.3
VN -98.6 74.9 30.9 -36.9 49.5 0.0 64.7 -9.5 63.2 9.4
RU -112.0 72.0 19.9 -155.7 23.9 -2.3 65.0 -9.2 63.2 6.7
SA -103.0 78.0 30.2 -43.0 49.0 -28.6 54.7 -17.8 61.4 6.1
CO -98.8 74.8 30.6 -36.3 49.2 -4.3 64.7 -9.6 63.2 9.6
U.S. -108.9 72.8 25.7 -129.2 -2.6 24.6 65.0 -8.2 63.4 16.0
PL -116.7 80.0 21.2 -65.7 43.4 -16.7 60.2 -21.2 62.0 5.4
VE -100.2 74.1 28.5 -50.9 42.4 -1.1 65.5 -8.8 63.3 9.1
Investors -105.8 76.2 34.5 -38.9 50.0 -1.7 64.3 -10.0 63.0 10.2
comp PRC -4.4 5.7 9.3 -1.0 12.3 -1.6 9.2 -1.2 13.2 3.6
mon PRC -13.3 19.4 16.2 -1.5 19.2 -3.2 19.6 -3.6 26.3 7.3
aCountry abbreviations: JA - Japan, KR - South Korea, TW - Taiwan, OA - Other Asia, IN - India,
EU - Europe, U.S. - United States, LA - Latin America. Scenario abbreviations: comp - Competitive
setup, mon - Monopoly setup.
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investments compared to the deterministic model. In other words, investment costs are
basically higher. China reduces trade market prices through exertion of market power
in the deterministic and the stochastic cases by withholding coal imports. However, a
similar reduction of prices in the stochastic model and the deterministic model will lead
to a stronger reduction of investments in the stochastic case. This effect can be also
seen in the investment figures in Table 5.2; in scenario node ’s’ investments between the
Competitive setup and the Monopoly setup change by -43% in the deterministic model
and by -57% in the stochastic model. Lower investments in the stochastic model may
lead to lower payoff for China, which is shown by the VPI.
To conclude, losses of investors due to uncertain Chinese demand are significant. In-
vestors adapt to risky Chinese demand evolutions through different investment plans.
This adaption process comes at a price; investors’ rents are around 18% lower than in
the deterministic baseline. Total costs of uncertainty slightly increase if we account for
Chinese market market power. Interestingly though, it seems that monopsonistic be-
haviour causes that costs of uncertainty are transferred from the investors’ side to China.
The exertion of market power reduces investor’s profitability, and therefore investments,
significantly more in the stochastic model due to the increase of costs of capital for
investments compared to the deterministic case. Overall reduced investment activity
raises prices and thus also affects consumer rents in China.
5.6 Conclusions
The optimal timing and sizing of investments given uncertain future market evolutions is
an important challenge for capital-intensive industries. This decision problem gets even
more complex if we account for demand-side market power. We empirically investigated
these questions for investors in the global steam coal market. In this market, investors
currently face high uncertainty with respect to future evolution of Chinese import de-
mand. Additionally, China has realigned its resource strategy in recent years and keeps
coal imports and exports under tight control through quotas and taxes.
In the scope of this paper, we develop a multi-stage stochastic equilibrium model which
allows us to model uncertain Chinese demand in extensive form and where all players
maximise their individual payoff functions either subject to a price-taking strategy or
a setting in which a single player behaves as a monopolist/monoposonist and the other
players act as competitive fringe. The model accounts for risk aversion in the CAPM
sense by implementing the concept of stochastic discount factors. We use an established
large coal market database and empirically test for four hypotheses regarding the change
of investment plans and changes of the VPI. We find that accounting for uncertainty
will make investors hedge their investment decisions by delaying investments and by
spatially reallocating them. This results in costs of uncertainty for investors of 18% in
relation to their deterministic payoffs. If we enable China to exert market power, trade
market prices will be lower, thus leading to lower investments into export capacity.
Chinese market power also increases the total costs of uncertainty and its allocation
among players. In such a setup, costs of uncertainty are higher for China as withholding
consumption leads to a comparatively stronger reduction of investments due to risk-
averse investment behaviour of investors.
The results show that delaying of additional capacity investments even if faced with
probably rapidly rising coal demand is a consistent strategy for coal exporting nations
in an economic sense. Such delays are hard to identify in the real world but might
already be observable in recent investment figures (ABARES, 2011). Uncertain Chinese
coal import demand increases the capital costs for coal mining investments significantly,
which may lead to lower investment activity and bottlenecks in the export supply chain.
Exporters accrue scarcity rents in the short run in this case, which may help to explain
the high margins in the coal mining business in recent years (IEA, 2011c).
For China it would actually be beneficial to try to reduce uncertainty in the market as
it will also be affected by the related costs. This is especially true if it chooses to make
use of its demand-side market power potential. While this may seem difficult even for
Chinese government executives, more transparency in general on Chinese micro- and
macroeconomics might help market players to better foresee Chinese coal demand. This
is especially true for data availability of Chinese domestic coal consumption and supply.
Further research could focus on two-sided market power where investors also follow
non-competitive strategies, or on testing other concepts of risk aversion.
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Appendix A
Detailed results for chapter 2
Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium conditions are derived by the first-order derivatives of the Lagrangian L
(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions). For the WCM these conditions are then defined by
the equations (2.3) to (2.8) found in section 4.3 and the following additional equilibrium
conditions (A.1) to (A.5) .
The Lagrangian multipliers µm,t and µp,t are the shadow prices at mine node m and
port node p in period t and represent the costs of an additional unit of steam coal at
that node. In equilibrium, the difference between µm,t and µp,t are the transport costs
for transporting one unit of coal between both nodes (if the transport route exists).
Equation (A.1) defines the equilibrium condition for inland transport:
µm,t + dt · cTa(m,p),t − µp,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Ta(m,p),t ≥ 0 ∀m, p, t. (A.1)
The shadow prices µp,t and µi,t differ in equilibrium by bulk carrier transport rates
cTa(m,p),t, by port turnover costs c
P
p,t and also by the Lagrangian multiplier φp,t. φp,t
represents the value of one additional unit of port turnover capacity at port p. φp,t can
be interpreted as scarcity rent of constrained port capacity. Equation (A.2) gives the
equilibrium condition for sea transport between port node p and import node i:
µp,t + dt · cTa(p,i),t + dt · cPp,t + φp,t − µi,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Ta(p,i),t ≥ 0 ∀p, i, t. (A.2)
The Lagrangian multiplier λm,t gives the value of one additional unit of production
capacity. It is non-zero in the case that the capacity restriction (2.3) has no slack; e.g.,
when production is at the capacity limits. The shadow price µm,t is defined by the
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marginal production costs function cm,t (the first-order derivative of the production cost
function Cm,t) plus λm,t which can be interpreted as the scarcity rent at mine m in period
t if the mine is at maximum production. The equilibrium condition for production at
mine nodes is defined by the following equation:
dt · cm,t(Sm,t) + λm,t − µm,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Sm,t ≥ 0 ∀m, t. (A.3)
In equilibrium, for the case that IMm,t > 0, the sum of shadows prices for capacity over the
remaining model horizon
∑T
tˆ=t λmtˆ+m,t has to be equal to investment cost dt ·cI,Mm,t . The
shadow price of the maximum mine investment constraint described in equation (2.8) is
m,t. This equilibrium condition ensures that investment costs are always amortised and
allows us to interpret µm,t as the long-run marginal costs of mine production including
costs for capacity expansions. The same holds for the investment equilibrium conditions
for ports (A.5). The equilibrium condition for ports does not include a Lagrangian
multiplier for maximum investments, as maximum port investments are not constrained.
Equations (A.4) and (A.5) define the equilibrium conditions for mine and port capacity
investments:
dt · cI,Mm,t + m,t −
T∑
tˆ=t
λmtˆ ≥ 0 ⊥ IMm,t ≥ 0 ∀m, t, (A.4)
and
dt · cI,Pp,t −
T∑
tˆ=t
φptˆ ≥ 0 ⊥ IPp,t ≥ 0 ∀p, t. (A.5)
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Appendix B
Detailed results for chapter 3
Table B.1: Comparison of acutal and simulated trade flows in mt (energy adjusted) for eta=
-0.5.
SA RU VE VN IR CO PRC U.S. AU PL NW
Actual trade flows 2008
Europe 44 64 3 1 14 32 2 15 2 3 3
North America 1 2 2 31 1
Latin America 2 1 1 1 8 1 1
China 1 19 25 1
Taiwan 1 29 11 19
Japan 1 11 2 27 11 67
Korea 1 9 1 26 16 19
India 12 22 1 1
South East Asia 2 26 2 1 5
Total 64 87 6 23 172 73 42 16 116 3 3
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2008 (eta = -0.5)
Europe 21 69 32 25 1 28 5 4
North America 3 5 7 6 9 7
Latin America 2 4 3 3 3
China 5 5 13 4 5 11
Taiwan 7 14 15 6 7 13
Japan 13 7 27 13 14 22 25
Korea 9 11 18 8 10 16
India 6 10 5 4 9
South East Asia 5 3 11 4 4 9
Total 72 88 9 22 135 74 45 31 121 5 4
Actual Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 606 606
Source: IEA (2011a), own calculations.
121

Appendix C
Detailed results for chapter 4
Proof of proposition in section 4.2.2: We consider a setup with a national player
A which controls two firms that can produce a single commodity x: F1 (exporter)
and F2 (domestic supplier). Furthermore, there exists a domestic market D and an
export market E where x can be sold to (price-taking) customers. Let x1,D, x1,E and
x1 = x1,D + x1,E be the supply of F1 to the domestic market, the supply of F1 to the
export market and its total supply, respectively. The same holds for F2. C1 and C2 are
the respective convex cost functions of F1 and F2 with c1(x1) =
∂C1(x1)
∂x1
> 0 ∀x1 and
c2(x2) =
∂C2(x2)
∂x2
> 0 ∀x2. The maximum production capacity of F1 is limited to K.
We assume that the exporter faces a cost disadvantage if supplying the domestic market
and that the domestic supplier faces a cost disadvantage if supplying the export market.
This cost disadvantage of both firms is represented by constant cost terms t1,D > 0 ∀x1,D
and $ = t2,E > 0 ∀x2,E for F1 and F2, respectively. The cost terms are defined such that
c1(x1) + t1,D > c2(x2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0,K] and c2(x2) + t2,E > c1(x1) ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0,K] hold.
Let further U and V be the volume supplied to the export and the domestic market,
with U = x1,E + x2,E and V = x1,D + x2,D. The inverse demand functions in both
markets are decreasing in volumes.
We consider that A maximises welfare in the domestic market D plus his producer rent
from sales to the export market E less costs. His payoff function WA is:
WA =
∫ V
0
pD(V )dV + pE(U)U − c1(x1)− c2(x2)− T (x1, x2.
In the following, we will compare a setup in which A controls F1 and F2 and has access to
export and domestic markets (export&domestic setup) with a setup that only accounts
for the export market and A only controlling F1 (export-only setup). We will show that
x2,E can actually be greater zero rendering the export-only setup inconsistent.
123
Let µ be the capacity scarcity mark-up (dual variable) associated with the production
constraint K for F1. In case of a binding export capacity constraint K the equilibrium
condition for firm A to supply the export market in the export-only setup is:
pE(K) = −∂pE(U)
∂U
K + c1(K) + µ
∗′ if x∗
′
1,E = K, x
∗′
2,E = 0. (C.1)
which simply means that marginal revenue equal marginal costs plus the scarcity rent.
Equilibrium conditions for A in the export&domestic setup are:
pE(K + x
∗
2,E) = −
∂pE(U)
∂U
(K + x∗2,E) + c1(K) + µ
∗ and (C.2)
pE(K + x
∗
2,E) = −
∂pE(U)
∂U
(K + x∗2,E) + c2(x
∗
2) + t2,E if x
∗
1,E = K. x
∗
2,E > 0.(C.3)
From (C.2) and (C.3) we can see that
x2,E =
{
> 0, if µ∗ = c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)
= 0, if µ∗ < c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)
(C.4)
in the export&domestic setup.
Capacity scarcity is a function of the difference in export supply costs between both
firms. In the case of x2,E > 0, F2 covers the residual export market demand after
F1’s maximum export market supply has been deducted (see Figure C.1). F2 will start
supplying the export market as soon as its marginal export revenue equals marginal
costs. In this case, the resulting price bias is:
pE(U
∗′)− pE(U∗) = µ∗′ −
(
c2(x
∗
2) + t2,E − c1(K)−
∂pE(U)
∂U
x∗2,E
)
, (C.5)
which is always greater than zero in the case of a decreasing demand function as total
export market supply U∗ = K+x2,E in the export&domestic setup is greater than export
supply in the export-only setup U∗′ = K.
The same inconsistency occurs if A acts in a competitive manner in the export market.
However, the price bias is even higher: A would not account for the export price reduc-
tion inferred by delivering additional supply to the export market if it acts as a price
taker. Thus, marginal revenue from supplying the export market equals export price
leading to an even higher redirection of domestic supply. In this case, domestic supply
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Figure C.1: Export market equilibrium for the export-only setup (left) vs. export &
domestic setup (right).
to the export market acts as a backstop for export market prices in the case that we also
consider the domestic market. The price bias in a competitive setup would therefore be:
pE(U
∗′)− pE(U∗) = µ∗′ − (c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)) . (C.6)
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Table C.1: Actual and modelled steam coal trade market flows in mt in 2008.
Japan Korea (S.) Taiwan U.S. China Europe India Other
Actual trade volumes in mt
Indonesia 24.4 23.2 23.7 2.1 22.2 19.1 19.0 23.8
Colombia 27.8 35.9 9.5
Australia 74.1 20.5 20.6 0.1 1.7 2.8 0.8 6.2
South Africa 0.1 1.0 0.8 48.2 7.9 3.7
Russia 8.9 6.4 0.9 0.5 68.4 0.6
U.S. 0.3 0.3 0.2 13.5 0.1 4.0
China 11.8 16.7 11.2 0.1 1.7 0.8 1.6
Other 2.0 0.9 2.5 16.8 11.0 7.5
Trade shares for China - Indonesia duopoly without export quota
Indonesia 16.1 15.9 19.9 38.7 21.5 25.0 23.2
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 79.3 27.5 23.7
South Africa 6.4 42.0 14.1
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 21.6 10.4 6.5
China 12.6 8.9 6.4 7.3 5.2 2.9
Other 4.1 15.1 15.3
Trade shares for Indonesia monopoly with export quota
Indonesia 15.3 15.9 19.9 55.4 19.8 22.9 22.6
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 93.9 36.6
South Africa 39.0 22.2 1.3
Russia 12.0 11.4 69.3
U.S. 8.7 22.9 6.9
China 48.6
Other 4.1 15.1 14.9
Trade shares for perfect competition with export quota
Indonesia 36.7 32.2 64.7 29.3 26.0
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 77.0 53.5
South Africa 8.1 54.4
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 28.7 9.8
China 48.6
Other 19.2 12.1
Trade shares for perfect competition without export quota
Indonesia 0.5 15.9 65.4 79.9 27.2
Colombia 34.3 31.5
Australia 58.7 71.8
South Africa 2.7 59.9
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 27.3 11.2
China 55.9 66.1
Other 19.2 12.1
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Appendix D
Assumptions for chapter 5
Table D.1: Scenario tree data and stochastic discount factors.
Year 2009 2015 2020
scenario node l m h ll lh ml mh hl hh
GDP bn $ (2009 PPP) 9449 14602 16019 16287 18636 20480 21436 23536 21796 23932
Intensity (gce/$ PPP) 343 288 288 309 245 245 245 245 262 262
TPED (mtce) 3241 4208 4616 5028 4564 5016 5250 5765 5720 6280
fossil (mtce) 2986 3745 4154 4566 3880 4331 4567 5081 5036 5597
coal (mtce) 2175 2651 3062 3474 2671 3123 3358 3872 3827 4388
non-fossil (mtce) 255 462 462 462 684 684 684 684 684 684
market returns 1.00 0.80 1.25 1.50 0.90 1.30 0.90 1.30 0.90 1.30
Stoch. discount factor 1.00 1.84 0.86 0.31 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
Table D.2: Supply assumptions.
a b Cap cInv mine life g h Capmax
Shanxi 61.11 0.28 117 189 20 0.05 -0.001 180
Shaanxi 56.45 0.27 106 203 20 0.05 -0.0009 240
Quinhuangdao 82.73 0.09 354 163 20 0.05 -0.0001 650
Other 70.00 0.59 36 224 20 0.05 -0.003 150
Shandong 82.73 0.16 118 178 20 0.05 -0.0005 150
IR 35.71 0.18 203 129 15 0.07 -0.0003 320
QLD 66.67 0.56 50 240 20 0.05 -0.0025 100
NSW 55.56 0.19 86 172 20 0.05 -0.0005 150
VN 40.83 0.45 26 128 20 0.05 0 35
RU east 83.33 0.58 29 172 20 0.05 -0.006 70
RU west 78.36 0.42 62 204 20 0.05 -0.002 90
SA 40.83 0.67 61 222 20 0.05 -0.005 90
CO 27.78 0.50 67 150 20 0.05 -0.004 95
APP1 72.22 0.99 23 200 20 0.05 -0.009 55
APP2 94.44 1.23 23 244 20 0.05 -0.015 70
PL 81.67 2.72 4 210 20 0.05 0 15
VE 50.00 1.00 10 110 20 0.05 -0.01 20
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